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ABSTRACT

This Article posits that the British Constitution is changing
by incorporating written principles that restrain Parliament
through judicial review.
The Author asserts that this
constitutional model has basis in the common law and the
orthodox theories of Blackstone and Dicey. In addition, the
ultra vires doctrine supports the model and provides a basis for
judicial review of Parliament.
As constitutions may
accommodate written and unwritten elements of law, as well as
various means of enforcement and change, the Author posits
that constitutions are defined by how strongly they reflect
underlying legal norms. With a shift in the rule of recognition
endorsing judicial review, this expressive function of
constitutions democratically legitimizes constitutional texts as
positivist expressions of popular will that bind Parliament.
Therefore, courts may constitutionalize statutes or treaties
coming over time to represent shifting norms through commonlaw adjudication. Furthermore,the Author illustrates that such
a "quasi-written,"common-law constitution is already emerging
in the United Kingdom by examining cases based upon the
Human Rights Act and the European Communities Act.

Attorney at Law (W. Va., Ohio); M.A. (Hist.); M.A. (Pol. Sci); LL.M.; D.C.L.
Candidate, McGill University Institute of Comparative Law. This Article was originally
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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the British Constitution has undergone
remarkable changes due to further integration into the European

20031
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Union, the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, and devolution.1
These developments have affected the constitutional order of the
United Kingdom by demanding that Parliament conform to
substantive limitations on its exercise of legislative authority. For
example, the Human Rights Act protects certain fundamental
individual rights from government infringement by implementing the
2
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law.
European integration and devolution also create other sources of law
in the United Kingdom, thus potentially threatening the unitary
state. While this constitutional reform has occurred through treaty
or domestic legislation, which theoretically remain subordinate to
Parliament, the written instruments mentioned above have special
status and significance in the British Constitution. Those documents
reflect changing notions about the proper extent of parliamentary
authority and the institutional role of the judiciary in enforcing
accepted norms. The written instruments, along with unwritten
principles, are developing into a "quasi-written" constitution that
restrains Parliament and is enforceable by the judiciary.
Constitutional change is not a break from British legal tradition, but
instead represents a transition to an alternative, albeit previously
rejected, path of constitutional development. The incorporation of
written texts into this framework is compatible with the alternative
constitutional model and can take place through a gradual process of
common-law adjudication.
This Article suggests that the shift from a completely unwritten
to a partially written constitution occurs on two levels. Part II argues
that orthodox constitutional theory, as articulated by Blackstone and
Dicey, already has embedded within it strains of thought conducive to
the idea of a limited Parliament with a judiciary capable of exercising
review over primary legislation. Blackstone and Dicey, therefore,
emphasized positive law and political processes, rather than judicial
process, without completely undermining counterarguments that
support a limited Parliament. 3 These alternative arguments have a

1.

See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J.

(C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]. The Treaty of Rome created the
European Economic Community in 1957 and has since been amended several times.
The United Kingdom was not a founding member, but joined later and through the
European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (Eng.), gave Community law domestic effect.
See 0. HOOD PHILLIPS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 110-11 (8th
ed. 2001); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). The devolution of law-making
authority to regional assemblies within the United Kingdom results from the Scotland
Act, 1998, c. 46 (Eng.), the Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.), and the
Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38 (Eng.) [hereinafter Wales Act].
2.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
3.
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND;
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed.

1965).

866

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:863

long history in the common-law tradition. Blackstone's natural-law
theory contains ideas found in other places such as the judicial
opinions of Edward Coke. 4 Blackstone's theory accordingly offers a
solid foundation upon which to assert a common-law power of judicial
review to ensure that Parliament does not legislate contrary to higher
legal principles. Dicey, in justifying parliamentary power by virtue of
its moral accountability to the electorate, replaces the concept of
natural law with democratic principles. 5
As Dicey justifies
parliamentary supremacy on this account, he too invites
counterarguments for legal restraints upon legislative actions that
are contrary to democratic norms. Ironically, Blackstone and Dicey's
orthodox theories offer a starting point for shifting to an alternative
common law constitutional arrangement: parliamentary authority
may be restrained by fundamental, democratically-based principles
enforceable in some effective manner by judicial review.
Independent, common-law review power already exists in the ultra
vires doctrine, which allows courts to restrain executive action. This
doctrine illustrates how courts can limit government action based
upon common-law principles, and suggests that they may soon claim
to exercise such review power against Parliament itself.
Part III illustrates how the common-law constitution can
incorporate written principles. It explains that constitutions may be
either paradigmatic or definitive. In particular, the former provides a
legally unenforceable model for governance, while the latter imposes
strict rules subject to judicial review and beyond which the
government cannot act. A constitution can also be flexible or rigid in
form.
The flexible constitution requires no special amending
procedures, while a rigid constitution establishes significant
procedural obstacles to its alteration.
Those concepts are not
exclusive,
however,
and constitutions
may exhibit mixed
characteristics existing upon a sliding scale.
A constitution's
existence depends upon its normative force in the system rather than
its means of judicial enforceability or mode of change. Furthermore,
texts can express some fundamental principles in writing, leading to
a mix of written and unwritten norms. These written norms have a
positivist aspect as reflecting the will of the popular sovereign.
Moreover, in a democratic system, this popular will has supreme
authority over the subordinate legislature.
The judiciary can also exercise dual sovereignty with Parliament
in representing the electorate. Written constitutional texts are just a
manner of expressing the popular will, and judicial review exists as a

4.
EDWARD COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE
36, quoted in
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION 41 (9th ed. 1939).
5.
See generally DICEY, supra note 3.

A.V.

DICEY,
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democratically endorsed means to enforce it against government
encroachment. The democratic role of the judiciary also means that
courts can assess the normative value of certain documents within
the community. As certain statutes or treaties increasingly represent
foundational assumptions about good governance, courts can
constitutionalize them as legally enforceable limitations upon
Courts can do this through a gradual process of
Parliament.
common-law adjudication sensitive to Parliament's legislative
functions and broader political assumptions within the community.
That process can result in varying degrees of entrenchment and
judicial enforceability. Constitutional change is already occurring in
the United Kingdom, as illustrated by judicial treatment of the
Human Rights Act and the European Communities Act. That kind of
change represents a transition to an alternative common-law, "quasiwritten" constitution that effectively limits Parliament's exercise of, if
not formal claim to, sovereignty.

II. THE COMMON-LAW FOUNDATIONS OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Blackstone and Dicey: Theories of ParliamentarySovereignty
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, as A. V. Dicey wrote,
is the "very keystone" of the British Constitution. 6 Parliament itself
is unable to bind or restrict its own future actions, courts cannot
question or refuse to give effect to its enactments, and all other lawmaking bodies in the United Kingdom are subordinate to it. 7 While
Parliament remains supreme in theory up to the present time, there
exists an alternative conception of the unwritten, common-law
constitution that is a basis for reform and a foundation for a new
constitutional settlement in the United Kingdom. Arguments for
such a constitution have historical precedent, support contemporary
ultra vires judicial review, and are embedded within the orthodox
theory of parliamentary sovereignty itself. George Winterton states,
"[n]owhere is the development of this doctrine [of parliamentary
sovereignty] demonstrated more clearly than in the writings of
Blackstone and Dicey." An initial examination and comparison of
Blackstone and Dicey's ideas, however, show that they can support
counterarguments promoting judicial review and limited legislative

6.
DICEY, supranote 3, at 70.
STANLEY DE SMITH &
7.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 67 (8th ed. 1998).

8.

RODNEY

BRAZIER,

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

George Winterton, The British Grundnorm: ParliamentarySupremacy Re-

examined, 92 LAw Q. REV. 591, 597 (1976).
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authority based upon natural law or democratic conceptions of the
public good.
William Blackstone, like Dicey later, recognized the supreme
legislative power of Parliament. He described Parliament's authority
in the following way:
[Parliament's authority is] so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot
be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.... It can,
in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore
some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the
omnipotence of parliament. 9

An act of Parliament was thus the supreme law of the land, binding
throughout the realm, and alterable only by another act of
Parliament.' 0
Such extensive legislative power rested upon two
important foundations that underlay Blackstone's constitutional
model. First, Blackstone's justification for parliamentary sovereignty
depended upon a constitution properly balanced through its
representation of competing political and social forces." Second, he
acknowledged natural law, along with its close connection to the
common law, as a moral limitation upon Parliament's authority. 12 In
his support of parliamentary power, Dicey would go beyond the
balanced constitution in favor of one answerable to the electorate,
while substituting the idea of democratic public good for natural law
13
as a moral restriction upon legislative power.
Blackstone defined Parliament as an assembly composed of the
Commons, the Lords temporal and spiritual, and the Crown. 14 Only
these three forces acting together comprised the sovereign
Parliament, and were able to make law supreme throughout the
realm. 15 The Crown, Lords, and Commons balanced each other; their
competing interests created political tensions within Parliament to
effectively restrain its exercise of limitless authority. 16 As under
classic Blackstonian theory, Dicey also defined Parliament as the
Crown, House of Commons, and House of Lords assembled. 17 The
Crown in Parliament possessed absolute and unlimited legislative
power, having the "right to make or unmake any law whatever."1 8
According to Dicey, the concept of Parliament's sovereignty was the

9.
supra note
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Blackstone cited Edward Coke for this proposition.
3, at *156, *158.
Id. at *178-79.
Id. at *156-79.
See id. at *156.
See generally DICEY, supra note 3.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *155.
Id.
Id. at *50-51, *154-55, *159-60.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 39.
Id.

See 1 BLACKSTONE,
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"one fundamental dogma of English constitutional law." 19 As Dicey is
regarded as formulating the modern theory underlying parliamentary
sovereignty, it is his ideas that will be first examined.
In characterizing the nature of Parliament's sovereignty, Dicey
drew a clear distinction between legal and political sovereignty. He
asserted that Parliament was the ultimate legal sovereign possessing
boundless legislative authority. 20 The electorate, along with the
Lords and Crown, possessed political sovereignty while Parliament
remained legally supreme. This distinct political sovereignty did not
restrict the Parliament's authority to make law. Dicey explained the
difference between his two concepts of sovereignty in the following
statement:
[T]he sovereign power under the English constitution is clearly
"Parliament." But the word "sovereignty" is sometimes employed in a
political rather than in a strictly legal sense. That body is "politically"
sovereign or supreme in a state the will of which is ultimately obeyed
by the citizens of the state. In this sense of the word the electors of
Great Britain may be said to be, together with the Crown and the
Lords, or perhaps, in strict accuracy, independently of the King and the
21
Peers, the body in which sovereign power is vested.

The electors of Parliament were politically-sovereign.
Their
existence, however, did not affect the ability of the legally sovereign
Parliament to act.
In distinguishing between political and legal sovereignty, Dicey
criticized John Austin's description of sovereignty in the United
Kingdom. First, Dicey complained that Austin confused the concepts
of political and legal sovereignty. 22 Austin characterized sovereign
power as existing in the Crown, House of Lords, and the Commons in
23
the form of the electorate, rather than the House of Commons itself.
Dicey asserted that this view was inconsistent with lawyers' general
understanding about parliamentary sovereignty because the
electorate was clearly a separate institution from the House of
Commons. 24 It further conflicted with Austin's own conception of the
25
sovereign as the supreme law-making authority.
Dicey clarified that the supreme law-making authority in
England resided in Parliament, which was distinct from the
electorate itself.26 Contrary to Austin's claim, Parliament was not "in

19.
Id. at 145.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 73.
22.
Id. at 70-76.
23.
Id. at 71.
24.
Id. at 73.
25.
Id. at 71-73; Carol Harlow, Power from the People? Representation and
Constitutional Theory, in LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 62, 71-72 (Patrick
McAuslan & John F. McEldowney eds., 1985).
26.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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any legal sense a 'trustee' for the electors. '27 In other words, the
electorate had no share in the sovereign power to make law. 28 Dicey
believed that Austin overlooked this critical separation of legal and
political sovereignty. To illustrate that distinction, Dicey referred to
the Septennial Act of 1715, which extended Parliament's life from
three to seven years. 29 According to Dicey, the Act is important
because it demonstrated that Parliament's legislative authority exists
wholly independent from its legitimacy as a representative of the
politically-sovereign electorate.3 0 The parliamentary members in
1716 were elected under the Triennial Act of 1694, which limited the
duration of Parliament to three years. 3 1 With the passing of the
Septennial Act, however, Parliament extended itself beyond the
period of time for which the electorate had chosen.3 2 By ceasing to be
representative of the electorate, Parliament owed its existence to its
own exercise of legal power rather than to the choice of its electors.
Such an exercise of parliamentary power, though remaining legally
valid, infringed upon English principles regarding a representative
legislature. 33 The Septennial Act, therefore, demonstrated that "in a
legal point of view Parliament is neither the agent of the electors nor
'34
in any sense a trustee for its constituents.
Dicey's distinction between legal and political sovereignty had
two important implications. First, it suggested that the interests
between the legal and political sovereigns did not necessarily
coincide.35
Although the legal and political sovereigns were
"intimately connected together," Dicey made it clear that they were
nonetheless separate. 36 The legislature was not a "trustee" for the
electors. As the legal sovereign, Parliament could act as it wished,
and became subject only to the electors' powers to express their will
37
through elections, or by altering the constitution in some way.
Second, Dicey recognized democratic foundations for the British
38
Constitution and the moral legitimacy behind parliamentary action.
Although Parliament was not a trustee for the electorate, it

27.
28.
29.
the theory

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 75. "[T]here is no single statute which is more significant either as to
or as to the practical working of the constitution than the Septennial Act."

Id. at 44.

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
result and
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 75-76.
Triennial Act, 1694, 6 & 7 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).
DICEY, supra note 3, at 46-47.

Id.
Id.
the
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 44-48.
at 47-48. Dicey further wrote that "the Septennial Act is at once the
standing proof of such Parliamentary sovereignty." Id. at 48.
at 74-76.
at 76.
at 75-76.
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nevertheless could be expected to act upon the will of the political
sovereign. Despite the legal omnipotence of Parliament, the will of
the electorate existed independently as a possible standard by which
to assess legislative acts. 39 This democratic element complimented
the notion that the interests of the electorate and Parliament were
potentially different. The will of the electorate acted as a moral
obligation and check upon the all-powerful legislature even though it
40
lacked any legal effect.
The distinction between political and legal sovereignty, while
recognizing the legal primacy of parliamentary acts over electoral
will, offers a converse position favoring the Constitution's democratic
foundations.
Although Parliament remains legally supreme, it
derives its moral legitimacy from democratic principles. 41 It was
precisely for this reason that the Septennial Act was distasteful,
despite its legality; it offended the notion that Parliament was to be
42
chosen by, and representative of, the politically sovereign electorate.
The Parliament's electoral accountability, although not legally
mandated, remains a central principle of the modern British
Constitution.4 3 Parliament should reflect the will of the electorate
even if not obligated to do so in law. Dicey explained,
For, as things now stand, the will of the electorate, and certainly of the
electorate in combination with the Lords and the Crown, is sure
ultimately to prevail on all subjects to be determined by the British
government. The matter may indeed be carried a little further, and we
may assert that the arrangements of the constitution are now such as
to ensure that the will of the electors shall by regular and
constitutional means always in the end assert itself as the predominant
influence in the country. But this is a political, not a legal fact. 4 4

Parliament then, though in law not a trustee of the electorate, still
remains politically and morally accountable to it.
With regard to the political sovereign itself, Dicey's focus upon
the electorate reflected the democratic norms that had become
increasingly important in U.K. political life. In theory, the political
sovereign was composed of the Crown, the Lords, and the electorate.
The electorate, however, was by far the pre-eminent force.
Dicey was building upon England's past political theory, which
maintained a balance of social forces and past practice, where the
electorate had increased its political influence. Dicey stated,

39.
Id. at 75-81.
40.
Harlow, supra note 25, at 73-74.
41.
Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective:
Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2001)
[hereinafter Comparative Perspective].
42.

DICEY, supra note 3, at 46.

43.
44.

Comparative Perspective,supra note 41, at 14.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 73.
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[11n a political sense the electors are the most important part of, we
may even say are actually, the sovereign power, since their will is
under the present constitution sure to obtain ultimate obedience....
The electors are a part of and the predominant part of the politically
45
sovereign power.

Throughout the 19th century, not only did the House of Commons
dominate the constitutional arrangement and eliminate the practical
working of a balanced constitution, but government reforms also
dramatically expanded suffrage. 46 By Dicey's time at the turn of the
century, ministerial responsibility and effective ministerial exercise
of prerogative powers also seriously eroded the balanced Parliament
of Blackstone's conception. Parliament deferred to the government,
merely acting as an approving body for government policy and as a
forum for the opposition's dissent. 4 7 Ministers' exercise of their
formidable executive powers in the name of the Crown further
48
centralized authority in the hands of the government.
The Constitution, as Dicey knew it in practice, was not so
carefully balanced as Blackstone imagined it to be.49 Thus, while
Blackstone could trust Parliament with supreme legislative power
due to built-in political tensions, Dicey could not.
Instead, he
articulated his distinction between political and legal sovereignty,
emphasizing the ascendancy of the electorate within the political
sovereign. 50
Therefore, Dicey gave democratic legitimacy to the
omnipotent Parliament. Dicey simultaneously recognized the legal
supremacy of Parliament while ascribing ultimate influence and
control over it to the politically sovereign electorate. 5 1
This
connection between the otherwise distinct sovereign powers justified
Parliament's limitless legislative authority. The electorate's supreme
political authority translated into supreme legal authority exercised

45.

Id. at 75-76.

46.

ComparativePerspective,supra note 41, at 12.

47.
DICEY, supranote 3, at clviii-clxiii.
48.
Id.
49.
In contemporary times, with the virtual extinction of personal Crown
discretion and the complete subordination of the House of Lords to the Commons, the
idea of the balanced constitution can no longer be said to hold at all. Blackstone wrote
of such a possible situation that "if ever it should happen that the independence of any
one of the three [Crown, Lords, and Commons] should be lost, or that it should become
subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our
constitution." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *51-52. See also J.A.G. Griffith, The
Common Law and the Political Constitution, 117 LAW Q. REV. 42, 52 (2001). Griffith
writes, "[iut is not and never has been the function of Parliament to govern. The
principal role of the Government majority in the House of Commons is to sustain
ministers in office."
Id.
See also Eric Barendt, Separation of Powers and
ConstitutionalGovernment, 1995 PUB. L. 599, 614.
50.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 74-76.
51.
Id. at 75-76.
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by its chosen representatives in Parliament.
Hence, to trust
Parliament was to trust the people.
Blackstone did not rely solely upon electoral accountability in
controlling parliamentary supremacy even though he recognized its
role.5 2 Blackstone complimented the British Constitution on its
mixed nature of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, while briefly
pointing to elections as a political check on Parliament. 53 By Dicey's
time, the Commons' ascendancy within the legal and political
sovereigns meant that such balance no longer existed. Rather,
democratic accountability to the electorate circumscribed the exercise
of otherwise unlimited parliamentary power and normatively
justified it.54 By according such accountability a place in formal
constitutional theory, Dicey suggested that the electorate was
55
morally, even if not legally, supreme to Parliament.
While Blackstone and Dicey presented different justifications for
parliamentary supremacy, they relied upon political-as opposed to
legal--checks upon legislative action. 56 As previously explained,
Blackstone's balanced constitution accomplished this through
powerful institutional checks that were absent from Dicey's modern
constitutional model.
Blackstone could support Parliament's
legislative supremacy because Parliament's mixed and balanced
nature created internal political tensions that prevented it from
acting tyrannically. 5 7
Related to his idea that Parliament is
accountable to the electorate, Dicey recognized another distinction
between external and internal checks upon the exercise of legislative
and executive powers.5 8 Those were the only actual limitations upon
Parliament that Dicey admitted, and he characterized them in terms
of political, not legal, efficacy. 59 The strictly political nature of such
checks was a corollary to the concept of omnipotent sovereignty in
Parliament. Legal sovereignty was unitary and unlimited such that
no other government institution could restrict or share its exercise of

52.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *154-55.
53.
These different forms of government were reflected, respectively, in the
Commons, Lords, and the Crown. Id. at *48-51, *155-56.
Blackstone further
considered the statutory time limits for the life of a Parliament, as necessary to make it
responsive to the common good through regular elections. Id. at *179-82.
54.
Paul Craig, Public Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory, 2000 PUB. L.
211, 220-22 [hereinafter Public Law].
55.
Id. at 221-22.
56.
Id. at 218-22.
57.

Id. at 218-20.

58.
Id. at 221.
59.
De Smith and Brazier identify six political factors that limit Parliament.
DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 98-99. These are (1) international obligations,
(2) constitutional conventions, (3) practicability of enforcing the law, (4) fear of electoral
backlash, (5) the influence of interest groups, and (6) the Government's lack of an
overall majority in the House of Commons. Id.
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authority. 60 External limits, as the term implies, were independent
of Parliament itself.61 Those limits, which applied to any sovereign,
"[consist] in the possibility or certainty that his subjects, or a large
number of them, will disobey or resist his laws. '6 2 Such instances of
disobedience, or even rebellion, could result from the sovereign's
arbitrary or extreme changes in popularly entrenched ideals or
values.6 3 As Dicey suggested, imposing an Episcopal Church in
Scotland, abolishing the monarchy, or disenfranchising the popular
electorate are some examples of untouchable values during his own
time. 64 External checks and values that supported them depended
upon the "present state of the world. '65 Certain parliamentary acts
that the populace may once have found acceptable might no longer be,
just as previously intolerable actions might become appropriate or
welcome. 66
External limits could, therefore, change over time,
resulting in the possibility that constitutional principles could adapt
to changing social needs and attitudes. 67 Internal checks, in contrast,
68
related solely to the normative values held by a lawmaker himself.
Regardless of the legal power to do as he willed, Dicey believed
that the lawmaker would not act against certain fundamental ideals
central to his own belief-system. 69 For example, Dicey wrote that a
Muslim ruler would never think to outlaw the practice of Islam, just
as Louis XIV would never have imagined to carry out a Protestant
Reformation.7 0 In the United Kingdom, those internal checks have
traditionally come from deep-rooted values, such as respect for
representative government, democratic accountability, and the rule of
law. 71 Democratic ideals, which served as an external check and
were greatly esteemed by the populace, also restrict in considerable
degree the actions of Parliament due to their internal influence upon
72
its members.

60.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 76.
61.
Id. at 77 (discussing operation of the limit on non-parliamentary
governmental forms).
62.
Id. at 76-77.
63.
Id. at 78-79.
64.
Id. at 79.
65.
Id. at 79.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 80.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution,
37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329, 330 (2002) (describing British reliance on these values).
72.

See DICEY, supra note 3, at 83.
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B. FoundationalPrinciples as a Restraint upon Parliament
Blackstone's endorsement of parliamentary supremacy conflicted
with his other central tenet of natural law's supremacy. 73 He
described natural law as originating from God, immutable, and
directing the actions of men.7 4 Through reason, mankind could
discover those natural principles, and apply them to various and
particular worldly circumstances. 75 Natural law, as understood by
man, was superior to any contrary human law, which was
consequently not binding. 76 Blackstone wrote, "[N]o human laws are
of any validity, if contrary to [natural law]; and such of them as are
valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from this original. ' 77 Blackstone continued, "[I]f any
human law should allow or enjoin us to commit [a crime against
natural law], we are bound to transgress that human law, or else we
must offend both the natural and the divine. '' 78 Blackstone was
unclear at first how he intended to resolve this blatant contradiction
between Parliament's supremacy and natural law. 79 Daniel Boorstin
suggests that Blackstone saw no such contradiction, as Blackstone
found natural law to be simultaneously prescriptive and descriptive.8 0
Natural law dictated principles to which man-made law must
conform, and those laws themselves, particularly common law, were
evidence of natural law.81 Through reason, mankind discovered, but
did not create, pre-existing first principles of law.8 2 Blackstone thus
intimately connected the mysterious and divine with the rational and
human.8 3 He accordingly found English law to be informed by and
representative of natural law, thereby complimenting its excellence
84
and limiting criticism against it.
By characterizing English law as representative of discovered
first principles, Blackstone seemed unable to imagine Parliament
legislating in a manner that was blatantly contrary to natural law. 8 5

73.
Compare 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *41 (arguing for the supremacy of
natural law), with DICEY, supra note 3, at 90 (arguing for parliamentary supremacy).
74.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *38-41.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at *38-39, *41-42.
Id. at *41.

79.

See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY

Id.
Id. at *43.

ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 30-31 (1941) (describing this conflict in Blackstone);
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *43-47.
80.
BOORSTIN, supra note 79, at 120-21.
81.

Id. at 120-24; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *41-43.

82.
83.
84.

BOORSTIN, supra note 79, at 20; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *41-42.
BOORSTIN, supra note 79, at 12, 17-18.
Id. at 23-25, 30, 49-56.

85.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *91.
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Nonetheless, Blackstone implied a solution to such a problem:
natural law, which is binding upon Parliament, had only moral and
not legal effect. 86 An act of Parliament that offended against natural
law principles, therefore, did not necessarily create an obligation of
obedience upon the subject.8 7 The subject might even have a moral
duty to disobey the law in question, which would remain legally in
force. 8 8 Such a position advanced an early positivist version of the
89
law, where the law and its moral content could remain separate.
Yet such a moral distinction between natural law and acts of
Parliament threatens Blackstone's unity between them. Parliament
would remain the supreme legal power, even if notoriously acting
contrary to the morally supreme mandates of natural law.90
Blackstone essentially admitted this possibility by writing, "[I]f the
parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the
constitution, that is vested with authority to control it."91 Judicial
power to reject such an unreasonable law would "set the judicial
power above that of the legislative, which would be subversive of all
government. ' 92 The only option left to the courts is to interpret the
statute as far as possible with higher principles of law, but give effect
to Parliament's clear intent. 93 Therefore, Blackstone's Constitution
relied upon the balanced constitution-as well as the external
political checks of the general electorate and parliamentarians'
internal guidance by reason-in preventing Parliament's legislating
against natural law.9 4 In any case, restraint was to be found not in
Hence,
the courts, but only through the political process. 95
Blackstone gave precedence to the legislative process by

86.

J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

190 (1961).
Id. at 190-91; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *42-43.
87.
88.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *43, *91.

Such a tension also exists in the writings of some positivist thinkers who
89.
assert that individuals may justifiably disobey immoral laws, although such laws are
not invalid under the rubric of lex iniusta non est lex. Comparative Perspective, supra
note 41, at 10-11; JAMES R. STONER, COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE,
HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 167-68 (1992).
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *90, *157.
90.

91.
Id. at *91.
Id.
92.
93.
Id. at *83-84, *87, *89; GOUGH, supra note 86, at 189.
Although Blackstone makes it fairly plain that judges cannot substitute
94.
their own reason for that of the legislators, there arises the broader question of to what
extent a judge may continue to ignore his personal moral responsibility to refuse to
obey an act of Parliament against natural law. This jurisprudential problem, however,
is well beyond the scope of the paper.
95.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *91, *136-41 (describing protections for

basic rights and operation of restraints on authority).
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fundamentally intertwining the aspirational principles of natural law
96
with positive acts of Parliament.
Dicey's distinction between the political and legal sovereigns is
comparable to Blackstone's interrelationship between natural law
and the omnipotent Parliament.
Both present very similar
conceptions of Parliament's moral obligation to higher moral
authority and the problems that such a dichotomy presents. As
previously discussed, Blackstone constructed a theory that placed
natural law as morally superior to parliamentary acts. 97
He
continued to recognize the legal ability of Parliament to contravene
first principles. 98
Both natural law and Parliament remained
supreme in their respective spheres - natural law in the moral one,
Parliament in the legal one. Dicey, by characterizing sovereignty as
both legal and political, presented the same relationship between
Parliament and higher legal principles as did Blackstone.9 9 Dicey
certainly did not consider natural law as constituting a reference
point for the moral validity of law.' 0 0
Instead, Dicey made
Parliament accountable to the politically-sovereign electorate. 10 1 The
electorate was the ultimate source of legitimacy for Parliament;
Parliament was chosen by the electorate and morally obligated to act
on its behalf.'0 2 Acts of the supreme Parliament were, theoretically,
expressions of popular will. Dicey wrote,
[T]he difference between the will of the sovereign and the will of the
nation was terminated by the foundation of a system of real
representative government . . . To prevent the divergence between the
wishes of the sovereign and the wishes of subjects is in short the effect,
and the only certain effect, of bonA fide [sic.] representative
government.

103

Thus, external and internal limitations would become "absolutely
coincident" to ensure Parliament's responsiveness to the people.' 0 4
Similarly, Blackstone considered parliamentary acts as expressions of
natural-law principles to which legislation was morally bound to
105
adhere.
Higher principles, discoverable through reason and experience,
were generally discernable through a determination of what acts
served the public welfare. Blackstone and Dicey shared two basic

96.
DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL
THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 40, 49 (1989).
97.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *90.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at *91, *156-57.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 39.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.

105.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *42, *52-56.
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ideas in this regard, both compatible with one another. First, they
asserted a higher authority to which Parliament was morally, but not
legally, answerable. 10 6 For Blackstone this was natural law; for
0 7
Dicey it was the political sovereign in the form of the electorate.'
Second, both recognized the need for parliamentary acts to serve the
public.1 08
In Blackstone's theory, this requirement meant that
Parliament sought to implement principles of natural law. 10 9
Although Dicey did not explicitly comment on the concept of public
good, it is an easy presumption that he would have considered acts
benefiting public welfare to reflect the desires of the electorate. This
conclusion is a natural inference from his insistence that Parliament
act on behalf of the political sovereign." 0 Hence, Blackstone and
Dicey were able to equate beneficent parliamentary acts with the
requirements of either natural law or democratically accountable
government."' Both theories offered a means for legitimizing acts of
Parliament, while suggesting moral limitations upon the exercise of
otherwise unlimited legal authority." 2 These moral limitations
derived from fundamental principles of natural law or democratic
government that existed anterior and superior to legislative
3
authority."
Blackstone and Dicey, however, failed to address adequately the
problems that resulted from the contradiction of pairing
parliamentary sovereignty with another morally supreme source of
When confronted with giving precedence to a
legal legitimacy.
higher, moral authority, or legislative will, Blackstone and Dicey
chose the latter." 4 In the event of a conflict between natural law and
popular will against parliamentary act, Blackstone and Dicey
admitted that Parliament prevailed. 115 Despite recognizing a more
abstract but higher authority for law, both writers ultimately
11 6
embraced a preference for positivism in the form of legislative act.
Acts of Parliament received priority, though ostensibly reflecting
natural law or democratic will, because they were certain and were
matters of fact, rather than abstract principles requiring discovery

106.

Id. at *42-43; DICEY, supra note 3, at 73.

107.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *42-43; DICEY, supra note 3, at 73.

108.
109.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *43, *52-53.
Id. at *39-41.

110.
111.

DICEY, supra note 3, at 78-79.
Id.; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *39-41, *52-53.

112.

ComparativePerspective, supra note 41, at 13-15.

113.
at 140.
114.
115.
116.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *41; see DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7,
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *91, *156-57; DICEY, supra note 3, at 68-70.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *157; DICEY, supra note 3, at 70.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *157; DICEY, supra note 3, at 70.
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through the courts. n 7 Taking this positivist approach, both writers
rejected the judiciary's authority to invalidate parliamentary acts
1 18
that offended high principles.
Deference to parliamentary supremacy in the face of strong
support for either natural law or the political sovereignty of the
electorate nonetheless presents a problem of justification. Although
Blackstone and Dicey both suggested, and even admitted, that
Parliament could legally act against the public interest, they did so
only reluctantly. n 9 Both scholars attempted to escape the problem
by equating parliamentary acts, at least in ordinary cases, to
expressions of natural law or popular will. 120
There remains,
however, an obvious tension between this connection of first
principles and electoral will with parliamentary act. Blackstone and
Dicey tried to get around this difficulty through their particular
characterization of the political process-a process centering upon the
121
search for the public good.
Blackstone believed that natural law found expression in laws
that served the public good. 122 Based upon experience and a judicial

117.
Jeffrey Jowell, Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of
Judicial Review, 1999 PUB. L. 448, 455-56 [hereinafter Vires and Vacuums]. Jowell
notes the abstract nature of higher foundational principles, while recognizing their
gradual realization in a way that seems consistent with the common-law and political
processes described by Blackstone and Dicey,
[Clonstitutional principles are not rules. They lack that element of specificity.
They are prescriptive in character but indeterminate in content. Their content
crystallizes over time when concrete problems throw up the need to settle
competing claims of power and authority and rights. Judging these claims
requires a strong empirical sense that allows an evaluation, within the bounds
of democracy's inherent requirements, of changes in practice and expectations.
New principles emerge by a process of accretion reflecting a constitution's
changing imperatives and shifting settlements. These are based upon altering
notions of the proper scope of governmental power as well as upon other
fundamental social values which become endorsed over time.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118.
T.R.S. Allan, The Politics of the British Constitution: A Response to
Professor Ewing's Paper, 2000 PUB. L. 374, 375 [hereinafter Response]. Allan writes
that "[tihe doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty has nourished, and been
sustained by, a general embrace of legal positivism: legal rights and obligations being
essentially matters of fact[,] . . . their merits and consequences for the common good
were matters of judgment for politics." Id. He further remarks that "[t]he dominance
of legal positivism and the uncritical acceptance of unqualified parliamentary
sovereignty were remarkable features of a jurisdiction based on the common law, which
is inherently antithetical to both." Id. at 376.
119.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *91; see DICEY, supra note 3, at 83-85.
120.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *157; DICEY, supra note 3, at 83-85.
121.
See DICEY, supra note 3, at 49, 68; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *52-55,
*83.
122.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *52-53, *55 (discussing the operation of
laws regarding the government of indifferent aspects of life, designed to promote
welfare of society).
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reasoning process that sought to discover natural law, the common
law continued to apply tradition and adapt to societal needs. 123 As a
representative body, Parliament also sought to benefit the public
through the legislative process. 124 First principles were capable of
expression in very different forms, tailored to a society's particular
circumstances. 125 At the same time, some laws concerned matters
indifferent to natural law and involving only the regulation of societal
relations. 126
Even if the common law or Parliament erred in
following fundamental principles of natural law, Blackstone believed
such error was unintentional due to man's faulty reason. 127 It was
Parliament's manifest desire to contravene such principles that
Blackstone found highly unlikely, even though grudgingly recognizing
that body's legal supremacy in such an event. 128 In the normal
judicial and legislative process, Blackstone seemed to imagine a selfcorrecting process premised upon a reasoned search for the public
good. 12 9 The balance of forces within the constitution would facilitate

123.
A comment by T.R.S. Allan illustrates the connection between the common
law and the public good in a manner that reflects the Blackstonian conception:
The common law articulates the content of the common good, according to the
society's shared values and traditions.
The judges are its authoritative
exponents because their role is to express the collective understanding, by
interpretation of the precedents, as a basis for the impartial determination of
particular disputes. The special strength of the common law, as a foundation
for constitutional government, lies in its inherent commitment to rationality
and equality.
T.R.S. Allan, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism,115
LAW Q. REV. 221, 239 (1999) [hereinafter Consentand Constitutionalism].
124.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *156-57.
125.
Id. at *41-42, *53-55 (discussing matters indifferent to natural law and
offering examples of sucl as a landlord's taking a cow in lieu of unpaid rent and a
wife's property becoming the property of her husband upon marriage).
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Blackstone wrote,
In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such
persons in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of
which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled the Supreme
Being; the three general requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of
power: wisdom to discern the real interest of the community; goodness to
endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry
this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of
sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every wellconstituted frame of government.
Id. at *47-48; see also id. at *40-42, *46-48, *91.
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this search by ensuring that no single estate would dominate to the
130
detriment of other societal interests.
Dicey also seemed to envision that Parliament would act for the
public good. 13 1 Rather than evidencing principles of natural law, the
public good would represent the will of the electorate. 32 Parliament
also might occasionally err in serving the public interest, but its
ultimate accountability to the electorate resulted in a self-correcting
democracy.1 3 3 Through this democratic process of accountability and
self-correction, Parliament would eventually right poorly made or
unjust laws.' 34
Like Blackstone, Dicey also imagined any
parliamentary deviations from the public good to be occasional and
unintentional, and express actions contrary to the electoral will as
being highly improbable. 135 Dicey thereby erected a constitutional
structure in which Parliament's legitimacy to act remains
fundamentally linked with its pursuit of the public good. 136 Sir John
Laws eloquently asserts this premise in regard to the modern
constitution,
The government's constituency is the whole body of such citizens; and a
democratic government can have no remit but to act in what it
perceives to be their best interests. It may get it wrong, and let the
people down. But it cannot knowingly do so, for that would be to act in
bad faith; and no government can justify its own bad faith by pointing
to the fact that it was elected by the people. That would be to assert
that the electorate endorsed in advance the government's right
deliberately to act against its interests, which is an impossible
proposition. Thus the free will of every citizen is a premise of all the
government's dealings with the people, and so conditions its duty to act
137
in good faith towards them.

Furthermore, Parliament was morally obligated to act for the public
good.' 38 That obligation could be realized through natural law and

130.
Paul Craig, Prerogative, Precedent, and Power, in THE GOLDEN METWAND
AND THE CROOKED CORD: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC LAW IN HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE QC
65, 75 (Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds., 1998) [hereinafter Prerogative].
131.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 82-84.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.; Public Law, supra note 54, at 227; Comparative Perspective, supra note
41, at 15-16.
135.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 82-84.
136.
To legislate in accordance with some conception of the public good could
also be seen as a necessary element of the rule of law. The rule of law therefore
encompasses the public good, and both interrelate to restrain Parliament morally.
Consent and Constitutionalism, supra note 123, at 237. Thus, "Dicey's theory of the
rule of law may best be understood as a model of governance in accordance with a
determinate conception of the common good, whose concrete requirements in particular
cases would be settled by judges in accordance with precedent, interpreted as a
consistent body of legal principle." Id. at 243.
137.
Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72, 83 [hereinafter Law
and Democracy].
138.
Id.
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the requirements of representative democracy, depending upon either
Blackstone's or Dicey's framework.1 3 9 For Blackstone and Dicey, the
revision process for laws that did not reflect public interest was a
political process shielded from judicial evaluation. 140 Despite their
attempts to equate positive act with fundamental principle, neither
jurist could completely gloss over the gap that existed between the
two concepts.
While Blackstone and Dicey were reluctant to
recognize it, their theories failed in the end to offer adequate
protection against a real threat of Parliament contravening
foundational principles of law.
C. JudicialReview in Common-Law Thought
The subordination of the judiciary to Parliament was a logical
consequence of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
Blackstone, while discussing at length the constitutional position of
the legislature and the executive, offered no discussion of the
judiciary as a distinct government institution. While the Crown,
Lords, and Commons acted as checks and balances against each
other, Blackstone's exclusive identification of the branches of
government as the legislative and executive suggested that the courts
had no institutional role or power of review in his constitutional
model. 141 Dicey similarly declared that the courts could not question
an act of Parliament as contrary to the public good,
[Jiudges know nothing about any will of the people except in so far as
that will is expressed by an Act of Parliament, and would never suffer
the validity of a statute to be questioned on the ground of its having
been passed or being kept alive in opposition to the wishes of the
142
electors.

In comparison to Blackstone's suggestion that laws contrary to those
of nature were void, Dicey allowed "a very qualified interpretation"
143
that supported only an approach to statutory interpretation.
Courts, therefore, could do no more than interpret and apply a
statute without questioning its validity. 144 Dicey and Blackstone
thus envisioned a constitutional order based upon the sovereignty of
Parliament, without any legal limitations on its authority through
145
judicial review.

139.
140.
141.
142.

See DICEY, supra note 3, at 82-84; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *53-57.
See DICEY, supranote 3, at 82-84; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *53-57.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *146-47.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 74.

143.
144.

Id. at 62-63.
See id.

145.

See id.; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *146-47.
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Notwithstanding Dicey and Blackstone's conclusions, elements
exists within the thoughts of each that support a constitutional model
restraining parliamentary authority through judicial review. Those
elements have also historically existed within common-law thought.
Therefore, in order to limit legislative authority within a common-law
framework, judicial review can rest upon the theoretical foundations
of Blackstone and Dicey, along with historical precedent.
By speaking of both natural law and the sovereignty of
Parliament in absolute terms, Blackstone created an inevitable
tension between the moral and the strictly legal. In Blackstone's
concept of the law, acts of Parliament reasonably promulgated
By
natural law, which was the sole source of legal validity. 146
paralleling positive and natural law, Blackstone neatly avoided any
real discussion intended to resolve a direct conflict between the two.
Even though Blackstone stated that an act of Parliament was
supreme even if manifestly unreasonable, he seemed to regard such a
contingency as remote at best. 14 7 He relied upon the balanced
constitution, political accountability to the electorate, and rational
legal process to produce legislation promoting the public good,
By even recognizing the
thereby representing natural law. 148
slightest possibility of disjunction between natural and positive law,
Blackstone revealed the limitations of his characterization of natural
law principles as simultaneously prescriptive of law and represented
in turn by English law. 149 To admit the possibility of a rupture
required a clear choice between parliamentary authority that is
unlimited or legally restricted by foundational principles, whether
they be expressed through the unwritten common law, statutes, or
Despite his fundamental reliance upon
written documents.' 5 0
natural law as the fountainhead of legal legitimacy, Blackstone's final
deference to the will of Parliament places him on the side of
His position on natural law, however, cannot be
positivism.
undervalued based upon his acceptance of parliamentary supremacy.
The principles of natural law still serve as an internal check upon the
actions of legislators, while externally limiting Parliament by
providing a moral standard for the subjects' obligation to obey.
Blackstone's reliance upon natural law also lays strong foundations
for a theory of judicial review intended to enforce foundational
principles as legal limitations upon the legislative power.
Blackstone's conclusion that parliamentary will prevails is not a
necessary one, and counter-emphasis may be placed upon his naturallaw theory to allow judicial review of primary legislation.

146.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *146-47.

147.

Id.

148.

Id.

149.
150.

Id.
Id.
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The idea that courts through judicial review might restrain
Parliament based upon first principles is not a novel inference from
Blackstone's theory. 151 Judicial review had existed as a concept
within English legal and political thought for some time before
Blackstone penned his Commentaries.152 Sir Edward Coke and
American revolutionaries most notably supported this alternative
view of English constitutionalism, itself firmly grounded in the
unwritten common law. 153 Although the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy remains orthodox in contemporary law, these older
common-law arguments for judicial review of parliamentary acts still
provide foundations for the ultra vires doctrine, as well as a
potentially broader power of review restraining parliamentary acts
themselves. 154 Consequently, common-law judicial review premised
upon either a written or unwritten constitution offers a solid basis for
significant constitutional reform in the United Kingdom, while still
maintaining direct continuity with British tradition.
A brief
discussion of judicial review in English legal history demonstrates the
emphasis of Blackstone's natural law theory in supporting arguments
for a limited Parliament.
The most famous statement of judicial review in English law was
made by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case, which was decided
in 1610.155 Legal scholars and historians have much debated the full
significance and import of this case. 156 For this Article, a brief
examination of the case is sufficient to illustrate the venerable roots
of judicial review doctrine in the common-law tradition. In Bonham's
Case, Thomas Bonham brought an action for false imprisonment
against the Royal College of Physicians for having had him jailed for
practicing medicine without a license. 157 The Royal College, founded
under letters patent issued by Henry VIII and subsequently
reaffirmed, claimed authority under those instruments to require a
license of all medical practitioners in London. 158 The College also
possessed statutory authority to fine and imprison those practicing

151.

See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610).

152.

See id.

153.
See id.
154.
For a good comparison of the two opposing visions of British
constitutionalism as premised upon either a limited or omnipotent Parliament, see
T.R.S. Allan, Fairness, Equality, Rationality: Constitutional Theory and Judicial
Review, in THE GOLDEN METWAND AND THE CROOKED CORD: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC LAW IN
HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE QC 15, 15-18 (Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds.,

1998) [hereinafter ConstitutionalTheory].
155.
Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638.
156.
See infra note 185 and accompanying text; T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, STUDIES IN
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 45 (1983).

157.
158.

Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 642.
Id.
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improperly or without a license. 159 Bonham-a doctor of medicine
from the University of Cambridge-claimed an exception under the
same statutes that exempted Oxford and Cambridge graduates from
license requirement when practicing outside of London. 16 0 When
Bonham refused to pay the fine levied by the Royal College, the
College ordered his arrest and imprisonment. 161 The162resulting legal
contest hence centered upon the scope of the statutes.
The Royal College claimed authority in all instances to license
medical practitioners in London, notwithstanding their graduation
from Oxford or Cambridge. 163 On the contrary, Bonham asserted
that statutes excepting Oxford and Cambridge graduates practicing
outside of London also applied to the capital city as well. 164 Thus, the
correct interpretation of the statute seemed to be the main issue in
the case. Coke, however, approached the case from an unexpected
and significant angle, based upon the Royal College's jurisdiction to
imprison and its authorization to take a share of the fines that it
65
itself levied.1
Statutes authorized the Royal College to punish errant
practitioners in two instances. First, they allowed the Royal College
to impose fines on individuals practicing medicine without a
license. 166 Second, they further allowed the Royal College to impose
fines upon or order imprisonment of individuals improperly practicing
medicine. 16 7 Contrary to the Royal College's position, Coke drew a
clear distinction between those two grounds of punishment. 168 Coke
concluded that the power to imprison for improper practice of
medicine did not extend only to unlicensed practice. 16 9 Instead,
improper practices essentially referred to malpractice. 170 The Royal
College made no such allegation against Bonham, whom they only
accused of not having a license. 171 Thus, the Royal College lacked the
jurisdiction under the statutes to imprison Bonham under the
circumstances. 172
This reasoning was clearly one of statutory

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

886

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.'863

interpretation only, as Coke was relying upon the language of the
173
acts themselves to discern their meaning.
The second reason that Coke gave for denying the Royal College
power to imprison Bonham was perhaps one of the most controversial
statements made in the history of English jurisprudence. Having
found that the statutes' language did not give the Royal College
authority to imprison someone for practicing without a license, Coke
went further into the substance of the legislation. The Chief Justice
explained that the Royal College could not rightly judge causes from
which it expected to take a share of the fines that it imposed. 174 To
do so would violate one of the first principles of law, which was well
established in the common law itself, that a party could not be a
judge in its own cause. In cases where a statute and first principles
conflicted,
[The common law would] controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be
void.... 175

Coke seemed to suggest by this statement, which he supported
through a recitation of some precedent, two concepts that would later
greatly influence common-law theory. 176 First, higher law principles
existed that were superior to Parliament's will. 1 77 Second, the
judiciary wielded inherent authority to adjudge void parliamentary
178
acts offensive to such principles.

173.
In explaining this distinction between the clauses authorizing punishment,
Coke set forth four canons of statutory construction:
[T]he best (a) expositor of all letters patent, and Acts of Parliament, are the
letters patent and the Acts of Parliament themselves by construction, and
conferring (b) all the parts of them together, (c) optima statuti interpretatrixest
(omnibus particulis ejusdem inspectis) ipsum statutum; and (d) injustum est
nisi tota legum inspecta una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel
respondere.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 156. Plucknett examines in some detail the
precedents cited by Coke and finds that they weakly support the proposition that the
common law restrains Parliament. He concludes that "the theory which [Coke]
believed to be their legal foundation must be credited to his own political thought
rather than to that of his mediaeval predecessors upon the Common Bench." See also
STONER, supra note 89, at 56-58. Stoner argues that any weaknesses in Coke's use of
precedent, however, do not necessarily detract from his influence upon later legal
developments. Id.
177.
See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610).
178. Id.
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The full import of Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case is
uncertain. 79 Although he saw a place for natural law reasoning and
considerable judicial discretion in statutory interpretation, it is
unclear how far his theory extends as a basis for judicial review of
parliamentary acts.
Coke may have been advocating that first
principles be applied when interpreting ambiguous statutes, so as
only to interpret them consistently with the common law.' 80 As far as
a general power to void legislation, Coke's own words are subject to
this narrower understanding. 181 An act of Parliament "against
common right or reason, or repugnant," might very well have referred
only to manifestly absurd or self-contradictory laws. 18 2 In this
instance, the common law would control.
As Coke analyzed the statutes in Bonham's Case in a very
textual manner, the narrower interpretation of his words is arguably
consistent with the reasoning throughout the remainder of his
opinion.' 8 3 It is also more compatible with later developments in
English jurisprudence stressing judicial formalism, but allowing
courts to interpret the will of Parliament as incorporating generally
accepted legal values consistent with natural justice. 184 If one
accepts this interpretation, Coke might likely have applied an
unreasonable statute if Parliament's intent was stated expressly and
clearly. Although refusing to acknowledge a full power of judicial
review, this narrow interpretation of the Bonham's Case still leaves
considerable room for judicial interpretation of parliamentary acts
lacking express language showing intent to violate first principles.' 8 5

179.

J.W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN

CONCEPTIONS 160 (2000). Tubbs writes in regard to Coke's jurisprudence on the
relationship between statute and common law that "scholarship may help us narrow
the range and his possible meanings, but his language is so rich and ambiguous, and
his writing so unsystematic, that he cannot be pinned down exactly." Id.
For
discussion of the varying interpretations of Bonham's Case, see id. at 154-60, 183-84;
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

111-12 (1999).
180.
Public Law, supra note 54, at 213; LIEBERMAN, supra note 96, at 53.
181.
Public Law, supra note 54, at 213; LIEBERMAN, supra note 96, at 53.
182.

S.E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 274-75 (1985).

183.
Id. at 276; GOUGH, supra note 86, at 34-35.
184.
J. Beatson, The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law
Doctrine, 117 LAW Q. REV. 247, 261 (2001).
There is a presumption that parliamentary intention is primarily determined
by the text and that a provision is prima facie to be given its literal meaning,
taking into account its context ....
[T]he traditional formulation of the rules is
that only when the ordinary meaning leads to something unjust, anomalous,
contradictory or is ambiguous can the courts say that Parliament intended a
secondary meaning to be given to the provision.
Id.
185.
THORNE, supra note 182, at 277-78; PLUCKNETT, supra note 156, at 50
("Coke had claimed that the common law was fundamental, and it was an inevitable
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It also remains consistent with Blackstone's own contradictory
exposition of both natural law and parliamentary supremacy.186
Judges were to consider all acts of Parliament as conforming to

natural law, although

the legislature

might, albeit

doubtfully,

Furthermore, the
expressly decide to abrogate its principles.18 7
common law sought to express these higher principles and provided a
1 88
strong benchmark for interpreting statutes.
Regardless of Coke's actual meaning, many of his contemporaries

and followers regarded Bonham's Case as supporting a power of
judicial review capable of striking down acts of Parliament, as well as
the Crown.1 8 9 Thus, even assuming that Coke did not propose a full
judicial power to invalidate primary legislation in all cases,

subsequent

interpretations,

or

misinterpretations,

of his ideas

nevertheless asserted the primacy of higher legal principles over

contrary acts of Parliament.1 9

Although English law ultimately

embraced parliamentary supremacy, those strains of thought were
significant enough to present a viable and alternative path of
constitutional development. For instance, between the years of the
English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, royalists and radical
Levellers advanced Coke's theory in its broader interpretation by
seeking to fetter Parliament's authority. 191 As for the royalists, some

corollary of this theorem that the bench, as the sole repository of this common law,
should regard itself as thereby endowed with authority to treat statutes with the
widest discretion."). Coke also may have seen Parliament as a high court rather than
just a legislature and held a fundamentally different view of its acts than later jurists.
Instead of being the dominant source of law as presently understood, statutes more
simply declared or clarified the common law, or sought to "fill in the gaps." This closer
relationship between common law and statute would give judges far more discretion in
interpreting statutes, and might even allow them to refuse to apply acts of Parliament
in certain cases. It might also explain Coke's own apparent inconsistency between
supporting a fundamental law and a supreme Parliament. See DE SMITH & BRAZIER,
supra note 7, at 73; GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 114-19; CHARLES HOWARD
MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY 147-49, 291-92
(1979); STONER, supra note 89, at 54, 57-58, 60-61.
See DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 160 (1938).
186.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 96, at 54-55.
187.
188.
See STONER, supra note 89, at 60; THORNE, supra note 182, at 270-71.
189.
STONER, supra note 89, at 60; TUBBS, supra note 179, at 158-59. As for
Coke himself, he again suggested the primacy of common law over statute in the later
case of Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brownl. & Golds. 192, 198 (1612), as well as apparently
contradicting himself in later statements by asserting the supremacy of Parliament.
TUBBS, supra note 179, at 183-84; GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 125-26, 142.
LIEBERMAN, supra note 96, at 53-54. See THORNE, supra note 182, at 278
190.
("Coke's ambitious political theory is found to be not his, but the work of a later
generation of judges, commentators, and lawyers."). But see GOLDSWORTHY, supra note
179, at 122-24 (remarking, however, that those who did interpret Bonham's Case so
broadly were few).
191.
While the Levellers did not necessarily support the common law, nor
equate it with natural law as Coke suggested, they nevertheless appealed to the
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supporters of the prerogative argued that the Crown's powers were
themselves an integral part of the common law. 192 Accordingly,
Parliament was unable to trample upon the prerogative, and the
judiciary possessed the power to maintain the balance between
Of course, the possibility that the
Crown and Parliament. 193
judiciary, as the guardian of the common law, might provide legal
protection for the Crown against the legislature was unacceptable to
Parliamentarians. 1 94 As for the Levellers, they remained as a radical
and short-lived movement that could not counter the growing support
for parliamentary power. 1 95 Representing the final triumph of
Parliament over the Crown, the Glorious Revolution of 1688
effectively ended any attempts by royalists or radicals to rely upon
19 6
Coke's doctrine of a fundamental law to control the legislature.
The Glorious Revolution permanently altered the balance
between Parliament and the Crown, establishing Parliament as the
supreme law-making authority in the realm. 197 Consequently, the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and legislative supremacy
became legal orthodoxy. It was against such unlimited legislative
power that radical Whigs of the early 18th century appealed to
natural rights and popular sovereignty as restraints upon
government. 198 Despite some protests and reservations held by
oppositionist thinkers, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
gained ascendancy because it proved to be a more politically palatable
check against royal power and more accountable to the electorate
than was the judiciary.' 99 The English Constitution thus continued
to develop along the path of parliamentary supremacy, rejecting any
power of the judiciary to declare void acts of Parliament offensive to
first principles of law. 20 0 The fact that English law embraced the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, however, could not wholly

concept of a fundamental law to which Parliament was legally subject. J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 244-45 (3d ed. 1990); GOLDSWORTHY, supra

note 179, at 135-37; PLUCKNETT, supra note 156, at 52-54, 69; Winterton, supra note 8,
at 594-96. See MCILWAIN, supra note 185, at 85-92. See generally GOUGH, supra note
86, at 105-11.
192.
See Winterton, supranote 8, at 593-95.
193.
See id.
194.

GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 106-09.

See GOUGH, supra note 86, at

145-47,158-59.
195.

See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 135-37.

196.
Id. at 160-61, 173; DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 70-75.
197.
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 159.
198.
While radical Whigs did propose that there were limits upon Parliament,
they generally held the right of resistance or political opposition to reside in the people,
rather than in any power of judicial review. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 173-76;
MARIE P. MCMAHON, THE RADICAL WHIGS, JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON
LIBERATARIAN LOYALISTS TO THE NEW HOUSE OF HANOVER 38-39 (1990).

199.
200.

See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 200-01, 233-34.
See id. at 218-20, 233.
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eclipse the influence of competing ideas of judicial review and limited
legislative power. T.F.T. Plucknett writes,
[Coke's] learning and prestige had made enough disciples on the bench
to familiarize lawyers with the outlines of his thought, and eventually
the strangeness wore off until it became evident that the new thought
could be grafted on to the common law. The [Glorious] Revolution came
only just in time to prevent the conversion, and to make it finally clear
20 1
that there was no place for it in English constitutional law.

Despite the victory of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the
broad interpretation of Coke's theory of judicial review had gained
enough momentum to integrate itself into common-law constitutional
20 2
thought-enough so as to survive into contemporary times.
In the 18th century, the doctrine of judicial review manifested
itself most prominently in two places. First, Blackstone continued to
support the concept of natural law morally binding upon Parliament
and providing a basis for judicial interpretation of a statute. 20 3 He
went so far as to echo Coke in Bonham's Case, stating that "acts of
parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity; and
if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences,
manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to
those collateral consequences, void. ' 20 4 As previously mentioned,
Blackstone was prepared to yield to Parliament's expressed will in
20 5
such circumstances, and he made this reservation clear.
Blackstone expressed a position compatible with a narrower
interpretation of Coke's theory in Bonham's Case.206 Despite coming
down on the side of parliamentary sovereignty, Blackstone's theory
perpetuated the continuing tension between a supreme legislature
and the idea of fundamental principles limiting its power. Hence, the
theoretical foundations for a broad judicial review theory continued to
exist in Blackstone's work, although he himself placed final emphasis
20 7
upon Parliament's supremacy.
Although the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy established
itself as orthodoxy in 18th-century Britain, the tension evident in
Blackstone resolved itself quite differently in the American colonies
where an alternative theory of limited government prevailed. 20 8 As
made clear in much colonial rhetoric in the years before the
Declaration of Independence, Americans considered themselves to be

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

PLUCKNETT, supra note 156, at 69.
See generally DICEY, supra note 3.
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 181-83.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *90-91.
Id. at *91.
MCILWAIN, supra note 185, at 309; STONER, supra note 89, at 173-74.
See STONER, supra note 89, at 173-74.
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 204-15.
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British subjects propounding established constitutional doctrines
from which Parliament was departing.2 0 9
Thus, American
revolutionary thought represented a second crossroads in commonlaw constitutional development at which the colonies and Great
Britain parted. 210 While Britain had already chosen the path of
parliamentary supremacy, the American colonies decided upon the
other course seeking to subject the legislature to binding foundational
principles of higher law. 211 Therefore, American revolutionary ideas
are an important part of common-law constitutional thought, and
they remain relevant to contemporary constitutional debates in the
United
Kingdom
regarding
an
alternative
constitutional
212
arrangement.
Accustomed to home-rule
and resenting parliamentary
interference in domestic matters, as well as being informed by Cokian
and Blackstonian ideas of limited and balanced government,
American colonists championed common-law constitutional principles
as restraining Parliament. 2 13 The situation in the colonies during the
mid-1700s revisited constitutional issues debated in England
throughout most of the 17th century. Plucknett states,
The sovereignty of Parliament was by no means so obvious an
implication of the [Glorious] Revolution to people who had not lived in
London during the critical years from 1685 to 1688. It is a cardinal fact
that to the eighteenth-century American the doctrine of a fundamental
law was familiar, and regarded as quite consistent with the common
2 14
law scheme of things.

209. Id.
210.
The first crossroads was the struggle between the Crown and Parliament,
culminating in the constitutional settlement of 1688.
211.
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 204-15.
212.
For a series of essays that illustrates just how fundamentally interrelated
British and colonial American constitutional and political ideas were, see generally
THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980). It is also
interesting to note that there was some sympathy for colonial grievances in Great
Britain. Of course, one must distinguish between British arguments in favor of
fundamental principles offering moral limitations upon Parliament's authority in the
colonies, as opposed to those Americans arguing for real legal restraints.
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 194-96; GOUGH, supra note 86, at 193-95; G.H.
GUTTRIDGE, ENGLISH WHIGGISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 63, 86-88 (1963);
Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 404 (1928).
213.
The philosophical influences upon the advocates of independence were
varied, and included not only common-law thought but such great political thinkers
and natural law theorists as Locke, Puffendorf, and Montesqiueu among others. See
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-28
(enlarged ed. 1992); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-87, at 14-17 (1998).
214.
PLUCKNETT1, supranote 156, at 69-70; see also GOUGH, supra note 86, at 5556 (describing how U.S. historians discussed the constitutional situation in England
during the 17th century).
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To Americans, Parliament required as much restraint as the
Crown. 215 The colonists found this restraint in the ancient common
of Englishmen from
law, which protected the traditionally held rights
216
authority.
government
unchecked
or
arbitrary
Although the causes behind the American Revolution are
complex, those colonists opposing British power generally had three
main concerns relevant to the debate over limited government. First,
the common law guaranteed liberty against arbitrary and
discretionary encroachment by government. 2 17 Second, the common
law dictated a constitutional order of balanced government, which
was upset by the rise of parliamentary supremacy and ministerial
authority. 2 18 Finally, colonists further asserted that the law also
protected their tradition of internal self-government from
interference by Parliament.2 19 These grievances were more than
political differences; dissident colonists insisted that they were
fundamental principles of the English common law, and, besides
restricting the Crown, restrained the authority of Parliament in
America. 220 Thus, American revolutionary thought was firmly rooted
in the English common law, but represented a different and
competing development of it than had previously occurred in Great
Britain. 221 In the American colonies, Coke's concept of judicial review
grew in prominence and many Americans interpreted his decision in
judicial invalidation of legislative
Bonham's Case as supporting the
222
acts contrary to first principles.
The ideas of Whig writers also fundamentally shaped American
views of British constitutional theory. 223 Blackstone's Commentaries,

GOUGH, supra note 86, at 5-56.
215.
See BAILYN, supra note 213, at 30-31.
216.
See id. at 47.
217.
See id. at 70, 76-77.
218.
See id. at 124-25, 202-03.
219.
See id. at 47, 70, 76-77, 124-25, 202-03; Corwin, supra note 212, at 401;
220.
WOOD, supra note 213, at 200-01, 352. Colonial arguments for home-rule, bound only
together by Parliament's common imperial policies and allegiance to the Crown,
arguably represent the first serious articulations of the later imperial system founded
upon self-governing dominions. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 207-08; MCILWAIN,
supra note 185, at 358-60, 366-67; STONER, supranote 89, at 185-86.
WOOD, supra note 213, at 10 (writing that the Americans "revolted not
221.
See also id. at 44-45;
against the English constitution but on behalf of it").
ComparativePerspective, supra note 41, at 5.
Corwin, supra note 212, at 394-95; GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 205222.
06; GOUGH, supranote 86, at 32; MCILWAIN, supra note 185, at 309-10.
BAILYN, supra note 213, at 30-31, 34-35, 43; Suzanna Sherry, The
223.
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (1987); see also
Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism:Did
the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of 'Unwritten' Individual Rights?, 69
N.C. L. REV. 421, 425-27, 447-48 (1991); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Popular
Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J.
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which was the preeminent legal treatise of the day, likely further
educated American lawyers as to the concept of first principles
restraining Parliament, regardless of his actual support of
parliamentary sovereignty. 224 The apparent contradictions in his
work and his own endorsement of a natural-law theory, combined
with the colonists' acceptance of Coke and Whig ideology, invited an
alternative interpretation of the common law that rejected
parliamentary supremacy in favor of a constitution premised upon
225
first principles.
D. The Ultra Vires Doctrine as Common-Law JudicialReview
Notwithstanding the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a
limited form of judicial review exists in contemporary constitutional
practice in the United Kingdom. 226 This method of review is limited
in scope because it does not allow courts to invalidate primary
legislation. 22 7
Instead, judicial review allows courts to review
executive action to ensure its legality under act of Parliament and to
strike down ultra vires acts. 228 This ultra vires power of review has
increasingly allowed the judiciary to control the executive branch by
keeping the executive within its statutorily granted limits of decision-

POL. 51, 57, 62 (1986) (recognizing the influential role of Coke in American
revolutionary thought, while at the same time noting a counter-movement favoring
expansive legislative discretion as the best expression of popular will. This latter idea
might arguably be similar to Dicey's later theory of parliamentary supremacy justified
on democratic grounds, rather than on Blackstone's mixed constitution and natural law
theories.); GOUGH, supra note 86, at 192; Corwin, supra note 212, at 4.
224.
LOCKMILLER, supra note 186, at 169-70; STONER, supra note 89, at 162-63.
It should be noted, however, that Blackstone was an opponent of American
constitutional positions and clearly supported Parliament's right to legislate for the
colonies as it pleased. His natural law theories in his widely read Commentaries were
nevertheless subject to alternative interpretations. LOCKMILLER, supra note 186, at
172-74.
225.
Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 914 (1996); LIEBERMAN, supra note 96, at 51-52; see also Corwin, supra note 212, at 405,
407-08 (crediting Blackstone for also spreading the concept of legislative supremacy
throughout the colonies). But see Ian Loveland, Public Law, Political Theory and Legal
Theory-A Response to Professor Craig's Paper, 2000 PUB. L. 205, 205 (writing that
"Blackstone's influence on the architects of the American revolution is well known, and
it always struck me as anomalous that they would arrive at a political destination
which granted legal protection from bare legislative majorities to basic moral values if
that view had no root in Blackstone's own work").
226.
See A.W. Bradley, The United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights, and ConstitutionalReview, 17 CARODOZO L. REV. 233, 233-37 (1995).
227.
See id. at 233-34.
228.
STANLEY DE SMITH ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 95 (1999) ("In
essence, the doctrine of ultra vires permits the courts to strike down decisions made by
bodies exercising public functions which they have no power to make.").
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making. 229 Therefore, the judiciary controls Parliament indirectly by
interpreting enabling legislation that grants decision-making
authority to the executive in a way compatible with fundamental
The ultra vires doctrine simultaneously supports
principles. 230
orthodox constitutional theory in two ways, and it contains elements
conducive to developing itself further as a means to restrain
First, the ultra vires doctrine, formally at least,
Parliament.
continues to emphasize parliamentary supremacy over fundamental
principles, while reflecting Dicey's democratic norms and a narrower
23
conception of Coke's and Blackstone's idea of judicial review. '
Second, the doctrine is wholly judge-made, suggesting some degree of
inherent, common-law power of review existing independently from
parliamentary control. 23 2 This common-law power is subject to
The ultra vires doctrine thus
broader judicial development.
illustrates the compatibility of the concept of judicial review with the
common law, while containing, like Dicey's and Blackstone's theories,
potential for far-reaching development placing restrictions upon
2 33
Parliament.
Over the years the ultra vires doctrine has become a
fundamental part of British constitutional practice. By using the
ultra vires doctrine, Courts have exercised significant control over
executive acts and administrative discretion. 23 4 The purpose behind
this brand of judicial review is rather straightforward-courts review
executive actions to ensure that those actions remain within
executive statutory authorization. 23 5 Any acts judged by the courts to
go beyond such grant of power are consequently void as ultra vires
the agency's or minister's legal powers. 236 Therefore, as Jeffrey
Jowell states, "[u]ltra vires rests securely and wholly upon the
supremacy of Parliament and leaves no doubt that the courts in [the]
The doctrine
system are subordinate to the legislature. '23 7
emphasizes the legality of government decisions, rather than the
substantive content of either the decisions or the authorizing primary

While there is a conceptual difference between secondary legislation which
229.
makes rules and administrative adjudication which settles particular claims, this
discussion will refer to them both generally in the context of judicial review. DE SMITH
& BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 337-38.

See id.
230.
Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 448.
231.
DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at 96.
232.
233.
Id.
In doing so, judges "stand in a very real sense as the ultimate arbitrator of
234.
the balance between the demands of effective government and individual interests." DE
SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 506.
235.

See generally DICEY, supra note 3; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3.

236.

DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supranote 7, at 518.

237.

Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 448.
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238
legislation, by seeking to determine and apply Parliament's intent.
By seeking only to give effect to Parliament's will, courts must
necessarily forego such substantive review.
As the ultra vires
doctrine rests upon legislative intent and the question of legality, it
promotes a manner of judicial review that is traditionally
formalistic. 239 Consistent with such formalism, courts adjudicate in a
manner intended only to interpret and apply the statute as written
To refuse to
without assessing the value of its content. 240
acknowledge or uphold government action, otherwise authorized by
Parliament, would be to ignore the statute in question, and violate
the doctrine of legislative supremacy. 24 1 This formalistic method of
judicial review reflects Blackstone's and Dicey's preference for
positive legislation over unwritten legal principles intended to bind
242
the legislature.
Ultra vires review supports the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty by recognizing courts as obligated to uphold and apply
parliamentary intent. 243 In Diceyan terms, courts could be said to
defer to parliamentary democracy, thereby recognizing that the
electorate, as political sovereign, possesses ultimate authority to
determine the public good as expressed by the legally sovereign but
representative Parliament. 244 Much criticism against the extension
of judicial review actually relies upon such a democratic theory of
parliamentary sovereignty. According to those concerns, giving full
powers of review to the courts would be "countermajoritarian" or
"anti-political," and elevate un-elected, elite, and democratically
245
isolated judges over the will of the politically sovereign electorate.
This concept of ultra vires review fits well with Dicey's idea that the
will of the electorate is the legitimizing force behind Parliament's
actions. 246 As Parliament expresses the wishes of the electorate, at
least ideally, the courts should therefore defer to it in determining the

238.
See id. at 449; Paul Craig, Competing Models of Judicial Review, 1999 PUB.
L. 428, 428-29 [hereinafter Competing Models]; Mark Elliott, The Demise of
ParliamentarySovereignty? The Implications for Justifying JudicialReview, 115 LAW
Q. REV. 119, 120 (1999) [hereinafter Justifying JudicialReview].
239.
Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 448.
240.
DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 516 ("[t]o a large extent judicial
review of administrative action is a specialized branch of statutory interpretation");
Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467, 467 [hereinafter Analytical Framework].
241.

See generally DICEY, supra note 3.

242.
Id.
243.
Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires
Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 1996 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
122, 136-37 [hereinafter Fig Leaves]; Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 448-49.
244.
See generally DICEY, supra note 3.
245.
Richard Mullender, ParliamentarySovereignty, the Constitution, and the
Judiciary,49 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 138, 146, 148 (1998); Fig Leaves, supra note 243, at 140.
246.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 39-40.
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public interest. Their role in interpreting and applying legislation as
written by Parliament recognizes the public good as best determined
politically, not judicially. 247 While ultra vires review is compatible
with orthodox theory in that it gives effect to parliamentary intent, it
still allows courts broad room to interpret legislation consistently
with common-law and constitutional principles, such as the rule of
law. 248 Although committed in theory to apply the will of Parliament,
courts can take this interpretive license with statutes that are vague
or do not expressly abrogate the common law or the rule of law. They
can accordingly construe them strictly as to constrain executive
decision-making that might violate fundamental norms. In the end,
ultra vires review reflects Blackstone's and Dicey's preference for
positive law should it conflict with higher principles. The doctrine
remains compatible, however, with their invocation of higher
principles-in the form of natural law or democratic accountabilityas the legitimizing force behind man-made law, which courts can
apply in the absence of express language to the contrary. 249 It also
accommodates Dicey's imperative that court's presume Parliament to
legislate in accordance with the rule of law and interpret legislation
as to constrain executive discretion. 250 Courts have thus traditionally
implied to Parliament the intent to legislate consistently with
fundamental principles of law, as did Blackstone and Dicey. 251 This
interpretive aspect of ultra vires judicial review is consistent with a
narrow understanding of Coke's decision in Bonham's Case-an
understanding where judicial reference to first principles is an
interpretive tool, ultimately subordinate to Parliament's intent as
252
expressed in statute.
The interpretive process used by the judiciary in ultra vires
review strains the boundaries between formalistic and substantive
scrutiny of secondary and primary legislation. While courts invoke
concepts such as natural justice, the rule of law, or the common law
in interpreting legislation and reviewing administrative actions, they
often do so to effectively manipulate Parliament's intent and to
adjudicate upon substantive matters. 253 This tendency suggests two

247.
DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at 20-21, 169-70.
248.
Fig Leaves, supra note 243, at 134-35.
249.
Id.
250.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 413-14; Mark Elliott, The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a
Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of Administrative Law, 58
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 129, 142-45 (1999).
251.
Elliot, supra note 250, at 143.
252.
See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610).
253.
Natural justice, while an abstract concept, essentially requires "fair play"
during the process of executive decision-making. DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at
246-47, 275. As such, "'natural justice' is said to express the close relationship between
the common law and moral principles ..
" Id. at 249; DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note
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other points. First, courts may exercise the power of ultra vires
review, not from Parliament's implied intent that they do so, but from
their own inherent and independent common-law authority. Second,
by arguably exercising substantive review in the guise of the ultra
vires doctrine, courts are effectively following an alternative commonlaw theory of a limited Parliament. The ultra vires doctrine is
already developing in a manner potentially amenable to a more
robust practice of judicial review that restrains Parliament, while
maintaining continuity with the common-law constitutional tradition.
The justification for ultra vires review has significant
implications for the British Constitution, by either supporting or
weakening the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 254 As already
mentioned, the ultra vires doctrine claims that courts enforce
Parliament's will as expressed in statute by ensuring that secondary
legislation is legally made; they do not engage in substantive review
of either.2 55 This dedication to formalism touches upon the manner
in which judicial review is exercised, but still leaves unclear the
constitutional source of the courts' power.
An emphasis upon
parliamentary intent suggests that ultra vires review rests only upon
an assumption that Parliament intends the judiciary, as a
subordinate institution, to interpret legislation consistently with the
2 56
common law and the rule of law to restrict executive discretion.
In addition to the notion that ultra vires review serves to
preserve parliamentary authority against executive as well as judicial
encroachment, the underlying normative claim that Parliament is
dedicated to the rule of law remains. T. R. S. Allan asserts,
[T]he rule of law constitutes a bulwark against the deprivation of
liberty through exercise of arbitrary power. It encompasses principles
of procedural fairness and legality, equality and proportionality. Fully
articulated, the rule of law amounts to a sophisticated doctrine of
constitutionalism, revealing law as the antithesis of arbitrariness or the
257
assertion of will or power.

7, at 527-28. The two bedrock principles of natural justice, from which others stem, are
that concerned parties have the opportunity to be heard and that the adjudicator
should be unbiased. These principles are embedded in the common law. Id. at 250;
Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 452-53.
254.
Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 449.
255.
Id. at 448.
256.
DE SMITH, ET AL., supra note 228, at 18; Justifying Judicial Review, supra
note 238, at 119-20; Public Law, supra note 54, at 236. This means, of course, that
courts presume that Parliament does not intend to interfere with substantive or
procedural common-law rights except where expressly indicated or arising by necessary
implication. Id. at 187-91; T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF
FOUNDATIONS].

257.

BRITISH

CONSTITUTIONALISM

266

(1993)

Consent and Constitutionalism,supra note 123, at 223.

[hereinafter

LEGAL
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Dicey proposed a similar concept to the rule of law as a guide to
258
Parliament's exercise of otherwise supreme legislative authority.
In the context of judicial review, it is consistent with this view to
assume that Parliament would intend the executive to exercise its
grant of authority under the same constraint and subject to scrutiny
by the courts. 259 Lord Woolf comments,
The sovereignty of Parliament is but an important aspect of the rule of
law. There are other principles which are part of the rule of law, for
example, that the public are entitled to have resort to the courts; that
the courts are for the resolution of their disputes; that it is the courts'
responsibility to protect the public against the unlawful activities of
others including the executive; and that it is the responsibility of the
courts to determine the proper interpretation of the law. Just as the
courts respect Parliament's sovereignty, so the courts are entitled to
assume that, absent very clear language to the contrary, Parliament,
having passed legislation, does not intend to interfere with the
responsibilities of the courts under the rule of law. Accordingly, when
interpreting and applying the legislation, the courts assume Parliament
does not intent to interfere with the court's role in upholding the rule of
260
law.

The rule of law acts as a check upon Parliament, both internally as a
guide to its members, and externally as a standard by which the
261
public perceives its action; it also extends to limit executive action.
The rule of law thus interacts with parliamentary supremacy to
justify the ultra vires doctrine. In the end, however, parliament's
imputed delegation of review powers to the courts remains a political
matter.
If Parliament favored broad or unfettered executive
discretion, it could theoretically legislate to strip the judiciary of any
competence to declare secondary legislation void, although such a
possibility is politically unrealistic to say the least. 2 6 2 Under this
approach, the ultra vires doctrine rests upon no more than a judicial
assumption that Parliament has a general and unstated intent for
courts to apply it; it therefore exists only at the sufferance of

Parliament.

263

258.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 203.
259.
Id. at 202-03, 406-14; ComparativePerspective, supra note 41, at 17.
260.
Harry Woolf, Judicial Review-The Tensions Between the Executive and the
Judiciary, 114 LAW Q. REV. 579, 581 (1998) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Tensions];
Comparative Perspective, supra note 41, at 17 (writing that "[t]he rule of law, and the
values on which it is based, form a fundamental part of the constitutional environment
within which the British doctrine of legislative supremacy subsists").
261.
See ComparativePerspective, supranote 41, at 17.
262.
See Sir Stephen Sedley, The Sound of Silence: ConstitutionalLaw Without
a Constitution, 110 LAW Q. REV. 270, 285 (1994) [hereinafter Sound of Silence]. For an
example of how courts in the past have avoided Parliament's attempts to limit judicial
review, see the case of Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C.
147 (H.L.).
263.
DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at 17, 115-16.
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Although the political reality may be that Parliament would
never seriously curtail or eliminate the power of ultra vires review,
the position that the doctrine stems only from implied legislative
intent presents serious obstacles for its further development. From
this point of view, the judiciary already seems to have stretched its
judicial review power to the constitutional limit. The grounds upon
which a court may now declare an action to be ultra vires are
nevertheless rather wide. Although a court can only declare an
executive action to be outside of the statutory grant of authority, it
may scrutinize both executive action and the statute in question in a
The ultra vires
manner bordering upon substantive review. 264
doctrine has developed in a manner so that courts may review
executive actions on grounds other than legality, such as irrationality
and procedural impropriety, thus delving into the decision-making
Irrationality includes decisions that are also
process itself. 265
unreasonable, while procedural impropriety includes a violation of
both statutory requirements and natural justice. Violations of either
of these grounds could include abuse of discretion, failure to consider
relevant facts or evidence, or an absence of reasons. 266 In reviewing
executive actions on these criteria, however, courts continue to
elaborate upon a presumed parliamentary intent that executive
action is authorized only if it conforms to such principles. 267 Again,
such an assumption stems from a fundamental understanding by the
judiciary that Parliament desires to legislate and constrain executive
action in conformity with the rule of law. In theory, these inquiries
continue to focus solely on Parliament's intent and not on motivating
To pass substantive judgment upon
considerations or purposes.
executive actions permissible under statute, not to mention upon the
primary legislation itself, would be to challenge the will of Parliament
and require an independent constitutional footing from which to
assert the power of review.
The gray area between the procedural and substantive aspects of
irrational or unreasonable decision-making suggests that ultra vires
review based upon parliamentary intent may not adequately explain
judicial practice. An honest assessment of the substantive issues that
arise under concepts such as unreasonableness and a belief that
courts increasingly foray into a judicial approach, are antithetical to
orthodox ultra vires theory, and potentially the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty as well. 268 Another indication that the

264.
Id. at 130-42.
265.
Id.
266.
Id. at 147-48.
267.
Id.
268.
Of course, the question remains whether such judicial activity is
inappropriate as contrary to Parliament sovereignty or represents a new direction in
constitutional law that is to be accepted or embraced. See Vires and Vacuums, supra
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parliamentary foundations of the ultra vires doctrine may be an
inadequate justification for its existence is that courts exercise review
over executive acts stemming from prerogative claims having no
direct connection to statutory authorization. 269
Such judicial
authority could only result from the common law itself. It also
presents the question of how a review of prerogative actions could
arise from the common law if ultra vires remains based upon
parliamentary intent. The seemingly substantive elements hiding
within the ultra vires doctrine, as well as with the review of
prerogative executive actions, suggest that the power of review may
270
very well exist independently of parliamentary intent.
It is also clear that the ultra vires doctrine is a judicially created
one. That Parliament desires judicial review of executive actions is
an intention that has been wholly implied by the courts. The grounds
of review have similarly developed through the judicial process alone
and not through any parliamentary legislation. 27 1 Rather than
invoking an imagined parliamentary authorization for ultra vires
review, one could instead stress the doctrine's judicial origins as
evidence of the courts' independence from Parliament. Even though
courts still review secondary legislation only for compliance with
Parliament's intent-rather than any inherent substanceincreasingly creative methods of statutory interpretation that
promote concepts such as administrative fairness and reasonableness
further suggest an inherent judicial authority to practice a broader
scope of review. Ultra vires review, as an original creation of the
courts and having no express origins in legislative intent, could
conceivably stand as a common-law restraint upon parliamentary
authority. The fiction that the ultra vires doctrine derives from
Parliament's intent consequently has been characterized as nothing
more than a "fig leaf'; it nominally supports the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy while concealing the fact that it is an
independent, common-law judicial power. 2 72
This common-law

note 117, at 452-53; Jeffrey Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional
JudicialReview, 2000 PUB.L. 671, 673 [hereinafter Constitutional JudicialReview].
269.
See ConstitutionalJudicialReview, supra note 268, at 673.
270.
DE SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at 62-63. See also id. at 175-82 (for a
discussion of the review of prerogative powers); ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 154,
at 20; Dawn Oliver, Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of JudicialReview?, 1987 PUB. L.
543, 546-51.
271.
Fig Leaves, supra note 243, at 134-35; Andrew Halpin, The Theoretical
Controversy ConcerningJudicialReview, 64 MOD. L. REV. 500, 505 (2001).
272.
In the context of discussing Coke, Blackstone, and Dicey, Allan writes,
We should therefore concede to Parliament its law-making supremacy, but
within the overall restraints of the constitutional scheme as a whole. Statutes,
properly enacted, are entitled to great respect, but not unlimited deference: the
warmth of judicial reception may legitimately vary with the gravity of their
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position enhances the judiciary as an independent branch of
government inherently capable of substantively scrutinizing
273
executive acts, as well as the authorizing statute.
A common-law justification for judicial review, however, does not
necessarily entail the end of the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy. Just as Parliament has the authority to alter or abolish
principles of the common law, the Parliament could also claim the
right to modify or constrain judicial review based upon the same
grounds. Therefore, an inherent and independently derived power of
review might remain subject to Parliament in some degree. 274 This
sort of review remains consistent with, if not nearly identical to, a
narrow interpretation of Coke's judicial review theory and
Blackstone's reconciliation of natural law with positivism. There is
also nothing inconsistent between this position and Dicey's view that
parliamentary sovereignty exists alongside the rule of law. 275 A
common-law review power would have more in common with Coke
and Blackstone than orthodox ultra vires doctrine, as it would
recognize higher constitutional principles as an independent, even if
subordinate, source of law. Courts might very well possess an
independent power to review legislation based upon some higher legal
standard, such as the rule of law or even a constitutional document,
yet exercise that authority subject to ultimate legal sovereignty in
Parliament. Although positive acts of Parliament would still prevail,
courts might require express declarations to depart from
constitutional principles, while even more strictly interpreting
legislation so as to better protect procedural or substantive rights.
This version of common-law review, compatible as it is with Coke,
Blackstone, and Dicey, represents the resurgence of a theory of
judicial review that has long roots in British legal history.
Without legislative intent as the sole benchmark for the legality
of executive decision-making, courts could eventually turn to other

assault, if such it be, on settled rights and expectations. And the point at
which restrictive interpretation in particular cases should be described as
"disapplication" cannot be given philosophic precision.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 269-70 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 287; DE
SMITH ET AL., supra note 228, at 112-13 (not actually premising ultra vires review on
the common law, but basing it upon independent "principles of lawful or legitimate
administration"); Constitutional Theory, supra note 154, at 23; Fig Leaves, supra note
243, at 122-23 (explaining well the arguments for a common-law power of review, and
clearly supporting parliamentary sovereignty; this demands, in his view, the continued
acceptance of the ultra vires doctrine based upon implied legislative intent); Law and
Democracy, supra note 137, at 79.
273.
Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 449.
274.
The practical ability of Parliament to restrict the ultra vires doctrine,
however, would remain as slim as it now does, due to political barriers and widespread
acceptance of the propriety of some degree of review. Fig Leaves, supra note 243, at
126-27; Halpin, supra note 271, at 501.
275.
Competing Models, supra note 238, at 445.
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fundamental constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, as
substantive limitations that take precedence over Parliament's
express intent.
The grounds of review based upon procedural
unfairness and unreasonableness already seem to possess some
substantive content. 276
A development of this sort would not
necessarily subvert democracy by restricting the will of the
legislature. On the contrary, imposing substantive restrictions on
parliamentary power can "vindicate the democratic ideal," which
27 7
itself is premised upon individual liberty.
The rule of law is also inextricably embedded in the common law.
Lord Irvine suggests,
[T]he line which distinguishes adjudication on the validity of legislation
from questions of interpretationis not watertight ....
The interpretive
framework which exists in the U.K. legal order is based on a system of
morality which can be traced back to the roots of the common
2 78
law....

The continuity lends strong credibility to the recognition of a
common-law basis for judicial review because it still represents a
strain of English legal tradition, which is also an alternative that
might have profound effects upon the Constitution. 279 Indeed, one
might continue to debate whether the rule of law, for example,

276.
Consent and Constitutionalism,supra note 123, at 223; Vires and Vacuums,
supra note 117, at 455-56.
277.
Sir John Laws, Wednesbury, in THE GOLDEN METAND AND THE CROOKED
CORD: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC LAW IN HONOR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE QC 195-96 (Christopher

Forsyth & Ivan Hare eds., 1998); Constitutional Judicial Review, supra note 268, at
675.
278.
Comparative Perspective, supra note 41, at 20. Allan recognizes an
inherent tension in such a prospect between the judicial and policy-making roles.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 205-06. He writes,
[i]t would be a mistake to belittle the nature of this challenge since it strikes at
the core of a liberal conception of the rule of law. It questions the extent to
which a democratic polity, incorporating the basic elements of the separation of
powers, can consistently permit considerations of justice and fairness . . . to
govern the exercise of political power.
Id.
It is because of this problem that common-law principles, along with their
underlying moral foundations, remain essential to guide substantive adjudication and
prevent inappropriate judicial discretion. See id. at 289-90.
279.
Lord Irvine of Lairg, Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice
of Wednesbury Review, 1996 PUB. L. 59, 61 [hereinafter Wednesbury Review]. Lord
Irvine writes in regard to an interpretation of Coke promoting full judicial review that
"[s]uch notions form no part of the modern law.... They became obsolete when the
supremacy of Parliament was finally established by the revolution of 1688." Id.
However, the notion of a restrained Parliament subject to judicial review is far from
obsolete; on the contrary, it seems to be increasingly relevant to contemporary
developments, as evidenced by its resurgence within legal debates. The similarities
between ultra vires doctrine and the ideas of Coke and Blackstone have already been
noted above.
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primarily guarantees only procedural due process, or has more
substantive content constraining the scope or subject matter of
government action.28 0 In any case, an independent power of judicial
review might allow courts to invalidate executive acts, while refusing
to give effect to a clear intent of Parliament that violates fundamental
Courts would thereby shift from a mere
principles of law.28 1
interpretive judicial approach, which is aimed simply at assessing the
compliance of executive action with parliamentary intent, to one
focused upon the substantive validity of the authorizing primary
282
legislation.
By basing judicial review upon the common law rather than on
an implied parliamentary intent, courts should have more flexibility
and confidence in expanding the ultra vires doctrine in the way
discussed above. Common-law review should allow courts to feel
more confident in scrutinizing secondary or even primary legislation
against higher legal principles, even if Parliament still claims the
theoretical authority to override judicial determination. On the other
hand, a continued reliance on the doctrine upon implied legislative
intent would limit courts' abilities to expand judicial review powers
by mooring them to Parliament. 28 3 Therefore, under common-law
review more opportunities for dynamic constitutional change may
exist when courts confront legislative infringement of the rule of law,
or the government's obligations under the European Union and the
European Convention on Human Rights.2 8 4 Cut loose from the

The concept of the rule of law, while it certainly does mandate procedural
280.
standards of fairness, nevertheless likely suggests the adherence to certain substantive
values. "[A] bare notion of formal legality cannot furnish a useful conception of the rule
of law." Consent and Constitutionalism,supra note 123, at 222; see also id. at 231-34.
Craig counters that "[t]he fact that a particular court has recourse to moral
considerations or conceptions of justice or fairness when deciding a case tells one
nothing . . . as to whether that court is reasoning in a manner consonant with a
positivist or non-positivist view of adjudication." Analytical Framework, supra note
240, at 482-83. See also LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 209; Wednesbury,
supra note 277, at 199 (writing that "[t]he common law's challenge is now to define the
substantive content of the rule of law ... "). For a review of procedural and
substantive notions of the rule of law, see generally Analytical Framework, supra note
240.
Analytical Framework, supra note 240, at 206 (writing that "[tlhe scope of
281.
judicial review should be related to the evident risk of abuse of power"); Fig Leaves,
supra note 243, at 128-29 (suggesting that "the abandonment of ultra vires inevitably
involves the judicial review court in indirectly challenging legislative supremacy"). Id.
at 123, 134.
282.
This is the distinction between judicial review in the United States and the
United Kingdom. "While the emphasis [in the United States] is on morality as a
determinant of the validity of legislation, the emphasis in the United Kingdom is on
morality .. .as a determinant of the meaning of legislation." Comparative Perspective,
supra note 41, at 20.
Justifying JudicialReview, supra note 238, at 119.
283.
Such change would likely occur through an evolutionary process. "Judicial
284.
review of legislation can be assumed by a more drawn-out series of developments that
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limitations that a legislatively implied review power imposes, courts
could continue to develop the doctrine in a way that does not worry
about framing it in terms supportive of parliamentary supremacy. A
greater institutional independence of the judiciary may be desirable
considering the power of an executive backed by a majority in
Parliament. To better resist the power of the executive, "[i]t can
therefore be argued that it is even more important for the courts to
' 285
develop the doctrines of judicial review on the common law model.
Thus, common-law review enhances the constitutional position of the
judiciary.
The idea that courts have an area of legal competence arising
independently of Parliament means that the judiciary is equal to
Parliament. Sir Stephen Sedley has suggested that such a situation
may already exist with "dual sovereignty" exercised through both
Parliament and the judiciary. 28 6
This position resembles the
constitutional arrangement suggested by a broad interpretation of
Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case and a counteremphasis upon
Blackstone's natural-law theory. 28 7 It can also be reconciled with
Dicey by recognizing the rule of law as an aspect of democratic
constitutionalism that takes precedence over parliamentary acts
harmful to liberty. In this sense, the establishment of a common-law
power of review furthers what Lord Steyn has pointed out to be three
interacting constitutional principles: the separation of powers, the
rule of law, and constitutionalism. 288
The judiciary could, for
instance, restrain Parliament by substantively reviewing primary
legislation for compliance with the rule of law, thereby ensuring that

allows time for the readjustment of ideas, rather than by the single stroke of Chief
Justice Marshall's pen as in the early years of the United States." Sir David Williams,
The Courts and Legislation:Anglo-American Contrasts, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
323, 328 (2001).
285.
Public Law, supra note 54, at 237; Williams, supra note 284, at 337 (finding
the lack of a clear separation of powers to be an impediment to judicial review:
"Parliamentary sovereignty means, in essence, the supremacy of the executive under
our government system, and the confusion of legislative and executive functions
(especially when the senior judges are compromised) makes it all the more difficult for
the courts to assert judicial review."). A common-law justification for judicial review
should ameliorate this problem somewhat by giving the judiciary more independence
from both the legislature and executive. Barendt, supra note 49, at 605.
286.
Sir Stephen Sedley, Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda, 1995
PUB. L. 386, 388-89 [hereinafter Human Rights]; Lord Woolf, Droit Public-English
Style, 1995 PUB. L. 57, 69 [hereinafter Droit Public] (also recognizing the courts and
Parliament as "partners both engaged in a common enterprise involving the upholding
of the rule of law").
287.
See Mullender, supra note 245, at 143-44.
288.
Lord Steyn, The Weakest and Least DangerousDepartment of Government,
1997 PUB. L. 84, 86; Vires and Vacuums, supra note 117, at 457-58 (similarly
suggesting that the concept of "vires" can rest upon broader democratic and
constitutional principles providing a framework for government action).
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legislation is compatible with democratic constitutional values.
Common-law review allows for many options of interpretation and
application, and arguably contains the theoretical seeds to grow into
a full power to invalidate parliamentary statutes. For those reasons,
common-law based judicial review offers great potential for
constitutional growth and the effective enforcement of binding
principles against Parliament.
E. Summary
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has remained the
foundation of the British Constitution in modern times. Growing out
of the English Civil War, the doctrine established Parliament as the
supreme legal authority in England. 28 9 Blackstone offered in his
Commentaries what became the first authoritative justification for
this doctrine. He articulated a balanced constitution, complemented
by a separation between Parliament's legal authority and the moral
authority of natural-law principles. 290 Acknowledging the supreme
will of Parliament, against which no otherworldly power could legally
prevail, Blackstone also stressed natural law as the morally supreme
and legitimizing force behind man-made law. 29 1 Any law that did not
conform to these higher principles was invalid.2 92 Yet Blackstone's
juxtaposition of these two positions created a tension that still exists
in the unwritten Constitution between higher order law that morally
limits a Parliament that legally has no restraint on its actions.
Blackstone attempted to side-step this problem by finding that
natural law not only prescribed positive law to meet its requirements,
but also by suggesting that the English common-law and
parliamentary act were actually descriptive of these higher
principles. 293 This conformity resulted from the search for the public
good, as it occurred not only in the judicial development of the
common law, but also in the political process within Parliament.
Furthermore, unlimited legal authority in Parliament was practically
restrained through the competing interests of the Crown, Lords, and
Commons. Blackstone therefore preferred to pursue the public good,
and thus the search for first principles, through the political
294
process.
Still, the centrality of natural law to Blackstone's theory
provided an alternative foundation for judicial power to limit
Parliament legally based upon first principles. Such a power of

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

DICEY, supra note 3, at 41.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
See source cited supranote 12.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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judicial review represented a competing view of the British
Constitution. This alternative vision had been suggested earlier by
Coke in Bonham's Case, and incited advocates within England as well
as the American colonies who opposed unfettered parliamentary
authority. 295 Blackstone, while ultimately preferring the supremacy
of Parliament, nevertheless formulated an orthodox constitutional
theory that contained within it the doctrinal foundations for some
measure of judicial review that could conceivably restrain
296
Parliament.
Later, Dicey modified Blackstone's theory in two significant
ways. While reinforcing the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
Dicey's recognition of the balanced constitution was in many ways
hollow. The House of Commons had long since come to dominate the
government, making any justification of parliamentary sovereignty
based upon the balanced constitution realistically untenable. Dicey
recognized the power of the Commons and emphasized its democratic
origins. 29 7
Parliament was legally sovereign and all-powerful;
however, it remained accountable to the electorate. 298 The electorate
was the political sovereign even without legal authority, and the
pursuit of its interest legitimized parliamentary acts. 29 9
Under
Dicey's democratic constitutional model, the electorate became
morally but not legally superior to Parliament. 30 0
Furthermore,
30 1
Dicey departed from Blackstone by giving no place to natural law.
By elevating the electorate to a position of moral superiority to the
legislature, however, Dicey effectively substituted democratic will for
natural law.
Just as Blackstone assumed that parliamentary acts could
satisfy natural law principles by acting for the public good, Dicey
suggested that legislating for the public good presumptively coincided
with electoral will. 30 2 Also, external political pressures and internal
normative values realistically restrained Parliament so that judicial
review remained subordinate to the political process. Dicey further
justified unlimited parliamentary power upon its value as a
democratic expression of electoral will. 30 3
Thus, Dicey remained
reluctant to explore the possibility that Parliament might act against
the public interest, although he briefly admitted that in such a case

295.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *160-61.
296.
But see supra text accompanying note 95 (for argument that parliamentary
restraint would not be found in the courts).
297.
See supra text accompanying note 101.
298.
See supra notes 101, 107 and accompanying text.
299.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
300.
See supra text accompanying note 106.
301.
See supra text accompanying note 102.
302.
See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
303.
See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
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Parliament would prevail. 30 4 Dicey also implied that the interests of
Parliament and the electorate might not necessarily agree, as
indicated by his insistence that Parliament was in no way legally
bound to act in trust for the electorate. 30 5 Dicey's democratic theory
invites arguments that the normative significance of the public good
and fundamental democratic ideals might indeed restrain Parliament
from acting against them.
The works of Blackstone and Dicey, though contributing to the
development of modern orthodox constitutional theory, nevertheless
contain theoretical undercurrents supportive of an alternative
constitutional order. The concept of a limited Parliament, subject to
some review power in the courts, represents a distinct if nondominant strain of common-law constitutional thought. The tensions
found in Coke, Blackstone, and Dicey, however, continue to exist in
the form of ultra vires judicial review. For years, courts have been
reviewing and even invalidating secondary legislation as ultra vires a
statutory grant of power.
Ostensibly, the ultra vires doctrine
supports parliamentary sovereignty by ensuring that executive
actions do not go beyond the limits that Parliament intended. Yet
courts regularly interpret statutes creatively, and review executive
actions upon such abstract grounds as procedural unfairness and
unreasonableness as to foray into substantive review. Such practices
elevate the constitutional position of the judiciary and weaken the
parliamentary sovereignty doctrine. Furthermore, the ultra vires
doctrine is wholly judge-made. Some might argue that it nonetheless
represents an implied intent of Parliament that courts promote the
rule of law. However, a realistic assessment suggests that ultra vires
review is a common-law doctrine. The implications of this commonlaw origin-even if powers of review initially remain subordinate to
the express will of Parliament-is that the judiciary can better assert
itself as an independent branch of government. The judiciary would
also have more possibilities to develop review doctrines free from a
theoretical reliance upon the legislature, and could potentially assert
a right to invalidate acts of Parliament.
Ultra vires review, then, presently blurs the line between
substantive and formalistic adjudication, and increasingly calls into
question the institutional place of the judiciary and the continuing
validity of parliamentary supremacy. The recognition of the commonlaw origins of ultra vires review and its potential for broader
development is also consistent with some of the ideas of Coke,
Blackstone, and Dicey.
Just as orthodox constitutional theory
contains within it theoretical elements supporting a limited

304.
305.

See supra text accompanying note 115.
See supra text accompanying note 106.
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Parliament subject to a common-law power of judicial review, it can
likewise accommodate written constitutional norms.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF WRITTEN TEXTS

A. Characteristicsof a ConstitutionalSystem
As discussed in Part II, the unwritten nature of the British
Constitution does not necessarily preclude judicial review of primary
legislation. The common law can impose legally enforceable limits
upon both Parliament and the Crown, based upon the rule of law and
the democratic foundations of government. A subsequently adopted,
written constitutional document is, therefore, not an originating
source of either parliamentary limits or judicial review power.
Rather, it is a means for expressing those principles of limited
government.
Constitutional texts graft onto the underlying,
alternative common-law framework.
A constitutional document
facilitates judicial review if that enforcement mechanism already
exists in some form. A text neither guarantees the normative value of
judicial review, nor is its adoption a necessary result of the existence
of judicial review. Constitutional systems may accordingly vary both
in the extent to which they rely upon judicial or political methods of
enforcement, and combine written and unwritten elements.
This Section suggests that constitutions differ in how strictly or
exclusively they guide or limit government action. They can be
paradigmatic through the assertion of legally non-binding, but
generally observed, principles of good governance, or definitive in that
they establish enforceable parameters beyond which government
cannot act.
They also exhibit varying degrees of rigidity and
flexibility in their ability to change, whether through legislative
measures,
adjudication,
or
special
amending
procedures.
Furthermore, these characteristics can equally describe written or
unwritten constitutions.
The defining feature of a written
constitution, therefore, is its normative value as an instrument
expressing and memorializing the institutional arrangements and
their substantive boundaries, which exist as normative assumptions
about government.
1. Paradigmatic and Definitive Constitutions
One of the fundamental purposes of a constitution is to order the
political life of a society by providing a system of rules according to
which government institutions function.
This framework may
include the determination of how laws are created; the relative
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powers between legislative, executive, and judicial branches; or the
recognition of certain fundamental rights possessed by individual
citizens. A constitution may also provide general statements of
principles establishing a context within which government and laws
operate. 30 6 A constitution, then, speaks to the issues of both
institutional arrangement and substantive governing principles. As
Walter F. Murphy wrote, "[t]he goal of a constitutional text must...
be not simply to structure a government, but to construct a political
system, one that can guide the formation of a larger constitution, a
'way of life' that is conducive to constitutional democracy. 30 7
Murphy's definition includes two important observations concerning
the nature of a constitution. First, a constitution has the dual
purpose of both arranging government institutions and establishing
their roles. In most western constitutions, this involves some notion
of separation of powers between legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. 30 8 Second, there is a distinction between a constitutional
text and the constitution itself. This distinction, however, does not
discount a functional relationship between the two, as an enduring
constitutional text must correspond with or express underlying
normative ideals about the nature of government. A constitution may
also exist in unwritten form, as has traditionally been the case in the
United Kingdom. Yet this unwritten nature may blur the line
between more abstract constitutional principles and the formal
30 9
articulation of rules.
Generally, a constitution tends to be either paradigmatic or
definitive in how strictly it orders the political system. To say that a
constitution is paradigmatic suggests that it is a statement of
principles to which government action should adhere, but which act
as guidelines rather than legally enforceable rules. 310 A paradigmatic

306.
Walter F. Murphy identifies four possible functions of a constitution as a
charter for government, a guardian of rights, a symbol of political or national consciousness,
or as a means of "allowing a nation to hide its failures behind idealistic rhetoric." Walter F.
Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY:

TRANSITIONS

IN

THE

CONTEMPORARY

WORLD,

excerpts

reprinted in

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 195, 197 (Richard C. Clark et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Constitutions].
307.
Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional
Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91, 129 (1991) [hereinafter ConstitutionalDemocracy].
308.
While British political thought has long had the notion of a separation of
executive and legislative functions, see JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 80-88 (Prometheus ed. 1986) (1690), Montesquieu offered one of the most
notable and influential arguments for a tri-partite division that included the judiciary.
See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156-64 (Anne Cohler et al.

trans., 1989).
309.
PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 8-9; A.W. BRADELY & K.D. EWING,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (12th ed. 1997).
310.
The choice of the word "paradigmatic" for this characteristic is due to a
constitution's "exemplary" nature. As conceptualized in this Article, the constitutional
paradigm is not only representative of how government regularly functions in fact, but
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constitution operates primarily upon the underlying normativity,
finding salience in its continued representation of basic values held
by both private citizens and members of government. It creates a
pattern or an ideal model for the workings of government, including
institutional arrangements, substantive government powers, and
rights concepts. Whatever arrangements a paradigmatic constitution
makes in this regard, they are nothing more than non-binding
statements of principle guiding, but not legally requiring, government
action or forbearance. The government remains free to disregard the
principles promoted by the constitution.
Therefore, government
actions may be legal despite being unconstitutional in the sense that
they are contrary to the constitutional paradigm.
Opposition to such unconstitutional government action must
take the form of political pressure or resistance that may fail to
prevent or correct the violation. Legal claims arguing for the
invalidity or inapplicability of government actions due to their
unconstitutionality cannot succeed. Dicey's conception of the British
Constitution is perhaps the best example of a paradigmatic
constitution, dependent as it is on parliamentary supremacy
restrained only by external and internal limits. Political forces alone
restrict government and the application of constitutional principles is,
in the end, a political process, not a judicial one. The paradigmatic
constitution constructs a value system, the success of which continues
to depend upon its voluntary acceptance by members of government.
It also easily permits exceptions or departures from its basic
principles when the government feels it is necessary to pursue an
overriding policy, whether supported or not by the general
electorate. 3 " The judiciary, without full authority to strike down
legislation, nevertheless may continue to exercise wide latitude in the
extent to which it refers to constitutional principles when
interpreting or applying statutes and administrative regulations. In
short, the paradigmatic constitution acts as a moral compass for the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches and relies solely upon its
normative hold upon government members for its continued
observance, lacking any formal enforcement mechanisms in law.
The alternative nature of a constitution is one that is definitive.
While such a constitution asserts general governing principles having
normative force among both the population at large and government
actors, its role is more formal and imposing. A definitive constitution

is also aspirational in that it promotes particular ideals or rules to which government
should conform. See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993).
311.
Part III.A.2, however, supposes a distinction between the occasional
departure from a generally followed principle, and the habitual practice inconsistent
with it or blatant changes in the rule itself that effectively amend the constitution
thereafter.
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establishes rules for the operation of institutional structures and
their procedures, or sets out substantive government powers subject
to some legal control. Government actions contrary to its provisions
are either void and have no effect ab initio, or are provisionally
effective subject to mandatory correction by the government. 312 A
constitution is definitive because it attempts to circumscribe the
limits of government actions beyond where they cannot stray, as
opposed to where they should not stray. Government actors are
motivated to conform to constitutional principles and rules not only
from fidelity to their ideals, but also out of concern that conflicting
actions will legally fail. For a constitution to be definitive, some
effective measure of judicial review is probably best suited to
articulate the metes and bounds of government authority and enforce
compliance. Among constitutional democracies, judicial review and
the invalidation of statutes is a preferred means for enforcing
3 13
constitutional limits upon legislative and executive actions.
Canada and the United States are good examples of definitive
constitutional arrangements in the common-law tradition, as their
constitutions establish strictly enforceable procedural requirements
in the making of law, its application according to the rule of law, and
314
substantive limits grounded in federalism and a bill of rights.
While it is useful to make a broad generalization as to whether a
constitution as a whole tends to be paradigmatic or definitive in
effect, these descriptive terms may be particular to specific written
provisions or unwritten principles.
Furthermore, the labels of
"paradigmatic" and "definitive," for purposes of understanding, evoke
a dichotomous vision of the constitution as either completely
dependent upon the political will to abide by guiding principles or
policed by a judicial power to invalidate legislation. In actuality, a

312.
The Canadian cases of A.G. Manitoba v. Forest, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1032 and
Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, illustrate the idea of
provisional validity. In the first case, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that all
Manitoba statutes enacted only in English violated a provision of the provincial
constitution requiring that legislation be in both English and French. Such Englishonly legislation was therefore unconstitutional and invalid. The subsequent decision
found that, notwithstanding the unconstitutional promulgation of all English-only
legislation in Manitoba, those laws would continue to be temporarily valid until
constitutional requirements were satisfied by their translation to French.
313.
See Alec Stone, Abstract ConstitutionalReview and Policy Making in Western
Europe, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (Donald W. Jackson &
C. Neal Tate eds., 1992) [hereinafter JACKSON & TATE]; Dieter Grimm, Constitutional
Adjudication and Democracy, in JACKSON & TATE, supra,at 103, 104-05. "Nevertheless,
[judicial review] is not a universal or necessary element of a democratic constitution."
Jutta Limbach, The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution, 64 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5
(2001).
314.
See generally Peter H. Russell, The Growth of Canadian Judicial Review
and the Commonwealth and American Experiences, in JACKSON & TATE, supra note
313, at 29.
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constitution may consist of both paradigmatic and definitive elements
subject to varying degrees of judicial review.
U.S. constitutional law offers some good examples illustrative of
this phenomenon within the context of a constitutional jurisprudence
usually considered as firmly anchored upon a written text. The U.S.
federal judiciary, ever since the case of Marbury v. Madison, has
claimed, and regularly exercised, a power to review congressional
legislation, invalidating laws that it finds unconstitutional. 315 There
are a few constitutional issues, however, termed "political questions,"
that the Supreme Court has deemed nonjusticiable and committed for
resolution to Congress or the President. 316 Political questions present
constitutional principles or written rules that cannot legally bind
Congress or the President. 317 As the term indicates, these are issues
left only to political resolution and have no legal enforcement, despite
their constitutional status and purpose of guiding government
action. 318 The determination of what constitutes a political question
3 19
under the U.S. Constitution rests upon several considerations.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Baker v. Carr, elaborated
320
these factors,
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according
to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political
question, although each has one or more elements which identifies it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning

315.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The power of judicial review is not
stated in the Constitution, but was inferred by Chief Justice John Marshall. DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 71

(1985). Currie also remarks that "Marshall overstated his case badly by asserting that
judicial review was 'essentially attached to a written constitution."' Id. at 71 n.49.
316.
See 1 RONALD E. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.16 (3d ed. 1999).

317.
Id.
318.
Id.
319.
Id.
320.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker concerned a challenge to the
apportionment of election districts for Tennessee's General Assembly, which did not
accurately reflect population distribution. See id. The Court dismissed a claim that
the issue was a political question, breaking with contrary precedent. See id.; Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). It instead found the claim justiciable under the
Fourteenth Amendment's mandate that no state "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Baker, 369 U.S. at 200. In doing so,
Baker elaborated upon the definition of a political question. Id.
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adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
32 1
departments on one question.

For instance, the Supreme Court has found that political
questions encompass much of the conduct of foreign affairs, as well as
Section 4 of Article IV's mandate that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government. '3 22 Congress or the President retains discretion to
interpret the Constitution in these areas, free from judicial scrutiny
323
and subject only to other political controls.
The controversy over the adoption of the 27th Amendment is a
good example of how Diceyan external limits can restrain political
action in areas remaining nonjusticiable, even within a written
constitutional system. This Amendment was originally part of the 12
proposed amendments drafted by James Madison, which the First
Congress submitted to the states for ratification in 1789.324 The
provision, that would later become the 27th Amendment, mandated
that "No law varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives shall take effect until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened.3 25
In the package of
proposed amendments, Congress did not provide a time limit for
acceptance by the states. Nevertheless, the ten amendments that

321.
Id. at 217.
322.
David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 133-34 (1996). In
Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), for example, the Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari in a challenge against the legality of the Vietnam War. In Luther
v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) and Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118 (1912), the Court found that the determination of a legitimate or
republican form of state government involved political considerations outside of the
judicial role. Baker re-affirmed the nonjusticiability of political questions under the
guarantee clause, although it characterized the apportionment of legislative districts as
an equal protection problem. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
323.
Justice Brennan's description in Baker of what issues constitute a political
question, it should be noted, echo British justifications for a judicial formalism that
denies the courts the power to invalidate legislation by Parliament or stray from its
intent. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186. Arguments against judicial review of a substantive
nature rest upon the assertion that judges are an appointed elite not democratically
responsible to the electorate. These arguments also assert that the judiciary is
institutionally ill-equipped to conduct the same fact-finding missions and weigh policy
options, as can the legislature. Furthermore, the British notion of separation of powers
has been different than that in the United States. Whereas the U.S. understanding
places the judiciary in an independent position to check legislative action straying
beyond constitutional limits, the British approach has been to characterize judicial
review of statutes as an infringement upon the function of the legislation branch. See
Mullender, supra note 245; Griffith, supranote 49, at 66.
324.
Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1992).
325.
The ten proposals that did receive ratification constitute the Bill of Rights.
Incidentally, under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, elections for the House of
Representatives take place every two years.
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now comprise the Bill of Rights received ratification rather promptly
by 1791, while the salary provision did not. Through the years,
however, several states had occasionally ratified the proposed salary
amendment out of frustration with perceived problems in
Congress.3 26 In 1992, over 200 years after the introduction of the
original 12 proposed amendments, the state of Michigan ratified the
salary provision, thus meeting the three-fourths requirement
necessary for a federal constitutional amendment.3 2 7 The incredibly
long time-period between the Amendment's introduction and its
passage raised questions as to whether Article V implied a reasonable
3 28
period for ratification.
The Supreme Court, however, had already adjudged that
controversies under the Article V amending procedures might present
political questions unsuitable for judicial review. In Leser v. Garnett,
the Court refused to consider a claim that alleged improprieties in the
ratification process of two states meant that the 19th Amendment
failed to receive approval of three-fourths of the states as required
under Article V. 3 29 The closest judicial precedent to the controversy
over the 27th Amendment was the 1939 case of Coleman v. Miller,
which concerned a challenge to Kansas' ratification of a proposed
3 30
amendment 13 years after Congress had submitted it to the states.
The Court decided that whether the passage of time or changed
circumstances meant that the proposed Amendment was no longer
amenable to ratification was a nonjusticiable political question best
left to Congress. 33 '
In regard to the 27th Amendment, several
members of Congress publicly expressed reservations and suggested
that the passage of time might indeed preclude ratification of the
amendment.3 3 2
No judicial challenge to the validity of the
Amendment arose, however, and external political limits effectively
3 33
controlled the congressional response to the controversy.
Considering the subject matter of the Amendment and the possible
electoral consequences should Congress reject a widely popular

326.
327.
328.

Bernstein, supra note 324, at 537-38.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 542-43. See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh

Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 502, 503-05 (1994).

329.
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). Leser departed from previous
language in Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), that the U.S. Constitution, Article 5
implied a reasonable time period for ratification. The 19th Amendment provides that
"[t]he right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
330.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). The proposed amendment would
have overturned Supreme Court decisions interfering with congressional regulation of
child labor. It never received ratification by three-fourth of the states.
331.
Id.
332.
Bernstein, supra note 324, at 540-42.
333.
Id.
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measure intended to limit its ability to raise the salary of its own
members, it recognized the 27th Amendment. 334
This incident
illustrates how significant constitutional issues can remain
nonjusticiable and under the province of the legislature, even within
a written constitution providing for full judicial review in most cases.
It also reveals the restraining influence of political pressure upon a
legislature that is acting under nonjusticiable constitutional
provisions. Although the U.S. Constitution relies heavily on judicial
review, the political question doctrine means that some constitutional
rules or principles are essentially paradigmatic in that they suggest
legally unenforceable government obligations or courses of action.
The Canadian Constitution strikes an interesting balance
between political and judicial determination of constitutional issues
in regard to its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 335 Section 33 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, allows Parliament or a provincial assembly to
declare that a statute will have effect notwithstanding a possible
violation of certain guarantees in the Charter. 336 Peter W. Hogg
explains,
[I]t is obvious that there is room for argument over the question of
which institutions should have the power to determine questions of
rights.
The British solution is the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty. . . .

The American solution is judicial review. . . .

The

power of override places Canada in an intermediate position ....
[B]y
virtue of s. 33, a judicial decision to strike down a law for breach of s. 2
or ss. 7 to 15 of the Charter is not final. The judicial decision is subject
33 7
to legislative review.

334.
Id. at 498, 542. Action by Congress followed that of the Archivist of the
United States, who had promptly certified the amendment as valid pursuant to his
statutory authority. Id. at 540.
335.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
Charter].
336.
Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, § 33(1). Section 33(1) states that "Parliament or the legislature of a
province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case
may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter." Id. Section 33 therefore does
not allow the override of guaranteed democratic rights (Sections 3-5), mobility rights
(Section 6), language and education rights (Sections 16-23), and the enforcement
provision (Section 24). 2 JOSEPH ELIOT MAGNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA:
CASES, NOTES AND MATERIALS 204-05 (8th ed. 2001).
337.
PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 773 (2000).
This

interaction, sometimes maybe tension, becomes more apparent as the Section 52 of
Constitution Act, 1982 expressly gives the judiciary authority to exercise review, as
"any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, § 52.
While such review initially focused upon federalism concerns, while still respecting
parliamentary sovereignty of the federal and provincial legislatures within their
respective jurisdiction. In this sense, the existence of a "notwithstanding" clause in
both the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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Such a declaration automatically lapses in effect after five years,
requiring Parliament or the assembly to consider its possible
extension for another five-year period. 338 The effect of this provision
is that the legislative branch retains the ultimate authority to
legislate contrary to certain rights protected in the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. 33 9 Section 33, however, does establish manner and
form restrictions on the ability of Parliament or the assembly ability
to contravene the Charter of Rights by requiring that
[t]he declaration must be confined to the rights specified in s. 33; it
must be specific as to the statute that is exempted from the Charter,
and as to the rights that are overridden; and it may not be given
retroactive effect. These requirements are mainly formal, and .. .are
340
not very demanding.
The implications of this for judicial review are that the courts can
only review the constitutional validity of a § 33 declaration based
upon its compliance with these formal criteria; they cannot scrutinize
it upon substantive grounds. 3 4 1 This means that in the absence of an

§ 33, the judiciary exercises review,
of invalidation, over primary legislation. 342

express declaration under

including a power
Nevertheless,

Parliament

and

the

assemblies

retain

sovereign

authority to legislate contrary to specified Charter provisions, thereby
preventing any substantive judicial review of the statute in question
in such an instance. This balance between judicial and legislative

authority recognizes the popularly elected legislature as making
ultimate determinations as to the political necessity of a Charter
override.3 43 It thereby accommodates the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty. 3 4 4

The fact that Parliament has never invoked the

notwithstanding clause, while provincial assemblies have done so in
only a few instances, suggests the influence that Charter values and
§ 33 have in erecting political barriers to restrain legislative action. 34 5

represent restrictions, not enlargements or grants, of legislative authority. Canadian
Bill of Rights, infra note 391, § 2; Charter, supra note 335, § 33(1).
338.
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, § 33(3)-(4).
339.
However, MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE
LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA 79 (1992), writes, "[slection 33 is not an override

of the Charter at all, but is a refusal to let the legal profession have the final say in
politics." Id.
340.
HOGG, supra note 337, at 769, 771.
341.
Id. at 771-72.
342.
See PATRICK MONAHAN, THE CHARTER, FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA 99-100 (1987).
343.
HOGG, supra note 337, at 773-74. 'The power of override . . . makes

judicial review suspensory only." Id. at 774.
344.
See MONAHAN, supra note 342, at 118-20.
345.
The Federal government has never invoked Section 33. Qu6bec, however,
has used it twice. After the enactment of the Charter, the governing Parti Qu~becois,
which had been opposed to the Constitution Act, 1982, added a blanket
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This unique hybrid of parliamentary sovereignty and U.S.-style
judicial review demonstrates paradigmatic traits: the legislature, in
the end, is legally competent to adhere to or disregard Charter rights
and values at its discretion. The functional reality, however, is that
courts in Canada regularly and aggressively review, and even
invalidate, primary legislation upon substantive Charter grounds in
the absence of a § 33 declaration. 346 In this sense, derogable Charter
guarantees still operate in a definitive manner to restrain
government action and encourage judicial review. It must be noted,
too, that § 33 allows the override of most, but not all, provisions of the
Charter. 347 Exempted rights remain completely entrenched against
legislative encroachment and construct a strongly definitive
constitutional model enforceable by judicial review. The Canadian
Charter of Rights illustrates how a constitution can exhibit both
paradigmatic and definitive characteristics through the sophisticated
interaction between the judicial and political branches, and have
provisions that rely differently upon legal or political controls for
as
their enforcement. Hogg nicely describes this anomalous situation 348
promoting "dialogue" between the legislative and judicial branches.
The British Constitution, much more so than the U.S. or
Canadian, has traditionally been paradigmatic in that there is no
formal mechanism that can limit Parliament's legislative power.
Constitutional principles are nonjusticiable and dependent solely
upon political checks. There appear to be only two legal "rules" that
absolutely restrain Parliament under orthodox theory and that one
might term definitive of the constitutional order. The first is the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy itself, the inverse proposition of
which is that Parliament cannot limit its own substantive powers;
Parliament can always undo the actions of its predecessors. 34 9 The
second constitutional mandate is that an act of Parliament is only
that which passes through the Houses of Commons and Lords and
receives the Royal Assent. 350 An action that fails to achieve this is

notwithstanding clause to all existing provincial statutes. It also made such a
declaration in regard to legislation requiring that all signs in Quebec be in French.
ROBERT J. SHARPE

& KATHERINE

E. SWINTON, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

54-57 (1998). '"The only province other than Quebec to invoke the override was
Saskatchewan, in an effort to protect back-to-work legislation introduced during a
labour dispute." Id. at 57.
346.
Russell, supra note 314, at 37.
See generally Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336.
347.
HOGG, supra note 337, at 662; Mark D. Walters, The Common Law
348.

Constitution in Canada:Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law, 51 U.T.L.J.
91, 138 (2001) ("Under the modern court-parliament dialogue paradigm, neither courts
nor legislatures are supreme, but both contribute ideas from distinctive perspectives to
an ongoing discussion about the best normative structure for Canadian society.").
349.
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 58-59, 66.
Id.
350.
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not law and courts will give it no effect. 351 One might argue,
however, that even this procedural requirement is ultimately a
political question because courts will do no more than inquire
whether the act in question appears on the rolls of Parliament.
Courts will question neither the actual internal parliamentary
process, nor the giving of the Royal Assent. Instead, courts will
accept the rolls as conclusive evidence that the act has been
constitutionally adopted. 3 52 Other than these two primary rules,
Parliament may act freely, subject only to Diceyan internal and
external limitations. Still, while courts cannot substantively review
parliamentary acts and have traditionally followed a formalistic style
of adjudication, they nevertheless exercise considerable control over
government.
Part II discussed how courts directly restrain executive action
through the ultra vires doctrine, and how courts indirectly control
Parliament by interpreting legislation, sometimes quite creatively, in
conformity with constitutional principles. The English judiciary has
asserted such controls even in the face of clauses through which
Parliament has attempted to disallow any judicial review of
secondary legislation made under an enabling statute. This principle
is illustrated in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission,353 a
case that challenged the Commission's decision to reject the claimed
compensation. 3 54
In delegating authority to the Commission,
Parliament had added a clause declaring that no decisions of that
body were to be reviewed in court. 3 55 Nonetheless, the House of
Lords found that the Commission's decision was ultra vires and
interpreted the ouster clause as not preventing review of
administrative action that was a nullity from the outset. 356 The
Anisminic case shows, "for practical purposes the distinction between
application and interpretation of statutes is (in a sense) a matter of
degree: there is necessarily an uncertain border between restrictive
'357
interpretation and non-application (in the particular case).

351.
There is some question as to how far Parliament can change the manner
and form in how it makes law. Such changes, however, involve the law-making
procedure and not substantive parliamentary powers. The Parliament Acts of 1911
and 1949, infra note 510, for example, disallowed the House of Lords its traditional
right of veto, replacing it with a limited power of delay. The House of Lords Act of 1999
also restructured the composition of the upper House by limiting the right of hereditary
peers to sit, but without otherwise majorly affecting its legislative function. BRADLEY
& EWING, supra note 309, at 59-60.
352.
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 70-71.
353.
Anisminic v. Foreign Comp. Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L.).
354.
Id.
355.
Id.
356.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 65-66.
357.

Id.

at 65; See MARK ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW 30-34 (2001) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS].
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Regardless of the highly paradigmatic nature of the parliamentary
sovereignty model, adjudicative measures in practical effect give
some legal efficacy to constitutional principles. The more active
courts behave in this regard, the more definitive the British
35 8
Constitution will become.
The above examples from British, Canadian, and U.S. law
illustrate the fluidity of the concepts of a paradigmatic or definitive
constitution. A constitution, whether written or unwritten, may rely
upon judicial and political enforcement of its provisions to varying
degrees. To characterize a constitution as either paradigmatic or
definitive, however, is only a convenient term of generalization,
wherein exist many shades of gray. Lord Irvine of Lairg explained,
Constitutional supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty are often
perceived as concepts which are polemically opposed to one another,
given that the former limits legislative power and entrenches
fundamental rights, while the latter embraces formally unlimited
power and eschews the entrenchment of human rights. However, the
better view is that they represent two different parts of a continuum,
each reflecting differing views about how the judiciary and the other
institutions of government ought to interrelate. This conceptualization
follows (in part) from the fact the notions of constitutional and
legislative supremacy are themselves elastic....
Since they are each
catholic principles which accommodate a range of views concerning
institutional interrelationship, it is meaningless to suggest that they
are inevitably opposed to one another ....
[T]he two theories are best
thought of as different parts of a spectrum of views concerning how
359
judges should relate to the other branches of government.

This "spectrum" allows room for different kinds and degrees of
enforcement mechanisms within a constitutional model, and for
sophisticated relationships between the judicial and political
branches. 360 Accordingly, the political or legal protection available
for constitutional principles does not necessarily add to or detract
from their normative value within the community. It is instead such
normativity, rather than any particular extent of judicial review, that
is of paramount concern, and allows one to say that a nation has a

358.
Griffith recognizes such a conceptual shift from a political, or paradigmatic,
regime to a legal, or definitive, one. Griffith, supra note 49, at 44. Griffith writes,
"[Sedley] does not advocate a written constitution but re-asserts his claim that 'the
common law itself has both the capacity and the obligation to move in the next
generation towards a principled constitutional order.'
This is to regard the
Constitution as a legal rather than . . . a political construct." Id. (quoting Sound of
Silence, supra note 262, at 273).
359.
Comparative Perspective, supra note 41, at 7-8.
While Lord Irvine
comments in the context of human rights, his observation equally applies to other
areas of public law, such as the rule of law, devolution, and the primacy of European
Community law. Id.
360.
Id. at 18.
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constitution.3 6 1 Similarly, the normative value of a written text in
expressing these principles is the definitive consideration in
characterizing it as a constitutional document, regardless of the
36 2
extent of its legal enforceability.
Just as the British and U.S. Constitutions rely upon judicial
review differently, they also draw differently upon textual references.
In either political culture, however, underlying normative values of
constitutionalism precede constitutional form. 3 6 3 A constitution is
instrumental to constitutionalism not only through its establishment
of clear institutional structures and substantive rules, but also in its
manner of expression. It is through this expressive form that
political and legal institutions find guidance in articulating or
following underlying constitutional principles.3 6 4 In the United
States, courts first look to the written Constitution in restraining
government, while U.K. courts directly refer to the rule of law and
common-law rights that traditionally do not derive from a textual
source.3 6 5 Canada, having a constitution "similar in Principle to that
of the United Kingdom" has, in contrast, long recognized that a

361.
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 11 (commenting that "it may be going
too far to regard judicial enforcement as a necessary condition for a norm to be
classified as a law"); Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L.
REV. 216, 226-27 (1999).
362.
GOLDSWORTHY, supranote 179, at 11-12.
T.R.S. Allan, ConstitutionalRights and Common Law, 11 OXFORD J.L. STUD.
363.
453, 460-61, 468, 477 (1991) [hereinafter ConstitutionalRights]; Constitutionalism is an
abstract concept that, while open to differing definitions, is often taken to require
democratic government, adherence to the rule of law, some form of separation of powers,
and sometimes substantive restrictions on government authority. These basic values can
lead to different conclusions about the form of the constitution, as illustrated by arguments
both supporting and rejecting judicial review due to separation of powers. Murphy points
out, however, that a constitution and constitutionalism are not necessarily linked, as a
constitution might reject democratic or rights concerns. Constitutional Democracy, supra
note 307, at 105-09. He further makes a distinction between constitutionalism as requiring
substantive limitations upon government and democratic theory that relies only upon
political checks. Gavison suggests such labels can be confusing, as democratic government
is highly valued by those supporting either judicial or political checks. Gavison, supra note
361, at 223-24. This thesis rejects Murphy's distinction between constitutionalist and
democratic thought, instead asserting that constitutionalism is simply the commitment to
the basic ideals just described. The form of the resulting constitution, whether establishing
legal or political limitations on government authority, is an instrumental means to the
realization of constitutionalism. Comparative Perspective, supra note 41, at 2. Thus, the
United Kingdom and the United States have shared values of constitutionalism, while
having very different constitutions. Limbach makes the same point in comparing the
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Limbach, supra note 313, at 51.
364.
See ANTHONY KING, DOES THE UNITED KINGDOM STILL HAVE A
CONSTITUTION? 3-6 (2001).
365.
P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-

AMERICAN LAW 43-47 (1987); David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,
63 U. CHI.L. REV. 877, 885 (1996) (writing that the "written [U.S.] constitution has, by now,
become part of an evolutionary common law system... !).
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constitution can consist of both written and unwritten elements. 366
Courts of all three countries, however, do in fact refer to both written
and unwritten sources of law when adjudicating constitutional
issues. 3 67 In comparing Canada and the United States in this regard,
Murphy remarked,
[Canadians] distinguished between the constitutional document and
the larger constitution. Indeed, the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982,
lists a series of other texts imbued with constitutional status, and the
Canadian Supreme Court has accepted that the broader constitution
includes custom and tradition. In the United States, however, scholars,
judges, and other public officials seldom speak so clearly. Often "the
constitution" to which they refer seems coterminous with the text of
1787 as amended. Almost equally as often, however, "the constitution"
implicit in their arguments goes far beyond that document to include
interpretations, practices, traditions, and "original understandings"
conveniently, if not always accurately, ascribed to founders or
368
emendators.

Written and unwritten constitutional principles, then, must not exist
exclusively of one another. 369 The extent to which U.K. and U.S.
courts refer to unwritten and written sources of law, and how
determinative or influential those sources are, exist on extremely
opposite ends of a spectrum. In the United Kingdom and the United
States, foundational texts occupy different amounts of "constitutional
space." Both constitutions also have different compositions in regard
to the form of written texts that they primarily use. The U.S.
Constitution is one coherent, integrated document, and the British
textual sources exist as a conglomeration of treaties and statutes. 3 70

366.
Walters, supra note 348, at 91-92, 97-100; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31
Vict., c. 3, pmbl. (Eng.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
367.
Strauss comments that
[t]he written constitutionalism of the United States has much more in common
with the unwritten constitution of Great Britain than it does with the written
constitutionalism of a newly formed Eastern European state-or, for that
matter, than it does with the written constitutionalism of, say, the postwar
German Federal Republic or the Fifth French Republic in its first decade.
Strauss, supra note 365, at 890.
368.
Constitutional Democracy, supra note 307, at 114-15. Murphy further
writes that "a constitution need not employ a written text, and indeed, probably is
never fully encapsulated in a document ....
Id. at 105. Conversely, it would seem
remarkable if an unwritten constitution, such as that of the United Kingdom, never
had reference to particularly significant legal or political documents.
369.
Richard Fallon flatly states that "the United States has an unwritten as
well as a written constitution."
RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 111 (2001) (footnote omitted).
He further asserts that the written
Constitution exists alongside an unwritten, more general constitution comprised of
such elements as binding precedent, historical practice, and norms guiding
adjudication. Id. at 113-14, 116.
370.
Even though formal theory accords such documents no legal status
different from ordinary statute, it still acknowledges their special role in influencing
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These written constitutional principles also vary in the United
Kingdom and United States in how far they are paradigmatic, or
definitive in impact, to the extent that courts will actually rely upon
them in reviewing legislative and executive actions.
2. Flexible and Rigid Constitutions
Just as constitutions vary in how strictly they limit government
action through their reliance upon formal rules and enforcement
mechanisms, so too can they exhibit different dynamics of change.
Dicey recognized this important aspect of constitutions by
characterizing them as either flexible or rigid. 37 1 These two ideas
closely relate to whether a constitution is paradigmatic or definitive,
although they remain distinct in conceptualization. While the terms
"paradigmatic" and "definitive" refer to whether limitations upon
government power rely upon binding legal rules or moral force for
effect, "flexibility" and "rigidity" concern the ease with which such
These concepts reflect institutional
limitations can change.
in regard to legislative and judicial
the
system
competencies within
rules. They also touch upon the
constitutional
to
alter
basic
powers
way in which the constitution fundamentally adapts to or
accommodates shifting political normativity in society.
A flexible constitution, as the term implies, is one that is very
amenable to change, having few or no special amending
procedures. 372 One of the most obvious examples of flexibility is the
British Constitution. 373 The Constitution is paradigmatic in that the
Parliament can enact any law it wishes, whether or not it violates
other constitutional principles. 374 Alternatively, it is also flexible
because Parliament can alter constitutional principles themselves
and establish new baselines for government action. 3 75 Parliament
has done this in the past by establishing rules for the succession to
the Crown, declaring union with Scotland, and extending the
suffrage. 376 Recent constitutional changes have included the reform
of the House of Lords, continuing integration into the European
37 7
All
Union, devolution, and the passage of the Human Rights Act.

British constitutional development.

DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 21-22;

PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 18-19.

DICEY, supranote 3, at 91, 127-28.
371.
372.
Id. at 127; DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 10; PHILLIPS ET AL., supra
note 1, at 6.
373.
374.

375.
376.
377.
LAW 41-42,

DICEY, supra note 3, at 91; DE SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 7, at 15.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 91.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 41-44.
See A.W. BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
119-20, 172-73, 479 (13th ed. 2003).

2003]

BRITISH COMMON-LAW CONSTITUTION

of these significant constitutional measures were achieved through
the legislative process, requiring nothing more than a simple majority
in Parliament. 378 Despite formally having no legally binding effect on
Parliament, these acts have all had great impact upon the
Constitution. 379 As Dicey pointed out, certain laws in the United
Kingdom are constitutional as they "affect the fundamental
institutions of the state, and not because they are legally more sacred
or difficult to change than other laws. ' 380 There is, therefore, no
distinction in form between a regular statute and constitutional
enactment, although their normative value may vary greatly. 38 1 A
partial reason for the lack of formal recognition of constitutional acts,
as opposed to regular acts, is that Parliament is more than a
legislative assembly; it is also a "constituent assembly" empowered to
alter the Constitution. 38 2 Dicey justified such amendatory powers
themselves, included within the doctrine of parliamentary
38 3
sovereignty, by the democratic foundations of Parliament.
Restricting Parliament's power to change the Constitution would be
to limit its ability to respond to the will of the politically sovereign
3 84
electorate and its shifting values about constitutional government.
So far, the idea of a flexible constitution would seem to entail
nothing more than parliamentary sovereignty and the paradigmatic
form of constitution. Dicey himself confused these notions. "A
'flexible' constitution," he wrote, "is one under which every law of
every description can legally be changed with the same case and in
the same manner by one and the same body. 38s 5 To Dicey, "[a] 'rigid'
constitution is one under which certain laws generally known as
constitutional or fundamental laws cannot be changed in the same
manner as ordinary laws. ' 38 6 Dicey made no distinction between
Parliament's role in legislating against constitutional principles and
changing the principles themselves.
There is nevertheless a
conceptual difference between a paradigmatic and flexible
constitution. As Part II suggested, it is conceivable that in the near
future a British court might directly overrule or no longer apply an
act of Parliament that clearly conflicts with the guarantees of the
Human Rights Act. Such a situation would be a judicial attempt to
make the principles upon which the Act relies more definitive in

378.
See DICEY, supra note 3, at 91.
379.
See Robert Hazell, Reinventing the Constitution: Can the State Survive?,
1999 PUB. L. 84, 84-87.
380.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 127.
381.
Id. at 89; see also PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-10; GOLDSWORTHY,
supra note 179, at 11-12.
382.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 89.
383.
See id. at 73.
384.
See id. at 72-76; see also GOLDSWORTHY, supranote 179, at 228.
385.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 127.
386.
Id.
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nature. Parliament could still preserve the sovereign power to amend
or repeal these principles themselves, however, altering the
boundaries within which the judiciary might otherwise restrain it. A
situation would then arise in which Parliament is legally bound to the
restrictions it places upon itself as long as they remain in force, but
can alter that framework on a fundamental and lasting basis, rather
than acting in violation of it.
The Canadian Constitution demonstrates this approach in some
instances, as well as its counter-example, where Parliament cannot
change the constitution but can legislate against it. Section 44 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, provides that, "Parliament may exclusively
make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the
executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of
Commons. ' 38 7 Parliament has used this procedure only once to
adjust the number of seats in the House of Commons and allocate
them among the provinces. 388
While the unilateral amending
authority of the federal Parliament is very narrow in scope, § 45
provides that "the legislature of each province may exclusively make
laws amending the constitution of the province. 3 8s 9 Both §§ 44 and
45, giving Parliament and the provincial assemblies, respectively,
narrow and broad authority for unilateral constitutional amendment,
reflect the flexibility found in the British Constitution under the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 390 Despite this flexibility, the
existence of judicial review in Canada means that federal and
provincial courts can nevertheless review and strike down primary
legislation that offends constitutional provisions otherwise subject to
unilateral legislative amendment.

387.
The scope of this provision is expressly limited, however, by Sections 41 and 42.
These sections respectively require unanimity among provinces on certain matters and
general amending procedures regarding proportional representation in the House of
Commons, as well as the powers and selection of senators. See Stephen A. Scott, The
Canadian Constitutional Amendment Process, in RESHAPING CONFEDERATION: THE 1982

REFORM OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTON 249, 277-78 (Paul Davenport & Richard H. Leach
eds., 1984).
388.
Constitution Act, 1985 (Representation), R.S.C., App. II, No. 47 (1985) (Can.).
Section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982 replaced Section 91(1) of the Constitution Act,
1867, which gave similar amending power to Parliament. Constitution Act, 1982, supra
note 336, § 44; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 366, § 91(1). See HOGG, supra note 337,
at 89-90.
389.
This authority, like that of the federal Parliament pursuant to Section 44,
is expressly circumscribed by the general amending procedures of Section 41. See
Scott, supra note 387, at 278-79.
390.
The unilateral amending powers of the Parliament and provincial
assemblies are also limited in so far as that must conform to the Charter of Rights
pursuant to Section 32. The Charter does not restrain amendment under the other
amendment procedures requiring a combination of federal and provincial approval.
HOGG, supra note 337, at 74, 703-04.
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An even clearer situation where Parliament is legally subject to
self-imposed restrictions, which it may alter at anytime, arises with
the Canadian Bill of Rights. 391 The Bill of Rights guarantees
protection against federal infringement of several substantive and
procedural rights. 392 Section 2 requires that courts construe and
apply all other laws consistently with the rights and freedoms
contained in the Bill, unless Parliament expressly declares in a
statute that it should have effect notwithstanding. 393 This clause is
certainly a rule of construction, mandating that courts interpret
statutes according to its principles as far as it is possible to do so. In
contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has read § 2 to have a broader
application. In the case of R. v. Drybones, the Supreme Court found
that § 2 was more than a rule of construction, but required courts to
'394
declare that inconsistent acts of Parliament are "inoperative.
Drybones was a case appealing the conviction of an aboriginal man
395
found guilty under the Indian Act of being intoxicated off a reserve.
The Supreme Court found that the law in question violated § 1(b) of
396
the Bill of Rights, which guarantees equality before the law.
Because § 2 of the Bill required that Parliament give an express
declaration to override, which it had failed to do, and the particular
provision of the Indian Act could not be construed as compatible, it
became inoperative. 397 Writing for the majority, Judge Ritchie
explained this effect, "I think a declaration by the courts that a
section or portion of a section of a statute is inoperative is to be
distinguished from the repeal of such a section and is to be confined

391.
Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C., ch. 44, App. III (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter
Canadian Bill of Rights].
392.
The Canadian Bill of Rights protects such rights as freedom of religion,
freedom of speech and the press, fair trial, equality before the law, and protection
against self-incrimination. Id. The provisions in the Bill of Rights were mostly
superceded by the Charter of Rights, except for the Bill's guarantees of due process for
the taking of property, and a fair hearing for the determination of rights and
obligations. The Bill also only limits the federal, but not provincial, government,
whereas the Charter applies against both. HOGG, supra note 337, at 640, 647-48.
393.
The Bill of Rights states,
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill
of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe, or
to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights or
freedoms herein recognized and declared.
Canadian
394.
395.
396.
397.

Bill of Rights, supra note 391, § 2.
R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. 149, § 94 (1952) (Can.).
Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. at 294.
Id.
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to the particular circumstances of the case in which the declaration is
39 8
made."
The Bill therefore constructed a definitive legal model of rights
protection, and still does so in a couple of instances not covered by the
Charter of Rights. 399 Parliament nevertheless remains free to amend
or even repeal the Bill of Rights at will, as it technically remains a
regular statute.
Both the unilateral amending procedures and the Bill of Rights
highlight the conceptual distinction between constitutional principles
that are strongly definitive of practice yet highly flexible in their
susceptibility to change. The Canadian Constitution provides other
examples, where it is not so easily amended but still permits
While § 45 grants sweeping authority to
legislative override.
provincial assemblies to amend the provincial constitutions, the
federal Parliament can only do so within the very narrow confines of
§ 44. 400 Otherwise, formal modification of the Canadian Constitution
must proceed along three other avenues that raise a considerable
barrier to formal amendment. Section 38(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, requires that a proposed amendment on a matter not reserved
for a stricter process receive authorization by resolutions of both
Houses of Parliament and two-thirds of the provinces having at least
50 percent of the national population. 40 1 Additionally, any proposed
amendment that would affect only a particular province or provinces,
but not all of them generally, requires under § 43 the approval of only
40 2
those provinces concerned, along with Parliamentary approval.
Section 41 sets forth the most arduous amendment process by
requiring unanimity of the provinces, along with resolutions by both
Houses of Parliament. 40 3 This almost impossible standard applies to
matters dealing with the Queen, the Governor General, and the
provincial Lieutenant Governors. 40 4 It also encompasses minimum

398.
Id. It would seem conceivable, then, that courts could "disapply" a law in
one instance as in violation of the Bill of Rights, but give it full effect under a different
set of circumstances. This situation, however, has never arisen before the Canadian
courts. See id.
399.
See supra note 392. In the cases following Drybones, however, the Supreme
Court took a very narrow interpretive approach to the provisions of the Bill of Rights
and never again found federal law to be incompatible and hence inoperative.
Nevertheless, in Hogan v. R. the Court did characterize the Bill as "quasiconstitutional" in nature. Hogan v. R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574 at 597. SHARPE & SWINTON,
supra note 345 at 15-16.
400.
See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, c. 11, §§ 44, 45.
401.
The remainder of Section 38 tailors this general amending procedure for
proposals that would alter provincial powers or rights, and offers provinces the choice
to "opt out" of any such amendment. See HOGG, supra note 337, at 74-84.
402.
Id. at 83.
403.
Id. at 80-81.
404.
Id.
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provincial representation in the House of Commons, the use of the
English or French language, the composition of the Supreme Court of
Canada, as well as a change of § 41 itself.40 5 As for the Charter of
Rights, its alteration must proceed according to the general
amendment procedures of § 38.406 The "notwithstanding" clause
gives Parliament and the provincial assemblies authority to declare
an express derogation from the Charter. 40 7
They possess the
authority to legislate contrary to the Charter, though they cannot
amend it.
Therefore, Parliament and the assemblies in some
instances have sole authority to amend the federal and provincial
constitutions, while otherwise are bound to act consistently with
them subject to judicial review. In contrast, the Charter allows
Parliament and the assemblies to legislate blatantly against its
guarantees despite denying them the unilateral ability to amend it
permanently. 40 8
The Canadian Constitution illustrates the
conceptual difference between a constitution's paradigmatic or
definitive nature in imposing rules, and its flexibility or rigidity
regarding change.
The distinction between the process of permanently changing
constitutional provisions and legally enforcing them also exists in
U.S. constitutional law. The U.S. Constitution can only be amended
formally under the strict procedures of Article V. 40 9 The U.S.
Constitution is rigid in that constitutional changes come about in a
manner different from that of ordinary legislation. Such change
requires the participation of state legislatures or special ratifying
conventions in addition to participation by Congress. 410 Although the
U.S. Constitution is generally definitive in setting legal boundaries on
government action, some aspects like political questions, remain
nonjusticiable and paradigmatic in nature. Even those provisions or
principles that are nonjusticiable are still subject to formal, rigid

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id.
See id. at 794.
See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, § 33.
Id. §§ 33, 38.
Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires:

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof,
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress....
U.S. CONST. art. V.

410.

See id.
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amendment procedures in contrast to the greater flexibility of the
411
British Constitution.
The concepts of flexibility and rigidity, however, are more
complex than what their basic definitions might suggest. Informal
methods of constitutional change can be just as significant and
influential, perhaps even more so, than formal modifications of rules
and principles. 412 One way in which informal amendment can come
about is through changing judicial interpretations. 413
This
interpretive aspect may make a constitution less rigid than it appears
to be through the formal-amending process, just as political pressures
may erect strong barriers to change within a very flexible system.
The constitutional jurisprudence of the United States is replete with
examples of significant judicial modification. The U.S. Supreme
Court has, for example, changed the constitutional landscape by
expanding the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, as well as the
taxing and spending power, striking down segregation laws, and
broadening the scope of the Bill of Rights. 414 Through adjudication,
the Supreme Court has allowed the U.S. Constitution to remain
responsive to ever-changing societal needs and political values. 415
Judicial "amendment" makes the U.S. Constitution much more
flexible than it would seem from an exclusive focus upon Article V
amending procedures.
Similar to the United States, the British Constitution has also
evolved outside of direct parliamentary reform by statute.
Conventions have developed over long periods of consistent political
practice and reflect normative ideas about how the Constitution
should function in fact, if not in law. 4 16 Also, the judiciary has
impacted the workings of the Constitution, if not its formal theory,
417
through its articulation and increasing use of ultra vires review.
As discussed in Part II, ultra vires judicial review allows courts to
effectively control Parliament and the executive, while intense
political pressures would make the revision, or curtailment, of the

411.

CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER,

CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 21-22

(2001).
412.

BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 5.

413.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1267-68 (2001).
414.

See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 233-38, 275-

84 (1993); Strauss, supra note 365, at 884, 905.
415.
There are many critics of "judicial activism" or broad interpretation,
particularly among those advocating strict adherence to the original intent of the
framers. Such criticisms, however, highlight the extent to which the judiciary has
impacted constitutional change. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of
Originalism:An Account and Critique,71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991).
416.
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 26.

417.

See Laws, supra note 137, at 78-79.
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judicial review process inflexible. In addition, political pressures may
restrict parliamentary "amendments" of other basic constitutional
principles, just as they prevent or restrain its periodic departure from
those that have already been established. One final example of the
complexity of the concepts of flexibility and rigidity is the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty itself: the one fundamental constitutional
rule impervious to formal change by Parliament. Parliament cannot
substantively restrict its own future exercise of sovereign powers, and
courts cannot attack them under orthodox theory. 418 Therefore, the
persistence of parliamentary supremacy remains entrenched in
theory, although it appears to be eroding in practice.
Although Dicey did not draw the more subtle distinction between
a constitution's dynamic of change and its imposition of rules, he
commented on the connection between its rigidity and written form.
Dicey made two observations in this regard. First, concerning the
British Constitution, he remarked that the lack of a written form
resulted from its susceptibility to legislative alteration.
He
emphasized that this causal relationship was very different from the
contrary argument-that the British Constitution was highly flexible
4 19
because it was unwritten.
Dicey's assertion is important because it identifies the primary
role of normative foundations from which a written or unwritten
constitution develops. The form of the constitution does not give rise
to ideals of limited government, judicial review, or extra-legislative
amendatory procedures. Instead, normative assumptions about these
matters precede the formal constitution. A written constitution is
just an expression of already existing principles. Dicey wrote,
When a country is governed under a constitution which is intended
either to be unchangeable or at any rate to be changeable only with
special difficulty, the constitution, which is nothing else than the laws
which are intended to have a character of permanence or immutability,
is necessarily expressed in writing ....
Where, on the other hand,
every law can be legally changed with equal ease or with equal
difficulty, there arises no absolute need for reducing the constitution to
a written form, or even for looking upon a definite set of laws as
4 20
specially making up the constitution.

A constitution comes after certain principles about the nature of
government have arisen within a political culture. Thus, Dicey was
correct in conceptualizing constitutional principles as antecedent to
constitutional form. Yet he erred when he asserted that a written
document "necessarily" results from a rigid constitution. 42 1
A
constitution may be definitive in how strictly it binds ordinary

418.

GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 15.

419.

DICEY, supra note 3, at 89-90.

420.
421.

Id. at 90.
See id. at 89-90.
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legislation, or rigid in its resistance to change, but remains unwritten
in form. Part II discussed at length this possibility by suggesting
that the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution can reject
parliamentary sovereignty and accommodate more extensive judicial
review in continuity with its common-law roots. While it might be
fair to say that a written document "tends" to result from a rigid or
definitive constitution, as its written form better memorializes and
provides surer guidance as to its principles, such a relationship is not
necessary.
Although Dicey was incorrect in believing that a written
document was a necessary component to a rigid constitution, he
correctly suggested that a highly flexible constitution could take
written or unwritten form. Even the British Constitution, based
upon
Dicey's
model
of parliamentary
sovereignty, could
hypothetically be a written one. He stated,
But it is a mistake to think that the whole law of the English
constitution might not be reduced to writing and be enacted in the form
of a constitutional code ....
[T]he constitution of England might easily
be turned into an Act of Parliament without suffering any material
transformation of character,provided only that the English Parliament
retained . . . the unrestricted power of repealing or amending the
4 22
constitutionalcode.

Dicey's example characterizes a written constitution as a means to
expressing governing principles, even though it may lack legal
enforcement or special amending procedures.
The separation of form from function was so different that Dicey
could imagine the United Kingdom as having a written
constitution. 423 The fact that the British Constitution, as described
by Dicey, did not distinguish between especially constitutional or
regular laws, went to their nature as being paradigmatic and
flexible. 424 It did not prevent the recognition of laws as being
constitutional in the sense that they reflected fundamental political
425
normativity in a way that most other statutes did not.
The concepts of a flexible or rigid amending process is more
complex than the terms suggest on their own, even though general
characterizations remain useful and convenient for analyzing
constitutional systems. Definitive constitutions may indeed tend to
be more rigid, and paradigmatic ones more flexible, although the

422.
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
423.
When considering many of the Commonwealth nations, such as Canada
and Australia, it appears that "the Westminster system of government is not
inherently incompatible with a written constitution." BRADLEY & EWING, supra note
309, at 6.
424.
See DICEY, supra note 3, at 91.
425.
See id. at 127.

20031

BRITISH COMMON-LAW CONSTITUTION

relationship between the enforceability of rules and their dynamic of
change is not a necessary one. Prior discussion on paradigmatic
constitutions touched upon the role of a written or unwritten
constitution in imposing enforceable parameters upon government.
Yet it is helpful to briefly reconsider such a relationship in light of
rigidity and flexibility.
While the flexible British Constitution is traditionally subject to
legislative alteration, its foundational, and by far most important
principle-the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty-ironically
remains so rigid as to have ossified. The only avenue open to modify
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is that which Dicey foresaw
for overly rigid constitutions: revolution.4 26 Dicey, of course, was
apprehensive of "violent subversion," but revolution may also occur in
The revolution
a more peaceful and surreptitious manner.4 27
necessary to change the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty would
be a quiet one, brought about by a shift in the rule of recognition, and
the acceptance of a competing common-law model of limited
government. 4 28 Accompanying such constitutional transformation
could also be reliance upon written expressions of the principles
underlying it and defining Parliament's new limits. U.K. courts have
increasingly relied upon higher written law, such as the regulations
of the European Community and its founding treaties, in interpreting
legislation and exercising ultra vires review. Other texts, such as the
Human Rights Act and devolution statutes, will also likely have such
These documents arguably have already become
prominence.
foundations of contemporary constitutional practice and widely reflect
values about the nature of British government. Those statutes and
their roles are indicative of a change already taking place regarding
the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty.
B. PositivistFoundationsfor a Written Constitution
Because a constitution may exhibit mixed characteristics, a text's
normative value in expressing its underlying principles is
determinative of its recognition as a constitutional document. That

426.
Id. at 129-30.
See id. at 129.
427.
428.
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 242-45. Mullender writes that "[t]o
move from our present constitutional order to one in which the judiciary occupied such
a position of constitutional primacy would . . . involve a 'break in legal continuity' to
which the term 'revolutionary' could properly be applied." Mullender, supra note 245,
of 144 (quoting SIR WILLIAM WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 36 (1980)).
Mullender is correct that such change would be revolutionary, but only in the limited
sense that it would sever continuity with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
However, it would break with neither the common-law tradition nor the suppressed
elements of its theory that actually support such a constitutional arrangement. See
GOLDSWORTHY, supranote 179, at 245-46.
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understanding of a written constitution raises questions as to the
origins and authority of its values. It is the democratic foundation of
these governing principles that partly distinguishes constitutionalism
from arbitrary rule. 4 29 Even under the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, the legally unfettered authority of Parliament is subject
to moral restraints resulting from its democratic accountability.
Dicey's justification for parliamentary sovereignty accepts that
fundamental values of constitutionalism and the rule of law promote
the public good and give context to Parliament's exercise of authority.
The recognition of fundamental principles that restrain Parliament,
either morally or perhaps legally, however, goes back further than
Dicey as shown by Blackstone's theory of natural law and Coke's
opinion in Bonham's Case. The reconciliation of such higher law
notions with a democratic justification for legislative power results in
a conception of the public good that has a moral claim superior to and
binding upon Parliament. When constitutional principles derived
from this notion of the public good are memorialized in writing, that
text becomes a positivist expression of popularly-sovereign will that
courts may apply in restraining Parliament.
1. An Alternative Positivist Model
Within the alternative common-law constitution, paramount
principles cannot only exist in unwritten form, but they may find
expression in written texts as well. The entrenchment of documents
is compatible with the U.K.'s embrace of positivism, despite the fact
that this school of thought underlies the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty. 430
The alternative common-law constitution can
incorporate written documents based upon three positivist premises.
First, there must be a reorientation in the locus of sovereignty, so
that the politically sovereign electorate becomes superior to the
legally sovereign Parliament in setting restrictions on government
action. In this manner, the constitutional order comes to rest upon
popular, not legislative, sovereignty. This approach favors acceptance
of Hart's "rule of recognition" over Austin's simpler conception of one
sovereign, law-making authority. 431
Second, the government's
exercise of powers then results from the electorate's delegation of
sovereign authority to them; such delegation divides between the
legislative and the judicial branches. The judicial enforcement of
constitutional provisions becomes a legal manifestation of external

429.
430.

See supra note 363.
See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 365,

Perspective, supra note 41, at 10.

431.

ComparativePerspective, supra note 41, at 10.

at 225-29;

Comparative
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electoral restraints upon legislative action, translating popularlysovereign will into a form of enforceable state action upon
Finally, written constitutional documents have a
Parliament.
function similar to legislative statutes. They express the will of the
popular sovereign in clear terms that command or prohibit action by
Parliament. It is their expression, not of substantive principles and
values as such, but of the popular sovereign's force of will that gives
them moral authority.
Constitutional texts are subject to judicial interpretation and
application in much the same way as, say, an enabling statute
authorizing an administration to promulgate secondary legislation.
Courts can review primary legislation to ensure that Parliament has
acted within its grant of power and not ultra vires.
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty represents a form of
positivism as set forth by John Austin. 43 2 Austin's version of
positivism, upon which more sophisticated theories remain based, has
three basic propositions. 433 First, there must be an identifiable
Second, these
sovereign, whose command is authoritative. 434
commands impose general, sanctionable obligations upon the
populace or certain of its segments and receive habitual obedience
from them. 435 Finally, there is no necessary connection between
promulgated law and moral standards or content. 43 6 Orthodox
British legal theory rests on Austin's ideas because the Crown in
Parliament is the supreme legal sovereign whose will, as expressed in
law, is binding throughout the realm. 437 The law is unquestionable
because of the presence of a higher law-making entity, which does not
438
exist, or its compatibility with accepted morals or values.
Although Blackstone recognized that Parliament's will must
ultimately prevail, his theory differed from modern positivism as he
recognized natural law as a source of moral legal norms that he
struggled to reconcile with omnipotent legislative power. 43 9 Also,
these natural law standards were abstract and required "discovery"
through the reasoning process in the courts or Parliament. 440 The

432.
433.
Bentham.

See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 4.
Austin himself drew upon the ideas of other thinkers, particularly Jeremy
See

W.L.

MORISON,

JOHN

AUSTIN

66-67

(1982);

Anthony

J.

Sebok,

MisunderstandingPositivism, 93 MICH. L. REV., 2054, 2061-62 (1995).
434.

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED 5 (2d ed. 1861);

Sebok, supra note 433, at 2064-65.
AUSTIN, supra note 434, at 8-11; Sebok, supra note 433, at 2064-65.
435.
436.
AUSTIN, supra note 434, at 113; Sebok, supra note 433, at 2063-64.
437.

GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 9.

438.
439.

Id. at 9-11.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *160-61; Frederick

Schauer, Legal

Positivism and the Contingent Autonomy of Law, in JUDICAL POWER, DEMOCRACY AND

LEGAL POSITIVISM 215, 217 (Tom Campbell & Jeffrey Goldsworthy eds., 2000).
440.
See supranotes 81-84.
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positivist notion of law as the command of the sovereign rejected
Blackstone's approach, rather than emphasizing the morally
independent will of the legislature. 441
That was the British
conception of the constitution that most influenced Dicey and now
underlies modern orthodox theory.
The Austinian positivist doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
resists any attempt to circumvent it and place limits upon the
legislative power. 44 2
The imposition of legal restraints upon
Parliament, however, does not entail a return to natural law theories
or require a rejection of positivism. Rather, limited government can
also rest upon positivist foundations that legitimize written
constitutional documents as commands of another, but popular,
sovereign.
The central point for constitutional change in the United
Kingdom, and the reliance upon written documents, is a rejection of
Austin's basic model in favor of one like that of H. L. A. Hart. Hart's
positivist theory does better than Austin's by describing more
complex constitutional systems that incorporate ideas such as judicial
review or the lack of one supreme, law-making sovereign as in
federalism. 443
At the center of Hart's theory is his distinction
between primary and secondary rules. 444 Primary rules consist of the
rights and duties between individuals, and secondary rules describe
the means by which primary rules come into being, change, or are
extinguished. 44 5 Certain types of secondary rules, however, do not
446
owe their existence or validity to any other higher, defining rules.
Such a "rule of recognition" is the ultimate rule of the legal system
from which all others derive validity. 44 7 This fundamental rule
cannot be validated on its merits and exists as a political or social fact
based upon its acceptance by judges, government officials, and
members of the community. 448 The rule supplants Austin's more

441.

See R. George Wright, Does Positivism Matter?, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:

ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 57, 65 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).

442.
See R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 348-51 (5th ed. 1985).
443.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78-79, 103 (1961). The distinctions
between Austin and Hart are many, and the reasoning of both is careful and full of
nuance.
Additionally, many other prominent thinkers and commentators have
contributed to the understanding, criticisms, and further development of their ideas.
However, a thorough analysis of the jurisprudential debate on positivism is far beyond
the scope and purposes of this thesis. This work is concerned with constructing a
straightforward, workable, and acceptable theoretical basis upon which the British
constitution can more easily shift to incorporate written documents in limiting
government power.
444.

Id. at 90.

445.
446.
447.

Id. at 91-92.
Id.
Id. at 97, 102, 105-06.

448.

Id. at 98-99; GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 13-14.
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basic notion of law as the command of a single sovereign. 44 9
Accordingly, the law is more than a simple command enforceable by
the power of its issuing sovereign. 450 Rather, the authority of law
derives its validity from the peoples' perception. 4 51 Also, such
authority results from two other sources: (1) peoples' obedience to the
law after its promulgation according to secondary rules; and (2) on
452
the most fundamental level, the rule of recognition.
The rule of recognition itself, while existing as a fact, may rest
45 3
upon complex normative values about the nature of government.
It must not necessarily be a blind and substantively unconsidered
assumption. 454 On the contrary, it may take various forms that
reflect considerable normative content. 455 For instance, the rule of
recognition might simply remain the unwritten doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty. 456 Alternatively, it might place limits on
legislative authority, grant review powers to the judiciary, and
recognize a written text as the expressive instrument of popular
will. 457 The legal competencies of all government institutions and the
constitutional status of a written text, therefore, receive their
authority as foundational sources of law from ongoing endorsement
by the political community at large. Although the rule of recognition
is a social fact that intrinsically has no normative content, it is
nevertheless a descriptive concept to which normative values may
attach by virtue of their acceptance among officials and the
458
electorate.
Hart's rule of recognition offers an avenue of escape from
parliamentary sovereignty as that doctrine's continuing legitimacy
must depend upon its ongoing acceptance throughout the community.
Such change must not occur in a relatively sudden or formal manner,
but may be a slow process over time as attitudes and practices among

449.
450.

HART, supra note 443, at 64-67, 92, 97, 102.
Id.

451.

Id.

452.
453.

Id. at 75.
Id.

454.

Id.

455.
Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW, supra
note 441, at 302 (summarizing that rule of recognition as "a normative social practice
among officials.
Its authority among them derives from patterns of convergent
behavior." (emphasis added)); Id. at 297; MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL
POSITIvIsM LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 115 (1999).
456.
See generally KRAMER, supra note 455.

457.
HART, supra note 443, at 69, 70-71, 103.
458.
But see GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 256-59 (emphasizing the
separability of the formal rule of recognition itself from the possibly multiple and
conflicting normative justifications for it throughout the community. While such
separability, as a basic tenet of positivism, is possible under Hart's theory, it is not
necessary.); Public Law, supra note 54, at 225-28. The rule of recognition may promote
a certain "internal perspective" based upon motivating values.
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officials and the people coalesce and reinforce each other. 459 The
constitution might evolve, resulting in a weakening of the doctrine,
due to a gradual shift in the rule of recognition. The new rule may in
turn reflect, though not necessarily so, emerging normative
assumptions about government. This form of "organic" endorsement
by the popular sovereign, as well as by officials, permits an
evolutionary change in the constitution at a fundamental level
beneath the theory of parliamentary sovereignty. Developing social
and political practices, and the norms that drive them, can therefore
suggest a new rule of recognition that limits government power and
accepts its control through some form of judicial review. Change in
the rule of recognition might become evident through increasing
criticisms of parliamentary sovereignty or the acknowledgement by
officials of limitations upon government authority. Other signs might
include popular or judicial support for the rule of law, human rights,
and acceptance of competing sources of law such as that of the
European Community or regional assemblies. 460 Although formal
theory might resist these pressures for some time, constitutional
practice must in fact respond to a shift in the rule of recognition to
46 1
retain its legitimacy and prevent disintegration of the legal system.
Failure to do so might result in overt revolution of the constitutional
order, even though it be peaceful, and the establishment of more
pronounced and radical changes than would have occurred through
the legal system's gradual accommodation of new rules of validity or
widely-held norms.
Orthodox British theory already recognizes that the legitimacy,
not legality, of parliamentary action depends upon its democratic
accountability. 46 2 Rather than balancing a potentially conflicting
division of political and legal sovereignty, that theory can recognize
the normative claim that popular sovereignty restrains government
Modern notions of democracy arguably demand that
power.
government be more responsive to the electorate than Dicey thought.
This suggests that the will of the political sovereign should be
This
regarded as fundamentally superior to Parliament. 463
normative, democratic principle suggests and supports a new rule of
recognition that limits legislative authority, which is enforceable by
464
judicial review.

459.
460.

GOLDSWORTHY, supranote 179, at 245.
Id. at 244-46; see also HART, supranote 443, at 116-20.

461.

HART, supra note 443, at 114-15.

462.
463.
464.

Id.
Public Law, supra note 54, at 221-22, 228.
See id. at 228.
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2. Written Constitutions as Expressions of Popular Sovereignty
A division of sovereign legal powers can result in judicial review
that limits the legislature, ensuring that the legislature stays within
its constitutional boundaries. 4 65 By fulfilling this role, the judiciary
promotes democratic values despite not being an elected body, and it
enforces constitutional principles on behalf of the popular
sovereign. 466 This democratic foundation is straightforward, as the
rule of recognition from which it receives its authority originates in
the general political community. Judicial review also emphasizes the
democratic basis of the constitution that Dicey recognized by
entrenching principles, such as the rule of law, in order to ensure that
Parliament does not act contrary to the wishes of the political
sovereign. 467 Dicey, as previously discussed, described the difference
between internal and external checks as that between the
fundamental values of the rules and the limits to which subjects will
tolerate government action. 468
His acceptance of parliamentary
supremacy resulted in his description of these external limits as
being solely political in nature, and manifested only in the attitudes
46 9
and actions of the general public.
Dicey acknowledged that "political" as opposed to "legal"
sovereignty rests in the people. 4 70 His belief that "judges know
nothing about any will of the people except in so far as that will is
expressed by an Act of Parliament" rejected the idea that the courts
channel popular will and give it legal force. 471 Yet Dicey was
shortsighted by characterizing "external" to mean completely outside
of institutional government and emanating directly from the subjects
themselves. This understanding of "external" excludes the notion
that government might include an institutional check like the
judiciary, other than the legislative body itself, which speaks for the
people. In this sense, the judiciary can itself democratically represent
or express the citizens' normative assumptions as to the appropriate
limitations of legislative or executive powers. 472 The recognition of

465.

Sir

Stephen

Sedley,

Governments,

Constitutions, and

Judges, in

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT ACTION: THE COURTS AND ALTERNATIVE
MECHANISMS OF REVIEW 36 (Genevra Richardson & Hazel Genn eds., 1994)

[hereinafter Governments].
466.
Roger Cotterrell, Judicial Review and Legal Theory, in ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT ACTION: THE COURTS AND ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
REVIEW 13, 17-18 (Genevra Richardson & Hazel Genn eds., 1994).
467.
See LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 284.
468.
DICEY, supra note 3, at 76.

469.

See id. at 77-79.

470.

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.

471.
472.

See EISGRUBER, supra note 411, at 62, 211.

OF

938

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:863

the judiciary as a "proxy" for the citizenry gives the popular sovereign
a stronger position in opposing excessive government actions, and
mitigates or replaces the need for popular disobedience. "External"
limits upon the legislature's law-making powers can therefore exist
within the formal organizational framework of the government. The
electorate acts positively through legislative representatives
exercising individual judgment when enacting laws, while it acts
negatively through the judicial check of government actors
overstepping their discretionary boundaries. 4 73 This results in a
duality of representation that departs from the orthodox doctrine of
unitary, parliamentary sovereignty-that sovereignty is divided
between the legislature and judiciary. Sir Stephen Sedley suggests
that such a concept might have already developed in the British
4 74
constitution through the judicial exercise of ultra vires review.
T.R.S. Allan follows Sedley in his comments on the judicial
implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Allen
writes that "the British constitution embraces a dual sovereignty: in
the interpretation and application of law the courts have, and rightly
have, the last word. '475 This judicial role, based in democratic theory,
legitimizes its function in restraining the legislature and assessing
popular attitudes.
Judicial review as a means of enforcing popular sovereignty
might result, as in the United States, from direct popular ratification
of a written constitutional document. 476 Such a document might
explicitly recognize judicial review over legislative and executive
acts. 477 Otherwise, it could imply it as an enforcement mechanism.
The U.S. Constitution, for example, has no explicit mention of judicial
review, despite its long history with it. Chief Justice Marshall first
implied the power in Marbury v. Madison, although the doctrine was
478
not new in U.S. constitutional thought.

Sound of Silence, supra note 262, at 271. There are, therefore, "distinct but
473.
interlocking spheres of constitutional competence." Id.
474.
Sedley rejects the notion that the executive has any share of sovereignty,
but remains answerable to both Parliament and the courts. He suggests that "public
law now has both the doctrinal strength and the public support to say that this is a
matter on which there is no longer a constitutional silence and that the rule of law
recognises two sovereignties, not one and not three." Id. at 291.
Response, supra note 118, at 381.
475.
Anupam Chander, Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a
476.
United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L.J. 457, 474-75 (1991).
477.
Canada's Charter of Rights, for example, gives courts jurisdiction over
Charter claims and authorizes their granting a remedy, while the Constitution Act,
1982 states that any law inconsistent with the constitution has no effect. Charter,
supra note 335, § 24(1); Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, § 52(1).
478.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137; see also SCHWARTZ, supranote 414, at
39-43.
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In the Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton noted both the
significance of a written constitution as an expression of popular will
and fundamental governing principles, and characterized the
judiciary as the instrument for its realization in law,
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between [the
constitution and legislative act], that which has the superior obligation
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agent .... Nor does this conclusion by
any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power.
It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by
4 79
those which are not fundamental.

Implicit in Hamilton's remarks are three points supporting a
positivist foundation for a written constitution. First, the legislature
is the "agent" of the people, whose intentions are superior to it. As an
agent, then, the legislature must abide by the will of the popular
sovereign. This obligation, as well as the constitution's "validity," is
rooted in a democratic theory that transforms the moral imperative of
responding to the electorate into a corresponding legal obligation.
The constitution is the expression of this popular will, functionally
similar to a statute expressing the command of the legislature.
Second, in recognizing the moral and legal superiority of the popular
sovereign's will, the judiciary must enforce constitutional provisions
against the legislature. The role of the courts in this regard is
essentially little different from its role in interpreting and applying
statutes, with the exception that it is deferring to the people over
their agents. Hamilton, however, makes it clear that the judiciary is
not superior to the legislature. 480 These branches occupy different
but equal institutional positions intended to give effect to electoral
will. 48 1 In that sense they exercise dual sovereignty, delegated to
them by the ultimate popular sovereign. Finally, in addition to
recognizing a constitution as representing the democratic will of the
48 2
people, Hamilton described the constitution as "fundamental laws."
an
evokes
as fundamental
a constitution
Characterizing
understanding that its principles and rules have special status in the
foundation of the political system. Distinct from laws that "are not
fundamental," or those being regular acts of the legislature, the
constitution expresses normative assumptions about government.

479.
ed., 1999).
480.
481.
482.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
Id.
See id.
Id.
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These assumptions are bound with the popular sovereign's
democratic will, from which they gain their moral legitimacy.
A written constitution has normative value as a means of
An alternative
expressing pre-existing governing principles.
common-law model that limits Parliament and accepts judicial review
as a popularly endorsed means of enforcement can exist solely in
This constitution, however, can subsequently
unwritten form.
accommodate a written text as a means of better articulating and
expressing its foundational principles. Because those principles are
normative assumptions about government that inform the rule of
recognition, the written constitution acts as a "statute"; the written
constitution represents the popular-sovereign's commands, which are
binding on the legislature and enforceable by the judiciary.
C. Common-Law Adjudication and the Constitutionalizationof
Written Texts
Just as Coke regarded statutes as statements by the high court
of Parliament in declaring, clarifying, or altering the common law,
courts can consider certain texts as being expressions of fundamental
The judiciary can develop constitutional jurisprudence by
law.
referring to constitutional texts and treating them in traditional
common-law fashion. It can weave written texts into constitutional
jurisprudence alongside other unwritten principles restraining
Parliament. Courts can do this by gradually recognizing certain
statutes or treaties, such as the Human Rights Act and the Treaty of
Rome, as being paramount, common-law constitutional principles
because they represent norms of the popular sovereign. 48 3 Those
48 4
texts "fill in the gaps" of the unwritten common-law constitution.
They are also the products of an on-going, deliberative interaction
between the legislature and judiciary in shaping a constitution that
evolves with the popular sovereign's shifting normative assumptions.
While positivism has generally struggled to reconcile statute and
common law, older common-law theory, as understood by Coke,
supported a more ambiguous, and arguably harmonious, relationship
As a high court, Parliament articulated
between the two. 4s 5
principles of law conducive to the public good. Legislative process
was different than judicial process, but statutes declared, refined, or

483.
note 1.
484.
485.

See generally Human Rights Act, supra note 1; TREATY OF ROME, supra
See sources cited supra note 483.
See Sebok, supra note 433, at 2062-65. See generally A.W.B. Simpson, The

Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77 (A.W.B.

Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973) (discussing the tensions resulting between positivism and
traditional common-law theory).

2003]

BRITISH COMMON-LA W CONSTITUTION

otherwise developed the common law. 486 Coke supported a judicial
power to void statutes against "common right and reason" because of
this interaction between statute and common law. 487
Unless
Parliament has made its intention clear to change the common law,
courts have always deferred to it and interpreted statutes as
compatible with its principles. 488 Just as statutes may not only
declare and modify the common law in areas such as contract or tort,
they may also reflect common-law principles founded on the
constitution. As explained in Part II, Coke's theory, like explanations
by Blackstone and Dicey, is adjustable to support a constitutional
arrangement where fundamental common-law principles promoting
democratic conceptions of the public good take precedence over
contradictory statute. Under this framework, the judiciary possesses
much leeway in how it interprets and applies, or even rejects,
statutory law.
Thus, courts can follow a flexible adjudicative
approach in developing a constitutional jurisprudence that maintains
a balance between common law and statutory law.
The relationship between statutory law and common law
becomes more complex when a statute purports to change
constitutional principles. 4 89
Courts must then give special
consideration when attempting to reconcile a particular statute with
binding common law or subsequent contradictory statutes. A court
may find that such a statute possesses enough normative strength to
become entrenched in the constitution and limit Parliament in the
same way as paramount common-law principles. 4 90 Even without the
adoption of a comprehensively written and popularly ratified
constitutional document, texts graft onto the underlying common-law
framework and become normative in their own right as positivist
expressions of popular will. Texts in this sense do not "trump" or
stand apart from the common-law constitution, but become

486.
See supra note 129.
487.
See supra note 181.
488.
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 250-52.
489.
See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1266.
490.
The Supreme Court of Canada has once hinted of a similar process for the
Canadian Constitution. Section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that, "The
Constitution of Canada includes (a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act; (b) the
Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and (c) any amendment to any Act or order
referred to in paragraph (a) or (b)." Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 336, § 52(2). In
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia Speaker of the House of Assembly,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, the Supreme Court found that this Section was not exhaustive and
included within it the unwritten doctrine of parliamentary privilege. It therefore
followed a reverse process of formally incorporating an unwritten principle into a
predominantly written constitutional framework. Hogg muses on the possibility that
the Supreme Court could also add, and thereby judicially constitutionalize, other
written documents, although to do so a Canadian court "would be very bold indeed ..
HOGG, supra note 337, at 7-8.
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intertwined with it. 491 Such fusion of common law and statutory law
has occurred on a lesser level, for example, with the Statute of Uses
and Statute of Frauds, which "both changed the common law and
became objects of evolution and judicial elaboration, common lawstyle."4 92 These "statutes," originally enacted by Parliament during
the respective reigns of Henry VIII and Charles II, illustrate how
closely text can intertwine with common law. 493 This example of
melding statute and common law delineates how well a text can
become embedded in the over-arching unwritten tradition. The
integration of statutory law into the common law at this level,
however, goes beyond the legislature's power; it depends upon its
The result is a permanent
judicial treatment over time.
transformation of the common law, which absorbs the statute and
Consequently, the
promotes it as a constituent principle. 494
incorporation of texts into the common-law framework is an on-going,
evolutionary process that is "organic" in the sense that it is
responsive to deeper normative legal understandings within the
community, and occurs through common-law adjudication.
Incorporation can conceivably occur on a more fundamental
level, where a regularly enacted statute affects the constitutional
system in a deep-rooted, lasting way so that courts treat it the same
way as paramount common-law principles. As a regular statute,
preliminarily it might not legally limit Parliament and may itself be
constrained by higher constitutional laws. Its status can eventually
change depending upon its reception by the judiciary, other
government actors, and the community, thereby ascending to
constitutional status. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn term
written laws of this sort "super-statutes" because they "successfully
penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a deep
way." 495 As examples of such laws, they identify the U.S. Sherman
Antitrust Act; the Civil Rights Act; and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
496
Act; as well as, potentially, the British Human Rights Act.

491.

See LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 11-12.

Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1219. At least in the context of
492.
U.S. jurisprudence, these two "statutes" are taught in law schools and developed in
practice no differently from any other principle at common law.
493.
See Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.); Statute of Frauds, 1677,
29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.).
494.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 93-94; Beatson, supra note 184, at
250 (asking, '"Why, if they are relevant, should a common law system not also snap up
well considered trifles of statute law enacted by its own legislature?").
495.
Eskridge & Frerejohn, supra note 413, at 1215.
Id. at 1231, 1237, 1257 (citing Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C.
496.
§§ 1-2 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered Sections of 5, 28, and 42 of the U.S. Code); Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, 75 Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at
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Eskridge and Ferejohn identify three main characteristics that
characterize these and other super-statutes:
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a
new normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over
times does "stick" in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute
and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the
law-including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute ...
Super-statutes are applied in accord with a pragmatic methodology
that is a hybrid of standard precepts of statutory, common law, and
constitutional interpretation. Although the courts do not have to
consider the super-statute beyond the four corners of its plain meaning,
they will often do so because the super-statute is one of the baselines
against which other sources of law-sometimes including the
Constitution itself-are read. Ordinary rules of construction are often
suspended or modified when such statutes are interpreted. Superstatutes tend to trump ordinary legislation when there are clashes or
inconsistencies .... 497

The concept of the super-statute provides a model by which certain
statutes or even treaties can become constitutional documents
through an evolutionary and judicial process. The first part of the
above characterization is normatively dependent upon a statute's
intent to alter constitutional boundaries, its durability, and its broad
systemic effects. The second part is methodological because courts
recognize the super-statute's normative value, adjudicate it according
to a common-law constitutional jurisprudence, and give it priority
over "lesser" laws. Its normativity rests in a notion of popular
sovereignty, while institutionally it operates as a hybrid of legislative
enactment and judicial development. 498
Eskridge and Ferejohn
describe these exceptional statutes as "quasi-constitutional" in
status. 499 As they write within the context of U.S. law, however,
those statutes remain subordinate to the Constitution.
In the
alternative British model, super-statutes would instead become the
paramount laws themselves, in conjunction with fundamental
common-law principles limiting Parliament, and enforceable through
judicial review. 50 0 Through this process, Parliament and the courts
play a tandem role in developing the Constitution. Courts interpret
and apply regular legislation in a manner consistent with both
written and unwritten constitutional principles, and Parliament

21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)). Another super-statute would be the British Human Rights
Act, supra note 1.
497.
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1216.
498.
Id. at 1216-17, 1229-30, 1266-67, 1273-74.
499.
Id. at 1216-17, 1266-67.
500.
See id. at 1265 (characterizing both the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra note
391, and the British Human Rights Act, supra note 1, as super-statutes, but noting
that they do not have the "trumping power that a constitution does."). However, R. v.
Drybones, [1970] S.C.R 282, shows to the contrary that such a statute can have binding
effect upon the legislature. A super-stature can operate in this manner in British
public law ordered under the alternative common-law model.

944

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:863

participates in the "amending process" by originally passing a superstatute. Common-law adjudication thereafter constitutionalizes the
50 1
statute through an evolutionary process reacting to shifting norms.
Ways that super-statutes and unwritten constitutional principles are
enforceable and hierarchical, and unilaterally changeable by
Parliament, can vary depending on two factors:
(1) political
developments, and (2) their treatment by a judiciary with
considerable leeway in how it interprets and applies them. As a
result, the common-law constitution may contain written and
unwritten principles sharing the basic effect of restraining
Parliament, but in different manners and degrees. The variance
depends upon the normative values, purposes, and functions of higher
laws as they become apparent through the on-going judicial
50 2
process.

As texts co-mingle with the common law to form a changing
constitutional landscape, the interpretive approach taken by courts
will vary. Unwritten and written principles require broader, more
purposeful construction, sensitive to their relative moral force, as well
as their legal effects in restraining Parliament. 50 3
Indeed, the
common law has long provided not only formal rules but also abstract
principles of good governance, especially with regard to individual
rights and due process concerns.50 4 The example of the ultra vires
doctrine, with its requirement of rationality in the administrative
decision-making process, shows how abstract principles can be
judicially developed and applied to limit government action
depending upon circumstantial considerations.
Just as the
entrenchment of super-statutes results from the common-law process,
so does their subsequent interpretation and application as higher law
binding upon Parliament. Courts should, therefore, construe them

501.
See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1268-71; see also
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 179, at 240-46 (emphasizing that the judiciary cannot
constitutionalize texts on the basis of its own substantiating authority. The judicial
role in this process is to show deference to the elected Parliament in contested areas,
and carefully reflect upon actions and perceived attitudes of government actors and the
electorate. While courts of course exercise their own judgment in this regard and its
own attitudes affect its determinations, the constitutionalization of text results from
shifting political normativity within the political community at-large; common-law
adjudication is instrumental to this process, and not the originating authority). As
Eskridge and Ferejohn write, "Typically super-statutes are extensively relied upon by
the people, and are repeatedly visited and endorsed by legislative, administrative, and
judicial institutions in response to the actions taken by private as well as public
actors." Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1273.
502.
The possibility also arises that, just as they constitutionalize certain
significant texts, courts can de-constitutionalizethem in a like manner should they lose
their normative value in society.
503.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 87-88.
504.
Id. at 136-37; BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 17-18.
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"liberally and in a common law way, but in light of the statutory
purpose and principles as well as compromises suggested by statutory
texts." 50 6 Through their judicial entrenchment as expressions of
overriding
norms emanating
from the popular
sovereign,
constitutional texts are loosened from parliamentary intent. For
these reasons, courts' interpretive approach to constitutional texts is
likely to be more purpose-searching than formalistic. 50 6
Thus,
judicial interpretation and application should be more forwardlooking and considerate of results consistent with both the text's
underlying principles and broader systemic integrity. This contrasts
with a commitment of strict obedience to Parliament's intent when
enacting the super-statute. Furthermore, because courts can look
beyond the "four corners" of the text in question, they can consider
the impact of other relevant but regular, constitutionally statutory
schemes that are not entrenched. Because courts display a broader
principled and systemic consciousness, Parliament thereby has
further, even if indirect or attenuated, influence in the development
of constitutional jurisprudence.
The alternative constitution can come to include both written
and unwritten elements, constitutionalized, and enforced by the
judiciary in a common-law manner that reflects shifting normative
assumptions of the popular sovereign. This process, premised upon a
continuing and complex interaction between the judicial and
legislative branches, is a gradual, evolutionary means of
constitutional development that maintains continuity with Britain's
common-law and political traditions.
In recent decades, the
emergence of constitutionally significant statutes and vigorous
employment of ultra vires review seems to signal a weakening in the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and increased authority in the
judiciary. Such a situation heralds the resurgence of a common-law
constitutional model that limits Parliament through judicial review.
The next and final Section of Part III briefly examines this
transformation
process
by
identifying
significant
British
constitutional documents. It argues that the judiciary has already
effectively relied upon some of those texts to limit Parliament and has
begun gradually constitutionalizing them.
D. Overview: The United Kingdom's Quasi-Written Constitution
While the British Constitution has traditionally been regarded
as unwritten, it is wrong to conclude that it contains no written
elements. At different moments throughout its history, certain

505.
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 413, at 1247.
506.
See LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 93-94, 143-45, 156; Beatty,
supra note 322, at 142-43; Beatson, supra note 184, at 249, 251, 260.
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documents have fundamentally influenced Britain's constitutional
development and reflected critical shifts in political norms. Early
documents include the Magna Carta, the 1689 Bill of Rights, the Act
of Settlement, the Acts of Union between England and Scotland, and
the Reform Act of 1832.507 While none of these instruments legally
restrains Parliament, courts have traditionally used them as
interpretive tools, presuming that it intends to legislate consistently
with their provisions. 50 8 In this Century, Parliament began the
abdication of its imperial authority with the Statute of Westminster
in 1931.509 It also consolidated its democratic accountability by
greatly limiting the power of the House of Lords through the
Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, and abolishing the ancient right of
hereditary peers to sit in the upper chamber by the House of Lords
Act 1999.510 The most significant and far-reaching acts are the
European Communities Act 1972; the Human Rights Act 1998; and
the statutes devolving law-making authority to Scotland, Northern
Ireland, and Wales. 5 11 These latter documents are particularly
important in that they place direct pressures on Parliament's exercise
of sovereignty, requiring that it defer to other sources of law and
respect human rights. 5 12 These ambitious statutory regimes further
exist within the context of aggressive ultra vires review by the
judiciary and seriously undermine the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty.
Increasing judicial authority, competing with
Parliament's weakened, but still extant, claim to supremacy, results
in complex judicial and legislative interaction that makes the
Constitution very fluid in regard to its definitive or paradigmatic, and
rigid or flexible natures.
Judicial reliance upon and political
deference to European Community law pursuant to the European
Communities Act, the European Convention on Human Rights as
incorporated by the Human Rights Act, and the devolution statutes
have increasingly constitutionalized these written and unwritten
sources of law to form a "quasi-written" constitution.
This
Constitution, an alternative common-law framework comprised of

507.
Magna Carta, 1215, 9 Hen. 3, c. 1 (Eng.); Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c.
2 (Eng.); Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.); Union with Scotland Act,
1706, 6 Ann., c. 11 (Eng.); Act of Union with England Act, 1707 (Scot.); Representation
of the People Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (Eng.).
508.

BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 309, at 14-17.

509.
The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4 (Eng.), declared that
Parliament would thereafter no longer legislate for the Dominions without their
request and consent.
510.
Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 35 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1949, 12,
13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (Eng.); House of Lords Act, 1999, c. 34 (Eng.).
511.
See supra note 1.
512.
Hazell, supra note 379, at 86-87.
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both written and unwritten elements, is supplanting the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty in fact, if not yet in theory.
While the devolution acts have not yet produced significant case
law, the Human Rights Act and European Communities Act provide
good examples of how the judiciary is constitutionalizing these, and
potentially other, texts.
This Section briefly examines some
illustrative U.K. cases dealing with the Human Rights Act and the
European Communities Act. These cases show how courts can
elevate regular statutes to a higher constitutional status, and then
interpret and apply them in various ways effectively to control both
Parliament and the Crown. 5 13 They further illustrate the dynamic
relationship between the judicial and legislative branches in shaping
the Constitution, and suggest that in the future courts may more
boldly claim authority directly to set aside primary legislation.
1. The Human Rights Act 1998
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in October 2000,
incorporating most sections of the European Convention into
domestic U.K. law, subject to any reservations or derogations made
by the United Kingdom. 5 14 Sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act
establish the courts' powers in giving effect to the rights guaranteed
in the European Court of Human Rights. 515 Section 3(1) states that
"[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible
with the Convention rights. ' 516 Courts, as a matter of practice, have

513.
Beatson writes, for example, "the Human Rights Act 1998 envisages the
development of a new form of common law by reference to the text of the European
Convention of Human Rights-a legislative instrument." Beatson, supra note 184, at
251.
514.
Section 1 of the Human Rights Act, supra note 1, incorporates Articles 2 to
12 and 14 of the European Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and Articles
1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the European
Convention. The United Kingdom has so far made one derogation to the European
Convention, declaring a public emergency under Article 15(1) in response to the
situation in Northern Ireland. It also made a reservation to sentence 2, Article 2 of the
First Protocol respecting the right of parents to ensure education and teaching in
conformity with their own religions and philosophical conventions. In incorporating
the European Convention, the Human Rights Act omits Article 13, which states that
anyone whose rights and freedoms under the Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation was
committed by persons acting in an official capacity. This Article might likely violate
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by allowing private persons to seek damages
in the courts against public authorities for their acts clearly permitted by Parliament,
or perhaps even against Parliament itself.
515.
Section 2 of the Human Rights Act directs courts to "take into account" the
decisions and opinions of the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission, and
the Committee of Ministers. Human Rights Act, supranote 1, § 2.
516.
Id. § 3(1)
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generally applied this rule of interpretation some time before the
passage of the Human Rights Act, just as they have with common-law
rules. 5 17 The significance of this Section is that Parliament now
requires this interpretive approach and encourages the courts to push
their interpretation of legislation to a farther degree in seeking
compliance with the European Convention than they otherwise might
have under a judicial canon of construction. 518 Section 3(1) is thus an
interpretive clause incorporating European rights jurisprudence into
domestic U.K. law. Section 3(2) makes it clear, however, that
whenever courts have no choice but to find an act of Parliament
incompatible with European Convention rights, the will of
Parliament prevails and the contested statute remains valid. 519 This
Section prevents courts from claiming under the Act a power to strike
down primary legislation. Although § 4 re-emphasizes that courts
may not invalidate an act of Parliament, it does authorize them to
issue a declaration of incompatibility with the European
Convention.5 20 To remedy such a declaration, § 10 allows for a
Minister or the Queen in Council to order amendments to the
legislation removing the defect. 5 21 Although incompatible legislation
remains in effect, this fast track amending procedure allows the
government to take expeditious remedial measures and will likely put
it under considerable political pressure to take action. Section 19 also
gives a pre-enactment role to Crown ministers to ensure a statute's
compliance with the European Convention.5 22 This Section requires
the responsible minister, before the second reading of a bill, to make a
statement that it either is or is not compatible with the European
Convention.5 23 If the minister cannot declare the bill compatible, he
or she may nevertheless urge Parliament to pass the legislation
52 4
because Parliament retains full authority to do so.
The Human Rights Act recognizes a dual role for the courts when
adjudicating issues of fundamental human rights. First, courts must
endeavor to reconcile primary legislation with the European
Convention through the interpretive process, but if unable to do so,

517.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 13-15, 250-53; see MCILWAIN, supra

note 185, at 259-61 (noting that the judiciary's attempts to interpret statutes compatibly
with the common law trace back to Coke's time).
Human Rights Act, supra note 1, § 3(1).
518.
Id. § 3(2).
519.
Id. § 4(6)(b) (stipulating that a statement of incompatibility also has no
520.
effect on the parties to the proceedings).
521.
Id. § 10 (addressing a similar declaration by the European Court of Human
Rights).
522.
Id. § 19.
523.
Id.
524.

Id.
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they can openly declare it incompatible. 525 As for the interpretive
approach, courts already have been doing this for some time with
regard to parliamentary acts.5 26 This interpretive function continues
under the Human Rights Act, but courts now have statutory
authority to go beyond the formalistic search for parliamentary intent
and instead read primary legislation more consistently with the selfstanding principles in the European Convention. 527 Lord Hope, in his
opinion in R. v. Lambert, explained how the European Communities
528
Act had affected U.K. law,
As to the techniques that may be used, it is clear that the courts are not
bound by previous authority as to what the statute means. It has been
suggested that a strained or non-literal construction may be adopted,
that words may be read in by way of addition to those used by the
legislator and that the words may be "read down" to give them a
narrower construction that their ordinary meaning would be bear.
[citation omitted] It may be enough to say what the effect of the
provision is without altering the ordinary meaning of the words used.
[citation omitted] In other cases . . . the words will require to be
expressed in different language in order to explain how they are to be
read in a way that is compatible. The exercise in these cases is one of
translation into compatible language from language that is
incompatible. In other cases . . . it may be necessary for words to be
read in to explain the meaning that must be given to the provision if it
is to be compatible. But the interpretation of a statute by reading
words in to give effect the presumed intention must always be
distinguished carefully from amendment. Amendment is a legislative
529
act. It is an exercise which must be reserved to Parliament.

This passage makes three points about the Human Rights Act that
could apply with equal force to any other constitutionally-significant
statute. First, courts must interpret primary legislation according to
broad principles.
This method of adjudication departs from
traditional formalism, as courts are expounding a constitutional
jurisprudence rather than only looking to apply the will of
Parliament. This means that courts will continue substantively to
evaluate the meaning of statutory language in a way that is

525.
Id. §§ 3-4.
526.
Recognition of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, however, meant
that executive actions lawfully taken pursuant to clearly offending statutes remained
intra vires. See for example the opinion of Gibson L.J. in R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department,ex parte Brind, 1 A.C. 696, 726-27 (H.L. 1991).
527.
See Re K., 2 All E.R. 719, para. 41 (C.A. 2001).
528.
R. v. Lambert, 3 All E.R. 577 (H.L. 2001).
529.
Id. para. 81. Indeed, in the same case, all but one of the judges applied
such broad interpretive powers. At issue was the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, c. 38,
§ 28(2), (3) (U.K.). This act made possession of a controlled substance a criminal
offense unless the accused proved that he did not know the substance in his possession
was controlled. Appellant claimed that this burden of proof on him at trial violated the
presumption of innocence mandated by the European Convention.
European
Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(2). Lord Hope therefore read the word "prove" as used
in the act to mean "give sufficient evidence." Id. para. 94.
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compatible with those principles.5 30 Second, in interpreting statutes
in this manner, courts can be creative and bold. As Lord Hope put it,
courts can "read in" or "read down" necessary language that is
already there in order to tailor the statute's meaning to the European
Convention.5 31
Both interpretive measures can easily apply by
extension to any other constitutional principles, written or otherwise.
Lord Hope's third suggestion is that, although courts may go far
53 2
in their interpretive endeavors, they cannot "amend" the statute.
Instead, courts can only make a declaration of incompatibility and
must apply the will of Parliament.5 3 3 It is unclear how far courts will
be willing to go before finding the line between mandated
interpretation and impermissible amendment.5 3 4 It is also uncertain
just how clearly Parliament must state its intent to violate the
European Convention, as courts may come to require something akin
to the "notwithstanding" declaration in Canadian law. Lord Hoffman
made it clear in ex parte Simms that the override of fundamental
rights requires "express language or necessary implication. '53 5
Actual deference to parliamentary sovereignty might, therefore,
become very constrained and result in a more even balance between
legislative power and judicial enforcement of rights or other
constitutional principles. As Lord Hoffman recognized, political
pressures on Parliament along with its need to use express language
means that "the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging
the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality
little different from those which exist in countries where the power of
'53 6
the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.
It is true that the provisions of the Human Rights Act very
clearly allow a court in such instances of clear incompatibility to issue
only a legally non-binding declaration of such. 53 7 Lord Steyn wrote in
ex parte Kebeline that "[i]t is crystal clear that the carefully and
subtly drafted 1998 [Human Rights] Act preserves the principle of

530.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 256, at 267.
531.
Lambert, 3 All E.R. 577, para. 81.
532.
Id.
533.
Id. para. 80.
534.
Sir Andrew Morritt postulates that the court can seek "some interpretation
of the words used which is legally possible. The court is required to go as far as, but
not beyond, what is legally possible." Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. (No. 2), 3 All
E.R. 229, para. 42 (C.A. 2001). Still, the attempt to find a compatible reading of a
statute can likely lead to "instances where this has involved straining the meaning of
statutory language." R. v. London North and East Region Mental Health Review
Tribunal, 3 W.L.R. 512, para. 27 (C.A. 2001).
535.
R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Simms & another, 2 A.C.
115, 131 (H.L. 2001).
536.
Id.
537.
Human Rights Act, supra note 1, §§ 3(2), 4.
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parliamentary sovereignty. '5 38 Two reservations make such express
retention of orthodox theory rather attenuated. First, Parliament's
authority to legislate against human rights can be confined to the
Human Rights Act itself.539 Conceivably, judicial review in other
areas, such as European Community law, may limit Parliament's
powers. Canada again provides a pertinent example in regard to
Parliament's ability to legislate notwithstanding the Charter of
Rights, but not in contravention of entrenched principles of
federalism. Parliament's need to "carefully and subtly" draft the
Human Rights Act to prohibit courts from striking down primary
legislation is also evidence of the sovereignty doctrine's growing
weakness, not its continuing strength. 540
Under this view, the
Human Rights Act's "preservation" of parliamentary sovereignty
constitutes an attempted legislative bulwark or protestation against
further erosion of its powers at the expense of the judicial branch.
Therefore, the Human Rights Act's allowing a declaration of
incompatibility may be interpreted as Parliament's limited
recognition of shifting norms in the United Kingdom away from the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in favor of judicial review of
primary legislation. Moreover, the Human Rights Act encourages a
cooperative role between the judiciary and legislature, even if
541
expressly reserving the final say to Parliament.

538.
R. v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline & others, and R. v. Dir. of
Pub. Prosecutions, exparte Rechachi, 4 All E.R. 801, 831 (H.L. 1999).
539.
See generally Human Rights Act, supra note 1.
540.
Parliament's apprehension that, without an explicit reservation of
sovereignty, the judiciary would use Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act to override
an incompatible statute would be reasonable considering the earlier case of Factortame
(No. 2), infra note 542. In that case, discussed below, the House of Lords relied upon
similar clauses of the European Communities Act, supra note 1, §§ 2(1), 2(4), to
disapply an act of Parliament violating Community law. See H.W.R. Wade, W~hat has
Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?, 107 LAW Q. REV. 1, 4 (1991) [hereinafter
Sovereignty of Parliament]; Michael J. Beloff, Towards a Supreme Court? The British
Experience, 33 IRISH JURIST 1, 22-24 (1998).
541.
Lord Hope, for instance, writes,
In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that
there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on
democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person
whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the convention ....
It will
be easier for such an area of judgment to be recognised where the convention
itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is stated in
terms which are unqualified. It will be easier for it to be recognized where the
issues involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the
rights are of high constitutional importance or are of a kind where the courts
are especially well placed to assess the need for protection.
Kebeline, 4 All. E.R. at 844. See also Griffith, supra note 49, at 50, 60; Beatty, supra
note 322 at 134-35.
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2. The European Communities Act 1972 and European Community
Law

R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd.
(No. 2) presents another poignant illustration of how courts limit
Parliament by effectively abrogating primary legislation in violation
of European Community law. 54 2 After acceding to the Treaty 543
of
Rome, Parliament enacted the European Communities Act 1972.
Section 2(1) of this act gave all European Community laws effect
544
within the United Kingdom and declared them legally enforceable.
In addition, § 2(4) mandated that courts construe all secondary
legislation as compatible with it. 545 Within this interpretive context,
the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame Ltd. (No. 1) heard a challenge to a U.K. law instituting
new standards for the registration of ships, including restrictions on
ownership by non-British nationals. 546 Some companies, having
previously registered vessels as British, were unable to satisfy the
new requirements as their majority owners and shareholders were

R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), 1 A.C. 603
542.
(H.L. 1991); P.P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after
Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 221, 221 (1991) [hereinafter After Factortame] (describing
this case as the "culmination" of case-law development concerning the issues of
parliamentary sovereignty and British membership in the European Economic
Community).
543.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 1; European Communities Act, supra note 1.
544.
Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act provides:
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to
time created or arising under the Treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in
accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal
effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law,
and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression
"enforceable Community right" and similar expressions shall be read as
referring to one to which this subsection applies.
European Communities Act, supra note 1, § 2(1).
545.
Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act states:
The provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes, subject to
Schedule 2 to this Act, any such provision (of any such extent) as might be
made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other
than one contained in this part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect
subject to the foregoing provisions of this section.
Id. § 2(4). Section 2(2) grants authority to the executive to make secondary legislation
for the purpose of implementing Community Law. Id. § 2(2). See Joseph Jaconelli,
ConstitutionalReview and Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972, 28 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 65, 67 (1979).
546.
R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 1), 2 A.C. 85
(H.L. 1990); Merchant Shipping Act, 1988, c. 12 (Eng.).

2003]

BRITISH COMMON-LAW CONSTITUTION

Spanish. The complainants argued that the U.K. law in question
violated European Community law, which the U.K. government was
obligated to obey as a signatory of the Treaty of Rome. 547 They
further sought an injunction against the enforcement of the
challenged statute pending a reference to the European Court of
Justice, claiming that they would suffer irreparable harm from the
548
interruption of their business should they succeed on the merits.
The House of Lords decided that interim relief could not be granted
against the Crown, but requested a ruling from the European Court
of Justice on the question of whether the lack of such recourse was
itself a violation of European Community law. 549 The Court of
Justice held that it was a violation. 550 In Factortame (No. 2), the
House of Lords accepted the Court of Justice's ruling and no longer
applied the law in question by enjoining the Crown from enforcing
it.

55 1

The decision in Factortame (No. 2) raised concerns about the
nature of sovereignty in the United Kingdom and the constitutional
role of the judiciary. 552 The House of Lords, by rendering an act of
Parliament inoperative, seemed to suggest that Parliament had
indeed restricted its own sovereignty by the European Communities
Act contrary to orthodox theory preventing such substantive
limitation. 553 In his opinion in the case, Lord Bridge clarified the
constitutional status of European Community law and the judicial
approach to its enforcement. 554 While he asserted that the European
Communities Act impliedly repealed the statutory prohibition of
interim injunctive relief against the Crown with regard to
555
Community law, he ventured further by stating,

Complainants specified the Treaty of Rome, Articles 7, 52, and 221.
547.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 1, arts. 7 (establishment of an internal market), 52 (free
movement of persons), 58 (treatment of companies as persons), and 221 (equal
participation in the capital of companies). For a brief synopsis of the facts underlying
the Factortamecase, see After Factortame, supra note 542, at 244-45.
Under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, domestic courts of Member States
548.
can request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on Community law.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 1, art. 177.

See Factortame(No. 1), 2 A.C. 85.
549.
550.
R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd., 3 C.M.L.R. 867
(1990); After Factortame, supranote 542, at 244-46.
551.
H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution?, 112 LAW Q. REV. 568,
568 (1996) [hereinafter Revolution or Evolution]; LORD NOLAN & SIR STEPHEN SEDLEY,
THE MAKING AND REMAKING OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 4 (1997).

552.
Sovereignty of Parliament,supra note 540, at 3.
553.
Revolution or Evolution, supra note 551, at 568.
554.
R. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), 1 A.C. 603,
658 (H.L. 1991).
555.
The doctrine of implied repeal, based upon the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, holds that acts of Parliament inconsistent with earlier acts prevail. Of
course, courts maintain considerable room in interpreting conflicting statutes and
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If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law
over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the
E.E.C. Treaty [citation omitted] it was certainly well established in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom
joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty
Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act
1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has
always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when
delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to
be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law.
Similarly, when decisions of the Court of Justice have exposed areas of
United Kingdom statute law which failed to implement Council
directives, parliament has always loyally accepted the obligation to
make appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in
any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in
areas to which they apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights
under Community law, national courts must not be prohibited by rules
of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no
556
more than a logical recognition of that supremacy.

Three assumptions about the constitutional status of Community law
lie within Lord Bridge's statement. First, he made it clear that
Parliament joined the European Community voluntarily and was
fully aware of the implications arising from incorporating European
law through the European Communities Act. 557 Second, there was
"nothing in any way novel" in regarding Community law as supreme,
and the authority of courts to override incompatible domestic law was
"always . . . clear" under the Act. 558 Third, Lord Bridge referred to
the fact that, from U.K. accession to the time of the case, Parliament
had consistently obeyed decisions of the European Court of Justice
559
that found domestic law to violate that of the Community.
Therefore, the supremacy of Community Law was not only a judicial
doctrine, but a political one as well. Lord Bridge stopped just short of
attempting to define to what degree Parliament had limited its claim
to sovereignty, but makes it clear that de facto restrictions had
arisen. 5 60 The above passage shows that the Parliament's passage of
the European Communities Act, and its habitual obedience to its own
voluntary obligations, partially caused the judiciary's recognition of
Community Law supremacy and its overriding powers. An additional
fact that Lord Bridge failed to mention was that Parliament had
previously held a referendum in 1975 on continuing the U.K.'s

requiring that Parliament either expressly or impliedly intended a later act to repeal
the former. See After Factortame, supra note 542, at 248.
556.
Factortame(No. 2), 1 A.C. at 658-59.
557.
Id. para. 14-16.
558.
Jaconelli had some time earlier characterized such judicial authority under
the European Communities Act as "constitutionalreview." Jaconelli, supra note 545,
at 65.
559.
Factortame(No. 2), 1 A.C. 603, para. 6.
560.
Id. para. 25.
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Community membership, the results of which were in favor. 56 ' Such
popular approval lends added support to the binding supremacy of
Community law upon Parliament. This larger context indicates that
the higher constitutional position of Community law results, not from
any one legislative or judicial act, but from a pattern of behavior and
understanding about the normative force of Community law in the
United Kingdom.
While Factortame (No. 2) does not necessarily mean that
Parliament has permanently surrendered its sovereignty, it indicates
a constitutional practice analogous to the Canadian Bill of Rights as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Drybones
decision. 562 Under this approach, Parliament remains free to repeal
the European Communities Act, and to withdraw from the
Community. Yet, in the meantime, Parliament has constructed a
legal regime to which it must abide. 563 Factortame (No. 2) thus
stands for the propositions that Community law is (1) paramount
within the United Kingdom, (2) limits Parliament's exercise of
sovereignty, and (3) is legally enforceable against Parliament. 564 This
situation is a political fact as seen over time through the actions of
the judiciary, Parliament and other government actors, and the
electorate. 56 5 It is therefore arguable that the rule of recognition in
the United Kingdom is shifting away from parliamentary sovereignty
in favor of a limited legislature subject to judicial review. The
resulting Constitution is comprised of unwritten common-law
principles, the written provisions of the European Communities Act,

561.
562.
563.

KING, supra note 364, at 55-56.
See R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282; Jaconelli, supra note 545, at 68-69.
As Craig describes it,

A Parliament is perceived as having made a choice, to join the Community in
1972. The implications of this choice have repercussions for later Parliaments,
in the sense that the consequence of membership is, for the reasons given by
Lord Bridge, to afford supremacy to Community law. This 'consequence' can of
course be changed by later Parliaments, either by withdrawing from the
[European Community], or perhaps by expressly stating in a certain context
that national law is departing from Community norms. In the absence of either
of these developments the implications of the legislative choice made in 1972
stand, in much the same way that the provisions of an earlier statute requiring
particular majorities can only be altered by a later statute passed in conformity
with those procedural requisites.
After Factortame, supra note 542, at 252-53. See also Revolution or Evolution, supra
note 551, at 571; Sovereignty of Parliament,supra note 540, at 3.
564.
"Acts of Parliament are now subject to a higher law, and to that extent they
now rank as second-tier legislation." Sovereignty of Parliament,supra note 540, at 3.
565.
The status of Community law now in the United Kingdom contrasts
sharply with more skeptical attitudes upon accession in 1972. See F.A. Trindade,
ParliamentarySovereignty and the Primacy of European Community Law, 35 MOD. L.
REV. 375, 381 (1972); Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanizationof the British Legal
Style, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 352-55 (1994).

956

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

and, through it, the Treaty of Rome.
incorporate other written texts.

[VOL. 36:863

In time, it may similarly

E. Summary
Common-law theory contains embedded within it elements that
support a constitutional model of a limited Parliament subject to
judicial review. The British judiciary already exercises considerable
review over executive action through the ultra vires doctrine-a basis
for a claim of independent common-law derived powers of review that
may extend to cover both primary and secondary legislation. The rule
of law and democratic values can also justify arguments for the
Constitutional change in the United
restraint of Parliament.
Kingdom adopting these ideas would still parallel the common-law
tradition, albeit by following a path thus far considered unorthodox.
This alternative arrangement of the British Constitution fits within
its characteristic of being an unwritten framework. Nevertheless,
although a judicial power of review that controls Parliament can exist
independently of a textual source, these institutional structures can
easily lead to the adoption of constitutional writings.
Not only can the British common-law tradition theoretically
accommodate written constitutional texts, it has already begun to do
The determination of whether written principles have a
so.
constitutional status higher than ordinary law ultimately depends
upon their normative force in ordering the political system, rather
than their particular characteristics or modes of operation.
Constitutions in general, whether written or unwritten, may be
evaluated in terms of whether they are paradigmatic or definitive in
establishing the principles and rules intended to guide the exercise of
government powers, particularly in their reliance upon judicial
review. Furthermore, they may be flexible or rigid in their means of
amendment depending upon the legislature's ability to unilaterally
alter them, or the necessity of following special procedures. These
descriptive values are not themselves absolute or exclusive in how
they reflect actual constitutional practice. Rather, they represent a
sliding scale upon which a constitution may generally lie towards one
or the other end, while still exhibiting mixed characteristics. The
way in which written documents interact with the constitutional
system can vary greatly and maintain normative force as expressions
Thus, a final reliance upon political
of governing principles.
restraints by certain fundamental documents within U.K. law, such
as the Human Rights Act, does not exclude their understanding as
constitutional texts.
Although a constitution must not necessarily provide for direct or
full judicial invalidation of legislation contrary to its provisions, the
recognition of its supremacy is suited to support some form of judicial
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control.
Effective judicial review of some degree supports the
constitution's moral and legal supremacy, itself deriving from the
positivist nature of its authority. Certain documents, whether they
originate as treaties or statutes, may be more than promulgations of
the Crown or sovereign Parliament; those that have normative value
within the community receive the popular sovereign's endorsement as
constitutional principles. The founding of those constitutional texts
upon the will of the sovereign people can be made compatible with the
common law by building upon the ideas of Coke, Blackstone, and
Dicey. The public itself may determine its own good in the form of
constitutional principles, expressed in either unwritten or written
form, binding upon Parliament.5 6 6 In turn, courts can develop and
interpret those principles in common-law fashion. This positivist
approach rejects Austin's notion that all legal rules must proceed
from one sovereign entity issuing commands, such as Parliament.
Instead, the attribution of written or unwritten constitutional norms
to expressions of popular will stems from Hart's rule of recognition.
This positivist foundation for constitutional texts encourages courts
to restrain primary legislation in much the same way that it
currently exercises ultra vires review by acting as a "proxy" for the
popular sovereign. In this sense, it exercises dual sovereignty with
Parliament in giving effect to popular will. The review power can still
function in many forms, such as a full power of statutory invalidation
or reliance upon vigorous interpretive measures.
Furthermore,
Hart's theory permits informal and organic constitutional change
depending upon gradual, but major, shifts in political norms rather
than formal amending procedures.
The process by which certain texts can become entrenched as
constitutional documents, despite originating as ordinary statutes or
treaties, presents a unique approach to constitutional development
that remains true to the common-law tradition. Rather than relying
upon formal and conspicuous amending procedures, U.K. public law
may incorporate paramount written texts through "organic" or
gradual constitutionalization, slowly and cautiously determined
through adjudication.
Therefore, some constitutional principles
originate in "super-statutes" that are the products of interaction
between legislative and judicial processes in elevating written
principles to a status of higher law.
Consequently, evolving

566. If democracy is rightly understood as a scheme of governance for the
common good, rather than a means for the most efficient attainment of
whatever objectives a present majority desires, there is no opposition between
democratic government and the rule of law: each is a necessary and equally
valuable "higher-order" principle whose ultimate goal is a justice that all can
recognise and, in its main lines, endorse.
Response, supra note 118, at 382-83.
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normative assumptions dictate if or when, and to what extent, the
judiciary should incorporate certain texts into the common-law
constitutional framework.
When evaluating constitutional developments in the United
Kingdom, it is clear that written documents, such as Magna Carta
and the Act of Union, have played significant roles in the process.
Recent statutes, particularly the Human Rights Act, the European
Communities Act, and the devolution statutes, have also greatly
impacted the British Constitution and weakened Parliament's
sovereignty. The fundamental role of these texts in guiding both
adjudication and political action suggest that they reflect norms in
the constitutional system. Recent cases on the Human Rights Act
and the decision in Factortame (No. 2) illustrate ways the judiciary
can scrutinize primary legislation based upon those and other written
documents. A review power can effectively limit Parliament through
a variety of means, such as creative interpretation consistent with
broad constitutional principles, declarations of incompatibility
placing political pressures upon government, or by not applying an
offending statute. While limitations upon Parliament may take
different forms, they all depend upon a basic recognition that certain
laws are supreme and suited to some form of effective judicial review.
In applying these laws, the judiciary must realize that it has a
cooperative role with Parliament, which sometimes requires
deference to the legislative process. Courts must also be sensitive to
long-continuing practices of government actors and political attitudes
among the electorate that indicate shifting normative assumptions.
Courts may, therefore, effectively control Parliament according to
both paramount unwritten and written principles that comprise for
the United Kingdom a patchwork, "quasi-written" constitution.

IV. CONCLUSION

The British Constitution is in the process of transformation,
departing from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in favor of a
legislature effectively limited by unwritten and written constitutional
principles enforceable by judicial review. This new framework is
evolutionary in that it represents the resurgence of an older,
alternative common-law theory that maintains continuity with the
British constitutional tradition. The theories of Coke, Blackstone,
and Dicey, despite their contributions to the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, have embedded within them arguments
that support a limited constitution based upon democratic legitimacy.
These same considerations underpin the judiciary's inherent,
common-law authority of ultra vires review of executive actions, and
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opens the possibility that courts may extend their scrutiny to primary
legislation itself based upon unwritten constitutional principles.
Because a constitution may vary greatly in how strictly it
restrains the legislature and allows change in its provisions, its
existence depends upon its normative value in ordering government.
Written constitutional texts have a positivist aspect because they
express underlying, paramount principles. A change in the rule of
recognition may also reject parliamentary supremacy in favor of dual
sovereignty exercised by both the judiciary and legislature. Hence,
judicial review has democratic legitimacy as a means of enforcing the
popular sovereign's will, expressed in written constitutional texts,
against Parliament. Through common-law adjudication, courts may
gradually constitutionalize those statutes and treaties that come to
reflect shifting or emerging normative assumptions within the
political community. Furthermore, constitutional development is a
cooperative and interactive process between the courts, Parliament,
The resulting "quasi-written" constitution
and the electorate.
accommodates the co-existence of unwritten and written principles,
varying degrees of their entrenchment, and judicial enforcement that
might range from creative interpretation to the outright invalidation
of primary legislation.
Constitutional transformation is already occurring in the United
Kingdom. This is shown by limitations effectively placed upon
parliamentary sovereignty, which results from judicial review under
the Human Rights Act and the European Communities Act. While
profound in its impact upon U.K. constitutional practice, this
alternative constitutional model-rooted in past theories and sensitive
to British political culture-nonetheless maintains continuity with the
However, the following point must be
common-law tradition.
emphasized: discussion of constitutional change in the United
Kingdom should not overly focus upon the issue of parliamentary
sovereignty, which has long been the bogeyman haunting potential
reform.
This Article demonstrates that: (1) constitutions may be made of
a mix of characteristics, and (2) effective limitations upon the
legislature may consequently rely upon complex interaction between
the judicial and legislative branches. U.K. courts may play an
aggressive and significant role in employing various legal
mechanisms in controlling Parliament, without necessitating a
complete and categorical rejection of the parliamentary sovereignty
doctrine. Though it is conceivable that constitutional theory may one
day abolish the doctrine, the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine
might well remain if it were exercised sparingly and carefully in
deference to the judiciary as a dormant reserve power, not unlike the
Royal Assent. In any case, the open recognition and imaginative
accommodation of such possibilities can be the unique and defining
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feature of future British public law while reinvigorating
alternative, but still vibrant, common-law constitutional theory.

an

